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ABSTRACT  
Investments in climate science come with an expectation of social benefit. 
Science policy—decision processes through which individuals and organizations support, 
manage, and evaluate research—plays an important role in determining those outcomes. 
Yet the details of how climate science policy actually works have received very little 
attention amid academic and policy-focused discussions of climate science. This 
dissertation examines climate science policy with particular attention to how it supports 
“public values” that justify research investments.  
It is widely recognized funding for climate science in the US has advanced 
knowledge considerably in recent decades but failed to produce useful information for 
decision makers. In Chapter 2, I use a methodological approach known as Public Value 
Mapping (PVM) to investigate this failure of the science policy system. My results show 
that science funding institutions have been ineffective at guiding climate science toward 
desired outcomes because of problematic, but common assumptions about the links 
between science and societal benefit. 
The remaining chapters look more closely at the implications of these tacit 
assumptions, which are held by individuals, and embedded in the organizations that 
implement climate science policy. Chapter 3 examines the notion that prediction is 
essential to climate science. Wide acceptance of the “prediction imperative” limits the 
scope of climate science policy. Chapter 4 examines the interplay of values and 
assumptions in two recently established organizations in Australia, each supporting 
research on climate change adaptation.   
In Chapter 5 I document a widespread assumption in the climate science 
literature that agreement among multiple models should bolster confidence in their 
results. This can only be correct if the models are independent of one another. Climate 
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scientists have not demonstrated this to be true, nor have they offered a plausible 
framework for doing so.  
This dissertation adds an important dimension to our understanding of how 
climate science knowledge is produced, while offering constructive and practical 
recommendations to science policy decision makers working in government programs 
that fund climate science. Insight from these chapters suggests that an explicit and 
reflexive focus on values in science policy can be helpful to organizations pursuing 
science policy innovation. 
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To my grandfather, Jack. 
He would have loved arguing about these ideas. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Problem Statement: Unpacking Climate Science Policy 
The United States has devoted more than $30 billion to the study of climate and 
related systems since 1990. What kinds of knowledge are we getting from climate 
science? What kinds of knowledge should we be getting? These two questions have 
received growing attention over the past two decades. Two broad and greatly overlapping 
categories of research and writing can be identified within this intellectual space. One 
category, with a basis in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), reveals 
subtle dynamics of knowledge systems within climate science and policy. Scholars in this 
area have examined the ways in which climate scientists internally negotiate best 
practices and frame intellectual and policy problems (e.g. Shackley and Wynne, 1995; 
Shackley et al., 1998; Shackley, 2000; Lahsen, 2005; Parker, 2006). They document the 
implications of evolving problem frames (Miller, 2000; Demeritt, 2001; Miller, 2004b; 
Lovbrand et al., 2009), organizational forms (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994b, a; Miller, 
2001b, a, 2007), and technologies (Zehr, 1994; Litfin, 1998; Edwards, 2001, 2006, 2010) 
for scientific practice. And they probe the complex interactions between climate science 
and the national and international political processes that motivate, draw upon, and are in 
many ways defined by climate science (e.g. van der Sluijs et al., 1998; Shackley et al., 
1999; Pielke, 2000b, a; Demeritt, 2001; Miller, 2001a, 2004a, b; Demeritt, 2006). 
Broadly, these studies show that the results of climate science, not to mention the content 
of debates over what climate science should comprise and how it should function, are 
shaped in important ways by politics and culture (Jasanoff et al., 1998). 
A second broad category is concerned with the practical problem of connecting 
climate science knowledge with potential users (a central justification for government 
support of climate science). Some focus on the limits of evolving knowledge in particular 
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areas, such as predictive modeling (e.g. Rayner, 2000; Dessai et al., 2009a). Others 
examine apparent limits on the use of climate knowledge by particular industries or 
communities (e.g. Pfaff et al., 1999; Broad and Agrawala, 2000; Lach et al., 2005a; 
Rayner et al., 2005), and explore strategies and institutional forms that may aid in 
overcoming such limitations (e.g. Agrawala et al., 2001; Cash and Buizer, 2005; SPARC, 
2005; Nelson et al., 2008; Buizer et al., 2010). Related to this problem are studies that 
examine the kinds of climate science knowledge likely to be useful for those coping with 
the consequences of climate change (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2006; Meinke et 
al., 2006; Adger et al., 2009; Dessai et al., 2009a; Buizer et al., 2010). This work 
explicitly recognizes and responds to a crucial fact: climate science is not inherently 
useful. Blindly pushing forward the limits of human understanding is not the most 
effective way to invest money in climate science. To generate useful information from 
climate science, we must make informed choices about what to study and how to study it. 
In other words, we don’t just need high quality climate science knowledge; we also need 
effective climate science policy. 
 To date, most studies of climate science knowledge, including those described 
above, have paid little attention to science policy. Science policy is the set of processes 
through which organizations and individuals manage scientific research, and make 
choices about what to study and how to study it. It involves allocating fiscal and 
intellectual resources, evaluating success, setting priorities, and strategic planning. It thus 
plays an important role in structuring the scientific enterprise, and in determining the 
outcomes of research. Our neglect of science policy in science- and technology-focused 
research limits our ability to implement change within this system, and to improve the 
ways in which public money for research gets invested. 
To be clear, the academic literature does not ignore science policy entirely, and 
there a few important examples that address it directly. For example, Pielke (1995a, 
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2000a, b) describes in depth the legislative and administrative history of climate science 
in the US, documenting the ways in which high-level agendas for climate science are set 
through the political actions of scientists, funding agencies, and politicians. The account 
explicitly recognizes that individual and institutional actors within government funding 
agencies play an important role in defining climate science and positioning it relative to 
ongoing policy processes and policy goals (see also Demeritt, 2001; Miller, 2004b). 
Another example is the growing literature on boundary organizations which operate 
between and across social worlds, and in some cases help to connect climate scientists 
and potential users of climate science knowledge and tools (e.g. Agrawala et al., 2001; 
Guston, 2001; Miller, 2001a; Meinke and Stone, 2005; McNie, 2007; Buizer et al., 2010; 
Lemos and Rood, 2010). These organizations are important science policy actors, both in 
their impact on research, and their role in translating and communicating about research 
to user communities. But researchers have yet to examine the ways in which government 
agencies and agency personnel go about implementing climate science policy.  
There is a third category of activity dealing with the questions of what we are 
getting and what we should be getting from climate science, which might be expected to 
address agency-level climate science policy directly and in greater detail. This is the array 
of gray literature and official reports from government entities (e.g. CCSP, 2003; GAO, 
2005; CCSP, 2008d), consultants, and advisory bodies such as the National Academies of 
Science (e.g. NRC, 1990, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2009b, a), that inform, explain, and evaluate 
government programs related to climate science. Yet such reports tend to make 
recommendations about shifting and augmenting research portfolios without offering an 
account of how climate science policy currently works, and how it could work 
differently.  
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A short example demonstrates this. A recent review of US climate science 
programs by the National Research Council purporting to address structural issues in 
climate science funding states (NRC, 2009b, p. 9):  
The traditional approach of organizing climate change research by scientific 
disciplines (e.g., atmospheric chemistry) or biophysical processes (e.g., carbon 
cycle) has led to significant advances in our understanding of the climate system 
and the creation of a robust observations and modeling infrastructure. However, 
the paucity of social science research and the separation of natural and social 
science research within the CCSP, as well as the insufficient engagement of 
policy makers, resource managers, and other stakeholders in the program are 
hindering our ability to address the problems that face society. Solving these 
problems requires research on the end-to-end climate change problem, from 
understanding causes and processes to supporting actions needed to cope with the 
impending societal problems of climate change. 
This clearly identifies two general science policy problems: doing different research; and 
doing research differently. Not only are there gaps in knowledge that need to be filled, 
but new approaches to generating and delivering knowledge are also needed. However, 
the NRC report has very little so say about how science policy processes would need to 
change in order to fill the gaps and support those new approaches. And it completely 
ignores the fact that these recommendations, made in 2009, echo a litany of similar 
recommendations appearing in previous NRC reports on climate science with apparently 
little impact (c.f. NRC, 1990, 1992, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2009b). Why has this advice 
failed to take hold? And why should this latest iteration of that advice be any different 
from previous exhortations? 
 A quotation from someone working in a federal agency that funds climate 
science (which will appear again in Chapter 4) provides one response to this question: 
On one hand you're told by Congress, OMB, even Department leadership, “we 
have to see results. You've got to put your money where your mouth is.” And yet, 
the moment you direct a penny away from basic fundamental science in a science 
agency like this, everybody—EVERYBODY—stands up and claims that you're 
taking money away from science! The assumption is always that applications 
will grow with new money, never at the expense of science. Well, that's not 
reality. If we get new money, there'll be the expectation that all of it will go to 
basic fundamental research, not applications. 
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The statement exemplifies aptly the kinds of dynamics that have typically been ignored 
by the NRC, the literature on climate science and policy, and by general climate science 
policy discourse, even as many observers advocate for change to occur within this very 
context.  
 Climate science is funded based on a promise that it will help policy makers and 
others to cope with and respond to the consequences of climate change. Critics insist that 
climate science is failing to deliver on this promise, and needs to change. I argue that in 
order to create change in the way climate science works, we must understand and engage 
with the science policy system that underlies climate science, and this requires 
investigations and analysis that have not been done previously. The work presented in the 
following chapters takes a first step in this direction, offering a critical look at the 
structure and function of climate science policy. In addition to generating new insights 
about climate science policy, I also aim to directly inform that community with useful 
recommendations, while refining and operationalizing new approaches to science policy 
analysis. 
My analysis in these chapters leads to many specific and general 
recommendations for science policy decision makers, climate scientists, and science 
policy scholars. But I have not approached this research with a pre-conceived notion of 
how climate science must change. Instead, my goal has been to observe, describe, and 
interpret the interplay of values, ideas, decision making, and organizational structure in 
this important but seldom considered arena. The organizations managing climate science 
constitute a venue for debate and deliberation, where decisions have consequences for the 
ways in which governments facilitate and oversee scientific research. These institutional 
and human actors have a significant role in determining what kinds of climate science 
knowledge we are getting. They have a voice in discussions about what kinds of climate 
science knowledge we should be getting. And any attempts to change the way climate 
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science works will have to confront the detailed social, organizational, and political 
realities of climate science policy. 
2. A New Approach to Research Evaluation 
Former Science Advisor to President Bush John Marburger is known for his 
speeches appealing to “the nascent field of the social science of science policy” to “grow 
up, and quickly, to provide a basis for understanding the enormously complex dynamic of 
today's global, technology-based society” (see Marburger, 2005). His exhortation points 
out that science policy is, or at least should be, more than just political struggles over the 
size of research budgets (see also Sarewitz, 2007). It is also in large part a problem of 
choice among many different kinds of scientific activity, given limited funds (e.g. 
Toulmin, 1964; Kitcher, 2003). Although recent decades have seen a trend toward greater 
accountability of publicly funded research programs (e.g. Luukkonen-Gronow, 1987; 
Cozzens, 1999; Gibbons, 1999; Guston, 2000b; Lyall et al., 2004), the suite of tools 
available for evaluating science policy remains narrowly focused on discrete outputs such 
as publications and patents, or on measures such as efficiency  (Luukkonen-Gronow, 
1987; Bozeman and Sarewitz, in review). Such measures may have some analytical 
utility, but they do not relate meaningfully to the promised social benefits that usually 
serve as justification for public investments in science.  
Beyond informing specific debates about climate science policy, this dissertation 
also aims to address this key shortcoming of research evaluation. Specifically, two of the 
chapters herein contribute to the development of a framework for assessing the structure 
and performance of scientific research against desired social outcomes. Public Value 
Mapping (PVM) is an approach to policy analysis with particular utility for examining 
policies and programs dealing with science and technology, developed partly as a direct 
response to dominant paradigms in research evaluation related to market values 
(Bozeman, 2003, 2007). The central normative argument of PVM is that the economic 
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outcomes of research investments are not indicative of social benefits. It is thus argued 
that assessments of the success or failure of a research policy should be based on criteria 
related to the public values that motivated that investment in the first place (Bozeman and 
Sarewitz, 2005).  
The PVM framework involves three related analyses of a policy or research 
program: mapping, value chain analysis, and public failure assessment. Mapping public 
values is simply a process of documenting and describing public values that have been 
used to justify research investments. Value chain analysis relates identified public values 
to other instrumental or intrinsic values that may be at play in a policy system. Public 
failure assessment examines whether programs are fulfilling, or are likely to fulfill those 
public values identified in the process of mapping. PVM is not overly prescriptive in how 
to implement these three analyses, because it is extremely flexible in terms of the scope 
and unit of analysis. For example, PVM may focus on an academic discipline (e.g. Logar, 
in review), the implementation of a policy through a particular program or set of 
programs (Gaughan, 2002; Maricle, in review; Slade, in review-b), or on a the processes 
and motivations leading to policy formulation (e.g. Valdivia, in review). It may be 
retrospective, prospective, or even incorporated into an ongoing process of assessment as 
a program proceeds.  
My own approach to implementing PVM is elaborated in Chapters 2 and 4. The 
key point to be made about my use of PVM as a research framework is that it provides a 
means of investigating and revealing the values and values frameworks at play in a given 
policy arena, and for assessing policy implementation based on this analysis. These 
normally-tacit elements of a policy problem can lead to important and potentially useful 
conclusions that encourage deliberation and expand the range of options for consideration 
by science policy decision makers. 
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PVM is similar to policy analysis in some ways. For example, the policy sciences 
explicitly focus on values and their interrelationships, and on the power of ideas in a 
given policy space (Lasswell, 1971; Clark, 2002). The Ways of Knowing Framework 
(Feldman et al., 2006; Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Lejano and Ingram, 2009), which I 
use in Chapter 3, also takes the role of ideas and shared understandings of policy 
problems as central components of analysis.1 What sets PVM apart is its normative focus 
on improving research evaluation: it provides a vocabulary that highlights both the 
shortcomings of other frameworks for assessing research policy, and the reality that 
traditional measures of research output do not say much about public values. The hope is 
that this vocabulary will be useful both in the research community and to science policy 
organizations.2 
The other frameworks used in this volume (summarized in Table 1.1) also have 
potential to inform science policy. Cases using the Ways of Knowing (WK) framework 
(Feldman et al., 2006; Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Lejano and Ingram, 2009; Neff, 
2009; Schneider, 2009) take manifold understandings of a policy problem as the 
analytical focus of policy research. They identify opportunities for “inclusive 
management,” in which actors—particularly public managers—within the system may 
bring together different perspectives in new ways. This work examines both structure and 
process of policy implementation. 
The Robustness framework (Levins, 1966) originates in a philosophical debate 
and is herein applied as a theoretical contribution to climate science. However, this too 
                                                       
1 This is in contrast to other well-known policy analysis models, such as Kingdon’s 
(1984) agenda setting model, which downplay or altogether ignore the complicated role 
of scientific knowledge in the policy process. See Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) for more 
on this. 
2 I discuss some early evidence of the appeal of this framework to science policy decision 
makers in Chapter 6.  
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has implications for science policy, particularly in debates about what kinds of advances 
in knowledge or reductions of uncertainty are possible and desirable (e.g. Mearns, 2010; 
Meyer, in review). 
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Table 1.1. 
Frameworks used in this dissertation. 
Framework Acronym Brief Description and References 
Relevant 
Chapters 
Public Value Mapping PVM Uses the broadly accepted values that form a basis for 
governance as criteria for assessing policy 
implementation and outcomes. Makes a distinction 
between public values other values frameworks (such 
as market value, or science values), and makes 
interplay of multiple values explicit. (Bozeman, 2003; 
Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2005; Bozeman, 2007; 
Bozeman and Sarewitz, in review) 
2, 4 
Ways of Knowing WK Borrowing from Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1987), 
takes shared understandings of policy problems as an 
analytical focus. A manager’s way of knowing (WK) 
an issue has consequences for the ways in which she 
manages. Broadly accepted WKs have influence over 
policy implementation and outcomes. (Feldman et al., 
2006; Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Lejano and Ingram, 
2009) 
3 
Robustness [none] Argues that for agreement among multiple simulation 
models to inspire confidence, they must be independent 
from one another. This has implications for the 
building, evaluation, and funding of climate models. 
(Levins, 1966) 
5 
 
3. Conceptual Approach: Tracing myths, values, and ways of knowing 
There is a long tradition of science policy scholarship that describes and traces 
the consequences of myths about advancing knowledge. For example, Jasanoff (1990) 
examined the complex roles of technical experts—the “fifth branch”—in regulatory 
processes. To do this she applied a wide range of scholarship about “the admixture of 
science and values in regulatory proceedings and about the contingent and negotiated 
character of scientific knowledge” (p.2) to a part of the democratic system that had 
previously received very little attention from researchers, despite its importance. Jasanoff 
framed this work as a process of moving from specific to general. She notes that her work 
“provides an avenue for exploring some of the enduring conflicts between democratic 
and technocratic values in this country’s public and political life” (Jasanoff, 1990, p.2). 
Despite general revelations that emerge from such a focused study, equally important 
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results (and perhaps more practical from the standpoint of informing policy practice) 
come from revealing the functional implications of long-recognized tensions and tacit 
assumptions within a particular organizational or operational context. In other words, it is 
also useful to move from general to specific. By examining broad, somewhat abstract 
ideas about science and politics within a specific policy space we can develop relevant 
knowledge and practical approaches to improving science policy. 
Similar to Jasanoff’s approach, this research uses general and climate-specific 
scholarship from STS and other knowledge-focused fields to examine science funding 
agencies and the people who work for them. My emphasis remains largely on the specific 
contextualized results one can glean from such an investigation: the potential to learn 
things about how science policy works, which can then inform and improve practice in 
that same context. 
Throughout this dissertation I am concerned with bringing to light and examining 
the unspoken or tacitly assumed parts of a policy problem that relate somehow to 
advancing knowledge. “Myth,” as used in the policy sciences to indicate “relatively 
stable and coherent patterns of perspective” (Lasswell, 1971, p. 25), is a generally 
inclusive term for these elements. According to Clark (2002, p. 23) “myth is both the 
cause of and an essential element in any solution to environmental problems.” The goal 
of this work is not to permanently eradicate problematic or “incorrect” myths. Rather, it 
seeks to make explicit the variety and consequences of myth embedded in climate science 
policy.  
Some of the myths acting on and constituted in science policy processes are very 
general understandings of the world along the lines of Schwarz and Thompson’s typology 
of conflicting “rationalities,” each of which, “when acted upon, both sustains and justifies 
the particular organizational form that goes along with it” (1990, p. 8). Weinberg’s 
(1970) “axiology of science” and Sarewitz’s (1996) five “policy myths” about science 
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and technology are additional examples of such broadly held, seldom questioned, and 
deeply consequential assumptions. 
Other myths, such as the “ways of knowing” discussed in chapter 3, and the 
“science values” described in chapters 2 and 4, relate specifically to particular policy 
problems. Whether issue-specific or quite general, the myths of knowledge advance 
described in these chapters may be expressed by individuals, embodied in the structure of 
an organization, or implicit in the terms of a policy or decision making process. 
4. Methods 
 The three chapters following this one consist of interpretive case studies (“small-
n analyses”), focused inductively on the US Climate Change Science Program and 
climate change adaptation research policy in Australia. When interested in the detailed 
inner workings of a unique and complex system, this approach is ideal. It allowed me to 
spend large amounts of time conducting semi-structured interviews and participant 
observations, mapping a range of previously unknown perspectives and dynamics. A 
large-n statistical analysis would not serve these purposes, as it would necessarily trim 
away the very details of interest. In such cases, identifying important variables, system 
components, and dynamics is part of the research process itself. It makes little sense to 
develop hypotheses in advance, when these key elements of the system are as yet 
unknown.  
Case study research generally implies “the intensive study of a single case where 
the purpose of that study is—at least in part—to shed light on a larger class of cases (a 
population)” (Gerring, 2007, p. 20). The impetus for the research, however, was a gap in 
understanding related to a very specific policy domain, and so the concept of a larger 
population is not of central importance. Calls for change in climate science are generally 
devoid of any detailed account of what such change would look like in terms of science 
policy. What would managers and agencies have to do differently? What is preventing 
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them from changing? In other words, the core pragmatic goal of this work has been to 
describe a part of the climate science landscape so as to aid in problem solving within 
that specific context.  
 However, these investigations also stem from a desire to provide broader insights 
(i.e. outside the context of climate science policy) which help in thinking through the 
general problem of managing science for desired outcomes. They contribute to the 
development of theories and frameworks (such as PVM) with broad applicability in 
science policy. In that sense, this research contributes “building block case studies,” 
which “identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose,” and 
which may be “parts of larger contingent generalizations and typological theories” 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 76). 
5. Structure of This Dissertation 
 As opposed to the traditional book-style structure, this dissertation presents four 
stand-alone articles, each intended to be submitted to an academic journal for publication. 
Chapter 5 has already been published in Environmental Science and Policy, and Chapter 
2 is in the final stages of review with Minerva. It bears emphasizing that this structure has 
limited my ability to highlight in an explicit fashion, the synergy among these separate 
pieces. Additionally, some repetition of theory, substance, and results was necessary in 
order to make each chapter hold together on its own. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 are focused on climate science policy in the US. Both draw 
extensively on interviews with science policy decision makers, participant observation, 
and analysis of documents associated with the interagency program that coordinates 
climate science across thirteen federal agencies. Chapter 2 applies the PVM framework to 
this program as a whole, and develops the concept of “science values”—ideas about the 
ways in which knowledge advance relates to positive outcomes for society. I conclude 
that the logic and structure used by the Program to link science to societal benefit are 
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generally incomplete, incoherent, and tend to conflate intrinsic and instrumental values. I 
argue that to be successful with respect to its motivating public values, the US climate 
science enterprise must avoid the assumption that any advance in knowledge is inherently 
good, and offer a clearer account of the kinds of research and knowledge advance likely 
to generate desirable social outcomes. 
 A key element of my approach in Chapter 2 is the use of a widely recognized 
public values failure—the performance of interagency climate science—as a starting 
point for a focused analysis using PVM. In other words, the aim of this case was not to 
demonstrate public values failure, but to use PVM to unpack it. Analysis of the interplay 
of values within an organizational structure in this case reveals insights about the causes 
of public values failures in US climate science, and leads to recommendations that 
actually take into account the organizational and political realities facing science policy 
decision makers in that context. In developing and applying the concept of “science 
values,” Chapter 2 also builds a new element into the PVM framework, and sets up the 
application of PVM to adaptation research policy in Chapter 4. 
 Chapter 3 looks closely at the significant role of prediction in climate science 
policy, primarily in the US, though also drawing on some broader examples. In this piece 
I describe the “prediction imperative” as a “way of knowing” climate science policy with 
important and limiting consequences for climate science management. The prediction 
imperative gains power through the many different actors who use it as a basis for their 
activities related to climate science. I argue in that public managers of climate science 
have opportunities and the responsibility to resist the prediction imperative in service of 
the public good. 
 Chapter 4 returns to the PVM framework, this time focusing on two recently 
established national-level organizations that fund climate change adaptation research in 
Australia: the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, and CSIRO’s 
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Climate Adaptation Flagship. Unlike Chapter 2, this case study does not take a 
recognized public values failure as a starting point. Instead, PVM serves as a tool for 
examining the ways in which two separate organizations are currently negotiating and 
defining science values and public values in a relatively new policy space around 
adaptation research. A key element of this investigation is the wide array of “value 
chains” expressed by researchers and science policy decision makers. These chains are 
different ideas about the extent to which different kinds of scientific practice (e.g. user-
framed research, predictive modeling, or present-day/historical studies) are likely to 
support desired public values such as useful information for decision makers. I conclude 
that such debates over value chains suggest an agenda for targeted, portfolio-specific 
science policy research. Furthermore, I argue that value chains need to play a more 
prominent role in high-level science policy discourse, so that they may impact the 
formation and implementation of adaptation research policy. 
 Chapter 5, co-authored with Zachary Pirtle and Andrew Hamilton, is a theoretical 
contribution to debates over how to interpret predictions of complex climate models with 
implications for the management of climate science. We demonstrate that the climate 
science literature frequently makes use of the assumption that agreement among multiple 
models should increase confidence that their results are correct. However, this 
assumption only holds if the models being compared are independent from one another. 
We argue that understanding agreement and independence among multiple models is one 
area in which conceptual clarity is crucial, and more work is needed. 
Chapter 6 offers a concluding discussion, and points to future opportunities for 
research on, and engagement with, climate science policy. 
Chapter 2 
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PUBLIC VALUES FAILURES OF CLIMATE SCIENCE IN THE US 
Foreword 
 This chapter was submitted to Minerva as part of a special issue on the Public 
Values Mapping framework, and is currently undergoing a second round of reviews after 
minor revisions. In some instances I make reference the other cases in that special issue 
as a group, but when I refer to a specific point made in a specific case, I have changed the 
reference to “in review” or “in press,” depending on the status of that particular paper.  
 An earlier version of this paper included a longer and more detailed description 
of interagency climate science. I have excerpted that description and included it in 
Appendix C. I also expand on the brief concluding recommendations in Section 2.2 of 
Chapter 6. 
Abstract 
This paper examines the broad social purpose of US climate science, which has 
benefitted from a public investment of more than $30 billion over the last 20 years. A 
public values analysis yields five core public values that underpin the interagency 
program. Drawing from interviews, meeting observations, and document analysis, I 
examine the decision processes and institutional structures that lead to the 
implementation of climate science policy, and examine public values failures 
accommodated by this system. In contrast to other cases which find market values 
frameworks (the “profit as progress” assumption) at the root of public values failures, this 
case shows how “science values” (“knowledge as progress”) may serve as an inadequate 
or inappropriate basis for achieving broader public values. For both institutions and 
individual decision makers, the logic linking science to societal benefit is generally 
incomplete, incoherent, and tends to conflate intrinsic and instrumental values. I argue 
that to be successful with respect to its motivating public values, the US climate science 
enterprise must avoid the assumption that any advance in knowledge is inherently good, 
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and offer a clearer account of the kinds of research and knowledge advance likely to 
generate desirable social outcomes. 
1. Introduction 
In the United States a large “global change research” community investigates 
climate change through research on the complex interrelations of natural processes, as 
well the role of humans in impacting and reacting to these forces. Atmospheric scientists, 
hydrologists, ecologists, paleobiologists, oceanographers, agronomists, statisticians, 
epidemiologists, glaciologists, and many others seek resources from US climate science 
funding. They launch hundred million dollar satellites, which orbit the Earth looking back 
at us. They assemble massive numerical models to run on the world’s largest computers. 
They send research vessels throughout the world’s oceans, and construct elaborate 
facilities to run experiments measuring ecological change.  
Climate science3 engages a wide range of disciplines and institutions: thirteen 
federal agencies fund work in this area. But this structural complexity exists under a 
single mission, vision, and framework set out in law by the Global Change Research Act 
of 1990 (PL101-606, 1990), and maintained through an interagency coordination process. 
Since that time, more than $30 billion has gone to global change research. 
A recent National Research Council (NRC) evaluation of US climate science 
found that, while the Program has significantly advanced understanding of climate 
change, “progress in synthesizing research results or supporting decision making and risk 
management has been inadequate” (NRC, 2007, p.3). This observation highlights an 
important fact: the Global Change Research Act (GCRA), like most science policies, has 
                                                       
3As is common in many policy documents related to federal climate research, I use 
“climate science” and “global change research” interchangeably. 
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a broader purpose—it constructs an aspirational link between science and some form of 
social progress.  
The GCRA stipulates funding for research in order to “produce information 
readily usable by policymakers.” Nearly two decades later, the NRC finds that the great 
volume of knowledge resulting from global change research has failed to fulfill this 
mandate. In fact, from the very beginning, outside evaluators have highlighted the failure 
of the interagency program to make significant progress on this task (Byerly Jr, 1989; 
Pielke, 2000a; NRC, 2005, 2007). In this paper, I use the Public Value Mapping 
framework (Bozeman and Sarewitz, in review), to investigate the link between climate 
science and the broader social purpose of climate science policies to show how this has 
happened.  
I assess the fulfillment of public values by examining policies, institutions, and 
the mental models of individual decision makers associated with US climate science. As 
individuals and institutions coordinate, manage, and make specific choices about how to 
spend money on climate science, what drives their decisions? Do the incentives 
embedded in the system uphold the public values that motivate funding for climate 
science in the first place? Although the importance of such questions was highlighted in 
this very journal (Minerva) by Stephen Toulmin in 1964 (see also Kitcher, 2003; 
Bozeman and Sarewitz, in review), to this day they seldom receive adequate attention as 
the nation’s R&D system expands. 
I begin by briefly outlining the Public Value Mapping framework.4 I then 
identify and describe the key public values that emerge from program documents, 
external documents such as National Research Council (NRC) reports, and interviews I 
                                                       
4 See Bozeman and Sarewitz (in review) for a more detailed account of Public Value 
Mapping in science policy. 
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conducted with more than 50 program officials who work for science agencies and 
participate in interagency climate science activities. A juxtaposition of these values with 
the dynamics of decision making and management within the climate science program 
provides the basis for a public values failure assessment, helping to explain why the 
Program has not delivered promised benefits despite advancing knowledge through high 
quality science. This assessment reveals widespread and ill-founded assumptions about 
the connections between knowledge advancement and difficult social problems like 
climate change, and provides important insight, both for climate science, and for science 
policy in general. 
2. Public Values Analysis 
Bozeman (2007, p.13) defines the public values of a society as: 
those providing a normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and 
prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the 
obligations of citizens to society, the state and one another; and (c) the principles 
on which governments and policies should be based. 
Public values do not prescribe specific policy action. Acceptance or use of particular 
public values such as air quality, public health, or human dignity (in other words, 
agreement that these are good, desirable things), by no means precludes deep conflict 
over the way in which they might be achieved, or over their importance relative to one 
another. Furthermore, the term “normative consensus” is not meant to imply universal 
agreement. Public values may simply be asserted as justification of a policy or program, 
or in other cases even posited by the researcher conducting a PVM analysis (Bozeman, 
2007). The key feature of public values is that they serve as a basis for collective action. 
Public values failures occur when “neither the market nor the public sector provides 
goods and services required to achieve public values” (Bozeman 2007, p.16). 
Public values analyses are motivated by the conclusion that the economic 
outcome of a policy (e.g. profit, efficiency, growth of industry, GDP) is not necessarily 
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an appropriate indicator of whether that policy is successful. For example, if a clean 
energy policy gives a substantial financial boost to corn farmers selling their crops for 
biofuel, we may reserve judgment as to whether the policy has succeeded in reducing 
emissions of pollutants as originally intended. 
One can apply this argument to public investments in science as well. Bozeman 
and Sarewitz (2005) argue against the common assumption that market success (or 
failure) correlates directly with public values success (or failure) when it comes to the 
funding of research and development. Medical research provides a particularly 
compelling example: massive investments by the US government have fueled major 
advances in medicine, around which an enormous industry has grown. Yet health in the 
US remains mediocre in comparison to other developed nations even while its costs 
continue to skyrocket: market success; public failure (Gaughan, 2002; Gawande, 2009; 
Slade, in review-a, b).  
Following this logic, one may view climate science as a market failure (funding 
is provided through the public sector), and, in light of critiques by the NRC and others 
mentioned above, as a public values failure. The grid in Figure 2.1 illustrates this. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. Climate science in the context of public values and market values. 
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Useful information, though important and prominent, is not the only public value 
associated with the climate science enterprise. In the next section I present a list of five 
prominent public values that underpin US climate science, and discuss each of these 
values in the context of individual decision making and institutional structures. The last 
two decades have seen considerable continuity in the general purpose of coordinating 
climate science among agencies, even if the language used to express that purpose and 
the means of achieving it have evolved. So far, under the Obama Administration, the US 
Climate Change Science Program (CCSP, as it was known under the Bush 
Administration) remains largely intact, except that it has reverted to its pre-Bush-
Administration name of “Global Change Research Program.” For the sake of consistency, 
I will use CCSP as a reference to the federal interagency program in general. 
3. Public Values in Interagency Climate Science 
A variety of sources can provide information about public values, including 
public law, a government’s founding documents, the results of surveys and public polls, 
or the missions and visions of public institutions.5 Such sources often articulate 
aspirations that link, through some internal logic, particular activities (such as scientific 
research) to the achievement of positive outcomes for society. Claims of social benefit 
might be utterly political and insincere, advanced merely for personal gain, or 
preservation of the status quo. This should not discourage their use as expressions of 
public value. Sincere or not, if offered as a policy goal, they may justifiably be used in 
evaluating the outcomes of that policy. Revealing divergences in public values and actual 
intent is precisely the point of Public Value Mapping. 
                                                       
5 See Bozeman (2007) and Bozeman and Sarewitz (this issue) for more on this. 
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The list in Table 2.1 focuses on the most commonly expressed principles and 
goals of the program drawn from a variety of official documents.6 It is not hierarchical, 
and there is no clear consensus on how the values relate to one another, or should be 
balanced. As mentioned previously, it is not important that there be universal agreement 
about public values. For the purposes of this case study, I do not consider the extent to 
which the values listed in Table 2.1 are recognized or agreed upon in US society. They 
are taken indicators of the public benefit that the program is meant to achieve, and thus 
an appropriate set of criteria against which to judge its implementation (as opposed to 
market values, or measures of scientific output such as journal articles or patents). 
In discussing each of these values, I reference the concepts of instrumental and 
intrinsic values. Bozeman (2007) describes intrinsic values as representing a desired end 
state, while an instrumental value is adopted as a means to achieving an intrinsic value. 
The distinction between these two types of values is not always clear, and some public 
values may be framed as one or the other. Indeed, as I argue later, in some cases this 
malleability can be at the heart of public value failure.  
 The example statements in Table 2.1 demonstrate the consistency with which 
these values have been expressed in the years since the passage of the GCRA in 1990. 
Below I discuss each public value in more detail, drawing on interviews and official 
documents. 
                                                       
6 As can be seen in the table, the sources for these public values span the entire history of 
the program. The quotations offered here are just examples from a large number of 
instances in which similar expressions of public purpose occur in official documentation 
related to climate science policy. 
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Table 2.1. 
Statements associated with public values underlying  interagency climate science. 
1. Useful Information 
• “interagency climate science should “produce information readily usable by policymakers” (PL101-
606). 
• CCSP vision: A nation and the global community, empowered with the science based knowledge to 
manage the risks and opportunities of change in the climate and related environmental systems (CCSP 
2003, 2008). 
• CCSP mission: Facilitate the creation and application of knowledge of the Earth’s global environment 
through research, observations, decision support, and communication (CCSP 2003, 2008). 
2. High quality science 
• “Development of effective policies to abate, mitigate, and cope with global change will rely on greatly 
improved scientific understanding of global environmental processes and on our ability to distinguish 
human-induced from natural global change” (PL101-606). 
• “[The Strategic Plan] reflects a commitment by its authors to high-quality science, which requires 
openness to review and criticism by the wider scientific community” (CCSP 2003, p.1). 
• “CCSP remains committed to basic, ongoing research to understand climate processes and the forcing 
factors that cause changes in climate and related systems” (CCSP “Revised Science Plan” [2008, p.ii]). 
• “It is therefore essential for society to be equipped with the best possible knowledge of climate 
variability and change so that we may exercise responsible stewardship for the environment, lessen the 
potential for negative climate impacts, and take advantage of opportunities where they exist” (Our 
Changing Planet [OCP 2008]). 
3. Coordination and collaboration 
• “Although significant Federal global change research efforts are underway, an effective Federal 
research program will require efficient interagency coordination, and coordination with the research 
activities of State, private, and international entities” (PL101-606). 
• “CCSP adds value to federal agency efforts in climate change research and related activities by 
providing a structure and coordination mechanism that leverages individual agency efforts through 
increased cooperation, collaboration, and the joint development of research priorities” (CCSP, 2008d, 
p.ii). 
4. Transparency and communication 
• “The purpose of the [interagency] Office shall be to disseminate to foreign governments, businesses, 
and institutions, as well as the citizens of foreign countries, scientific research information available in 
the United States which would be useful in preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the effects of global 
change” (PL101-606). 
• “CCSP has a major responsibility to communicate with interested partners in the United States and 
throughout the world, and to learn from these partners on a continuing basis” (CCSP 2003, p.7). 
• “CCSP undertakes the significant responsibility of enhancing the quality of discussion by stressing 
openness and transparency in its findings and reports” (CCSP 2003, p.7). 
5. Stakeholder participation and support 
• “[The Program] shall consult with actual and potential users of the results of the Program to ensure that 
such results are useful in developing national and international policy responses to global change” 
(PL101-606). 
• “The program will improve approaches for sustained interactions with stakeholders that consider needs 
for information from a “user perspective” (CCSP 2003, p.7). 
• “Programs must respond to needs for scientific information and enhance informed discussion by all 
relevant stakeholders” (CCSP 2003, p.8). 
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3.1 Value 1: Useful Information 
In 1979, Lindblom and Cohen observed that the complexities of the lay 
community are perhaps as great or greater than the complexities associated with 
knowledge production. A variety of more recent studies examining how lay communities 
make use of climate information have borne this out. Such studies highlight the 
importance of the social, physical, institutional, and political context of decision makers, 
and generally refute the common assumption that more information necessarily leads to 
better decision making or increased information use (e.g. Pielke, 1995a; Lach et al., 
2005a; Lach et al., 2005b; Rayner et al., 2005; Lahsen and Nobre, 2007; Logar and 
Conant, 2007; McNie, 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). Scientific programs aimed at 
generating immediately useful knowledge must take this reality into account, and involve 
potential knowledge users throughout the research process (Jacobs et al., 2005; Cash et 
al., 2006; Meinke et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2008). 
To develop useful information is the most obvious, prominent, and challenging 
intrinsic public value of interagency climate science, and it has become a subject of study 
for social scientists focused on climate issues (c.f. Pielke, 2000a, b; Agrawala et al., 
2001; Jacobs et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2006; NRC, 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007; NRC, 
2009a). In thinking about CCSP’s relationship to the challenge of developing useful 
information, one may ask: 1.) what users are targeted and why; 2.) how is useful 
information defined; and 3.) how could one guide or structure a research program to be 
responsive to questions one and two? In the case of the US climate science, the answers 
to these questions are not straightforward. 
3.1.1 Who is Targeted? 
Early discussions and wording of the GCRA (PL101-606, 1990) seem to indicate 
that the Program should generate information useful specifically to decision makers in 
Congress (Pielke, 2000b, a). The CCSP has adopted a much wider view of the potential 
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users who should benefit from the results of climate science. The CCSP Strategic Plan 
and subsequent documentation tend to identify three categories of decisions that the 
Program will inform: Policy Decisions, Adaptive Management Decisions, and decisions 
related to the evolution of the science research agenda (see CCSP 2003, p.112). However, 
the Program does not describe a plan for delivering useful information to these groups. 
3.1.2 What is Useful Information? 
 CCSP’s definition of “useful” is not always clear, but the Program aims to do 
more than produce information that is merely relevant to decision making issues. The 
Strategic Plan (CCSP, 2003, p.2) defines decision support resources as:  
The set of observations, analyses, interdisciplinary research products, 
communication mechanisms, and operational services that provide timely and 
useful information to address questions confronting policymakers, resource 
managers, and other users. 
Consistent with the findings and recommendations of those who have worked in this area 
(e.g.  Jacobs et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2006; Meinke et al., 2006), this definition implies a 
proactive stance, responsive to the needs and limitations of those served by the Program. 
In general, ideas about what it takes to produce useful information in scientific 
research have evolved since the first decade of the Program, when a major focus was the 
reduction of uncertainty. Many have pointed out that most decisions do not (indeed, they 
cannot) rely upon the eradication of uncertainty (Pielke, 1995a); that scientific 
uncertainty can be a political tool used to win additional funds for science, or to delay a 
decision indefinitely (Shackley and Wynne, 1996); and that a great deal of our 
uncertainty about the behavior of the climate and related systems is irreducible (Dessai 
and Hulme, 2004). Reduction of uncertainty offers neither a sensible metric by which to 
judge progress in climate science, nor a reasonable surrogate for the goal of generating 
useful information (NRC, 2005). 
26 
Consistent with this view, very few of those I interviewed saw reduction of 
uncertainty as a crucial goal for climate science. Instead, they described uncertainty as a 
matter of appropriate characterization, communication, and management. Despite this 
evolved notion of uncertainty, predictive capability is almost universally viewed as 
essential to generating useful climate science. As one official said, “how else will you 
know how high to build the sea wall?” Many take it for granted that deterministic 
predictive capability should be the main goal of climate science, because they truly 
believe that this is the kind of information necessary to deal with climate change 
effectively. In other words, these individuals presume a causal connection between a 
particular kind of knowledge advance (improved predictions) and the fulfillment of 
public values.7 
The few program managers and agency officials I interviewed who rejected this 
mainstream view of prediction did so based on practical experience working with 
decision makers in various contexts. They described situations in which deterministic 
predictions were found to be unnecessary in helping communities, resource managers, 
local governments, and others to increase their resilience or better understand their 
options in the face of environmental change. These individuals do not view predictive 
models as totally irrelevant, but neither do they view them as “obligatory passage points” 
(Latour, 1987 cited in Shackley and Wynne 1995) for making climate science useful. 
3.1.3 How is the CCSP Managing Research Agendas to Produce Useful Information? 
Many CCSP documents focus on the need for useful information, but usually 
without any discussion of how specifically the research agenda needs to change in order 
                                                       
7 The questions of where the “prediction imperative” in climate science has come from, 
and why it is so dominant a force in shaping the research agenda, are important and 
interesting, but this discussion is reserved for Chapter 3. Maricle (in review) discusses 
these issues in a case study examining hazards research (earthquake and hurricane 
prediction).  
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to support that goal. Both the CCSP and the NRC, in their analyses and recommendations 
for climate science, tend to ignore the organizational and institutional components of 
science funding (i.e. the question of how to influence the direction of research and the 
composition of research portfolios). Simply identifying the gaps in knowledge or practice 
does not explain how to fill them using existing or new structures to advance desired 
public values. 
One exception to this is the example of social science or “human dimensions” 
research, which is often cited as a crucial but under-represented and under-supported 
area. The example of human dimensions research and its relative presence in the 
interagency program over the last two decades illustrates a general inability or 
unwillingness on the part of the CCSP to exert control over the makeup of the climate 
science portfolio.  
In 1990, the NRC called human dimensions the most critically underfunded 
element of the USGCRP, a sentiment it has repeatedly echoed in the intervening 18 years 
(c.f. NRC, 1990, 1992, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2009b).8 A 1992 report recommended 
that annual funding for this area of research be increased to $40-50 million, an amount 
that would have represented about 4-5% of the overall program at the time. In 2007, the 
NRC (2007, p.4) found that “the level of investment ($25 million to $30 million) remains 
substantially lower than the level of investment in the other research elements, and 
funding is atomized across many agency programs.” This represents about 1.5% of the 
total budget.  
As I discuss later (see section 5) the CCSP does not have a coherent or realistic 
approach to determining a research portfolio that will fulfill its mandate to develop useful 
                                                       
8 It is worth noting that many of these NRC reports were commissioned by the GCRP or 
CCSP for the specific purpose of providing guidance on these issues. 
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information. Yet even in cases where a clear need for change has long been asserted by 
outside evaluators, as in this example of human dimensions research, the CCSP and 
participating agencies have not implemented change in this direction.  
3.2 Value 2: High Quality Science 
The need to maintain a thriving and robust scientific enterprise is emphasized 
throughout CCSP documentation, as well as by individuals involved with the Program.9 
On its face, such an assertion seems both obvious and uncontroversial: it is, after all, a 
science program. But in the context of interagency climate science a focus on maintaining 
high quality science is a political act which sends clear signals about the priorities of the 
Program, and the mental model that informs its behavior.  
 Sometimes high quality science functions as an instrumental value—a necessary 
element in achieving Program’s underpinning goals and public values. For example, the 
CCSP Revised Research Plan (2008d, p.10) states that “substantive progress in CCSP 
Strategic Goals 1 through 3 is a required component of progress in many areas associated 
with Goals 4 and 5...” (see goals in Table 2.3, section 5). This claim reflects a common 
but false assumption (discussed further in section 6) that advances in fundamental 
understanding necessarily precede work on applied problems.  
In other cases (and sometimes in reaction to such criticisms), high quality 
research is expressed as an intrinsic public value. Many believe that maintaining capacity 
in the core areas of research that have contributed to interagency climate science in recent 
decades is an important goal in and of itself. One program manager linked the 
fundamental work her scientists are doing to the idea of a “strong America.” Another 
                                                       
9 The CCSP does not offer a clear definition of “high quality science,” though the 
examples in Table 1 do give some indication of what the term implies. This trope may 
function as a subtle, perhaps unconscious acknowledgement of the highly politicized 
nature of climate change debates, in which authority and expertise are routinely contested 
based on scientific credentials. 
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manager felt that shifting to a more applied focus denigrates the enterprise as a whole, 
making it less attractive to future scholars. Many view science as an independent, 
curiosity driven activity, in which the research proceeds in a bottom-up fashion. Though 
these individuals may understand the political or practical necessity striving toward 
useful information, they view this as a compromise which cuts against the intrinsic value 
of basic science—against the science values that underpin much of their decision making. 
Whether functioning as an intrinsic or instrumental value, high quality science is 
a political tool. In many instances, a reference to the maintenance of high quality science 
does not just mean ensuring rigorous research; it implies a commitment to what has come 
before. It is a signal to those with a vested interest in climate science that there is still a 
place for them in the evolving program.  
3.3 Value 3: Coordination and Collaboration  
The need to coordinate and collaborate across agencies, programs, and disciplines relates 
strongly to the idea of an efficient government. It also comports with the notion of the 
“super discipline” of Earth System Science, which strives to fully integrate human and 
natural systems to generate comprehensive understanding of global processes (Lovbrand 
et al., 2009). Even without the formal structure of the CCSP, coordination across 
agencies would be a common occurrence, as it was prior to 1990. 
 Successful collaboration also emerged as a strongly held value among those I 
interviewed. When asked to describe a project which they had found personally 
rewarding, almost every person told a story in which they viewed the building of 
relationships across boundaries as one of the positive outcomes. Every story had a 
collaborative component. 
Coordination and collaboration represent the biggest source of positive sentiment 
regarding the CCSP. Most interviewees agreed that the CCSP, in convening interagency 
groups at various levels of government, serves a useful purpose in building a network of 
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climate science managers and encouraging collaboration. Even among those whose 
general opinions of the CCSP are strongly negative—for example, because it distracts 
from important scientific work, or is cumbersome and ineffectual—this function of the 
Program was commonly seen as valuable, and perhaps the sole reason that they continued 
to participate. 
3.4 Value 4: Transparency and Communication 
As is evident from the examples in Table 2.1, this value is related to ensuring 
high quality science, but also functions as a public value instrumental in making science 
useful and realizing its benefits. These two conceptions emerged in interviews as well. It 
is widely accepted in the CCSP that making the processes and results of science open and 
available will enhance the quality of the scientific enterprise. It follows, then, that any 
research program (or any effort to coordinate and advance research) should strive toward 
openness and transparency simply as a matter of ensuring the health of the scientific 
enterprise.  
But many also describe openness as an essential part of achieving the broader 
aims of the CCSP. The 2003 Strategic Plan devotes a chapter to this goal, and the 
interagency coordination office devotes a considerable amount of time and resources to 
publicizing and explaining the synthesis and assessment reports it releases. Public events 
organized by CCSP at scientific meetings and other venues often combine an element of 
stakeholder feedback with a communications component in which staff explain what 
CCSP does amid the broader landscape of climate science funding agencies. 
Reporting progress to Congress is another important part of the CCSP’s 
communications effort. Almost every year since the passage of the Global Change 
Research Act the interagency coordinating office has submitted an “Our Changing 
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Planet” (OCP) report to Congress.10 In general, the document provides research 
highlights from the previous year, a sampling of plans for the coming year, and budget 
tables documenting resources allocated to climate science from each participating 
agency.  
The budget tables in OCP demonstrate the ambiguity of the CCSP’s role in 
advancing federal climate science. With no consistency across agency budget reporting, 
and no direct link between agency activities and CCSP priorities, it is virtually impossible 
to track changes in climate science over time within the framework of values and 
priorities established by the CCSP. Beginning with its FY2006 report, the CCSP began to 
group agency budget allocations under particular CCSP goals.11 This affords one 
snapshot of how the Program has prioritized its funds over the last five years (Figure 2.2), 
but the ambiguity of the goals (discussed further below), subverts any attempt to monitor 
them via budgets changes in priorities for US climate science.  
                                                       
10 To access these reports, visit http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/default.htm#ocp. 
11 However, the allocation of research to particular goals was done by the agencies, so the 
process is “black-boxed” and most likely based on inconsistent decision criteria. 
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Fig. 2.2. Research funding allocated to CCSP goals as a proportion of the overall CCSP 
budget. The goals are listed in Table 2.3. Note that the overall budget includes both 
research and observations, which is why the five goals do not add up to 100%. 
3.5 Value 5: Stakeholder Participation and Support 
The term “stakeholder,” along with variants involving communities and users, is 
one of the most important buzzwords in interagency climate science policy discourse. 
These concepts appear in all but one of the 16 chapters in the CCSP Strategic Plan,12 and 
are similarly pervasive in the more recent “Revised Research Plan” (CCSP, 2008d). 
However, involving stakeholders in the processes associated with research and research 
policy requires managing, incentivizing, and carrying out research in different ways (e.g. 
Cash and Buizer, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2005).  
The CCSP is pulled in many different directions with respect to who it is serving, 
and how it aims to interact with a wide variety of groups, both within the scientific 
community, and the broader public. Given the Program’s limited resources, and limited 
role in establishing research programs, it is not clear how the CCSP can systematically: 
                                                       
12 The chapter on Observing and Monitoring the Climate System does not mention 
stakeholders but does mention decision support. It mentions users in reference to the 
science community. 
33 
1.) identify appropriate groups that should be involved; 2.) work to understand the 
decision making needs and other challenges faced by those groups; 3.) reconcile those 
needs with climate research agenda; and 4.) help to translate research results into usable 
forms for appropriate groups. Yet all of these functions are stated or at least implied by 
the CCSP.  
The CCSP lacks the resources for a sustained effort to work with all of the 
groups of stakeholders that might make use of climate science knowledge. However, as a 
prominent public face of climate science in the US tasked with meeting the requirements 
of the GCRA, politically the CCSP must be seen as ensuring that this is happening. One 
program manager told me, “I don’t think the funding has been adequate in the program 
for that kind of work, but yet the program has been sold on that.”  
Another program manager involved in administering basic science activities 
conjectured:  
“I would guess that CCSP has not had any successes at any of that – the notion of 
helping the decision makers and policy people do things. As an organization, it’s 
just muddied the waters. It has not clarified anything.”  
In addition to its derision, the quotation is noteworthy for the subject’s distance and 
unfamiliarity with such issues. Though he makes science policy decisions in his capacity 
as a manager, the Program’s success in leveraging that very process to achieve social 
benefit is of little concern to him. There is wide agreement among those I interviewed 
and outside evaluators (NRC, 2007, p.3) that the CCSP as an institution, and climate 
science in general, have not fulfilled this public value. 
 The scientific community’s role as a stakeholder in agency funding programs 
further complicates matters. Scientists have traditionally had the loudest voices in the 
debate over what should be funded and how. As one program manager explained: 
I think of [scientists] as stakeholders, because if I step back, and look at the way 
they interact with the CCSP, they have all the characteristics of stakeholders. 
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They’re fully vested. They have needs. They have very strong ideas about where 
the science needs to go.  
Many of the program managers I interviewed rely on the scientific community to guide 
them, whether through informal networks of colleagues, scientific advisory boards, peer 
review panels, or conversations at the many science meetings they attend. This kind of 
proximity with the scientific community is obviously a crucial element of effective 
science management. Yet such interactions tend to reinforce the status quo and work 
against prioritization based on criteria related to public values other than those internal to 
the science itself. As one program manager noted, “the scientists, who are CCSP’s 
traditional major stakeholder group, are watching to make sure that you’re not selling 
them down the river.”  
This dynamic raises questions about whether a manager is working to support a 
discipline for the sake of itself, or trying to fund the work most likely to support 
outcomes consistent with the public values of the Program. Undoubtedly the solution to 
such a conflict would be different for each agency, and in all cases it would involve 
striking an appropriate balance. However, in the current system, tensions between 
discipline-driven science and needs-driven science are rarely acknowledged. 
Some programs or agencies within the departments that participate in the CCSP 
such as Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, and Transportation, have extensive 
capacity and experience with decision support in very well-defined communities. These 
elements of the federal government could themselves be seen as stakeholders for US 
global change research. They could use the interagency process as a forum to argue for 
the climate science information needs of their respective stakeholders. But federal 
programs with decision support capacity (but which do not fund research) are generally 
absent from the decision making processes of the CCSP, which explicitly involves 
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programs focused on basic science.13 One program manager noted that, “if the mission is 
to empower decision makers, then decision making agencies… should definitely be at the 
table. Some of them are, but they have really small [climate science] budgets.” 
4. Public Values Failure in Interagency Climate Science 
Having identified and described a set of public values underpinning US climate 
science, we can now look more closely at the ways in which the system is failing to 
deliver them. I draw on Bozeman’s “public values failure criteria,” (2007, p.16; see also 
Bozeman and Sarewitz, in review), as a starting point for diagnosing public values 
failures. In Table 2.2, I list public values failure criteria from Bozeman that apply to this 
case, as well as two additional entries, “Public Values Displacement” and “Inadequate or 
Inappropriate Institutions,” which I have added as a result of the public values inventory 
described above. The right-hand column in the table gives examples and explanations of 
how each criterion applies to US climate science. It is important to note that a wide 
variety of sources (such as program manager perspectives, public law, and budget 
reports), have contributed to this assessment of public values failure, each providing a 
different perspective. 
Table 2.2 demonstrates the complexity of the interagency climate science 
landscape, and the variety of points at which the system lacks the structural and 
conceptual elements needed to link climate science more concretely to public values. The 
public value failures listed in Table 2.2 are not inevitable. Rather the CCSP strategy, 
framework, and processes accommodate them. This identification of public values 
failures serves as a critique of the general framework linking knowledge production to 
                                                       
13 There are a few exceptions to this. NOAA and EPA both have small programs with 
decision support elements, and those program managers participate in the CCSP. Other 
departments with decision support capacity (such as Transportation, Interior, and 
Agriculture) do participate in the CCSP, but through their science programs, rather than 
their decision support programs.  
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societal benefit, not a predictive or deterministic account. For example, in applying the 
“Inadequate Institutions” criterion, we find that managers are not incentivized to pursue 
CCSP goals within their own programs. However, this does not prevent a dedicated 
individual from doing so, or from directing his or her staff of program managers to do so. 
Interagency climate science is a product of both individuals and organizations; of 
institutional incentives conditioning behavior, and leadership that challenges and 
reshapes existing rules. The following section explores these dynamics in greater depth. 
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Table 2.2. 
Public Values (PV) Failure Criteria, and Potential Public Values Failures of Interagency Climate Science (adapted from Bozeman 
2007). Criteria marked with ** have been added as a result of this case study. 
PV Failure Criterion Definition Explanation/Examples of the Potential Failure in Climate Science 
Mechanisms for 
values articulation 
and aggregation 
Political processes and social cohesion should be sufficient to 
ensure effective communication and processing of public 
values. 
• CCSP criteria for prioritization are too broad and vague to provide real 
guidance. No connection between science priorities and desired outcomes or 
public values. 
• Agency priorities trump interagency (CCSP) priorities. 
• Stakeholders too widely or ambiguously defined for meaningful, sustained 
interaction. 
Imperfect public 
information 
Similar to the market failure criterion, public values may be 
thwarted when transparency is insufficient to permit citizens to 
make informed judgments. 
• Budget reporting inconsistent across agencies and generally opaque; detailed 
information not readily available.  
Distribution of 
benefits 
Public commodities and services should, ceteris paribus, be 
freely and equitably distributed. When “equity goods” have 
been captured by individuals or groups, “benefit hoarding” 
occurs in violation of public value. 
• Particular kinds of climate science (particularly related to prediction) dominate 
the budget. Human dimensions research has not grown, despite recognized 
need. 
Provider availability When there is a legitimated recognition about the necessity of 
providing scarce goods and services, providers need to be 
available. When a vital good or service is not provided because 
of the unavailability of providers or because providers prefer to 
ignore public value goods, there is a public values failure due to 
unavailable providers. 
• Priorities tend to favor natural science over social science, and science-driven 
research over needs-oriented research despite recognized need. 
**Implausible and/or 
Incomplete Value 
Chains 
Pursuit of a proximate goal with ambiguous or unrealistic link 
to public values. 
• Managers may assume that supporting the needs of the scientific community 
will achieve broader public values. 
• Managers judge program success based on scientific outputs, and not the 
impact or use of those products. 
• Five overarching goals of CCSP strategic plan assumed to lead to specified 
public value, but the link is neither explained, nor backed by an organizational 
structure that can establish that connection. 
**Inadequate or 
Inappropriate 
Institutions 
The structure or culture of an institution disincentivizes the 
achievement of its motivating public values. 
• Inadequate resources for decision support and communications (approaches 3 
and 4). 
• Incentive structures built into science management emphasize science values. 
• Managers not incentivized to work toward interagency goals in building their 
programs. 
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5. Values in the Structure and Implementation of US Climate Science 
The most recent strategic plan published by the CCSP (CCSP, 2003) provides a 
useful entry point for understanding the ways in which assumptions linking knowledge 
advance to public values can influence the decision making and overall structure of US 
climate science policy. Table 2.3 lists the main elements included in the Strategic Plan. 
Its basic structure prescribes four different “approaches” to be used in pursuit of five 
goals, which ostensibly support the mission and vision of the program, evincing the 
following structure: 
approaches ! goals ! mission ! vision 
But the Plan does not describe how achievement of the goals (which all relate to 
advancement of knowledge) would actually support the mission and vision (which relate 
to the beneficial use of knowledge). Indeed each of the links in the structure is implicit, 
and taken for granted. 
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The two elements of the Plan that indicate something beyond supporting research 
and expanding knowledge are the third and fourth “approaches:” Decision Support, and 
Communications. Decision support and communications, in turn, may be crucial to the 
mission and vision of CCSP, but they are not necessary for achieving the five over-
arching goals of the Strategic Plan, which are research goals. Many involved with CCSP 
view goals one, two, and three as pertaining to “basic science” activities, with goals four 
and five constituting the more applied, or “decision support” work. But in reality, all five 
Table 2.3.  
Major components of the CCSP Strategic Plan (2003) 
Vision 
A nation and the global community, empowered with the science based knowledge to manage the 
risks and opportunities of change in the climate and related environmental systems. 
Mission 
Facilitate the creation and application of knowledge of the Earth’s global environment through 
research, observations, decision support, and communication. 
Approaches 
1. Scientific Research: Plan, 
sponsor, and conduct research 
on changes in climate and 
related systems. 
2. Observations: Enhance 
observations and data 
management systems to 
generate a comprehensive set of 
variables needed for climate-
related research. 
3. Decision Support: Develop 
improved science-based 
resources to aid in decision 
making. 
4. Communications: 
Communicate results to 
domestic and international 
scientific stakeholders, stressing 
openness and transparency. 
Goals 
1. Improve knowledge of the Earth’s past 
and present climate and environment, 
including its natural variability and 
improve understanding of the causes of 
observed variability and change. 
2. Improve quantification of the forces 
bringing about changes in the Earth’s 
climate and related systems. 
3. Reduce uncertainty in projections of how 
the Earth’s climate and related systems 
may change in the future. 
4. Understand the sensitivity and 
adaptability of different natural and 
managed ecosystems and human systems to 
climate and related global changes.  
5. Explore the uses and identify the limits 
of evolving knowledge to manage risks 
and opportunities related to climate 
variability and change. 
Research Areas 
Atmospheric 
Composition 
Climate Variability 
and Change 
Water Cycle 
Land-Use/Land-
Cover Change 
Carbon Cycle 
Ecosystems 
Human 
Contributions and 
Responses to 
Environmental 
Change 
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of the goals are flexible and overlapping, and all are concerned with expanding 
knowledge, not with developing capacity to apply it.14 Thus, efforts to achieve identified 
goals (i.e., via research) can ignore completely the broader values that motivate global 
change research (i.e., supporting decision making to reduce negative social outcomes), 
even as they are consistent with the logic expressed in the Plan. 
 Another important element of the Plan is its list of “Criteria for Prioritization” 
(CCSP 2003, p.8): scientific or technical quality; relevance to reducing uncertainties and 
improving decision support tools in priority areas; track record of consistently good past 
performance and identified metrics for evaluating future progress; and cost and value. It 
would be difficult for any single research effort to satisfy all of these criteria, but the list 
is broad enough that anything currently underway at participating agencies will probably 
satisfy at least one or two. Thus, instead of providing concrete direction for those wishing 
to make funding decisions with CCSP priorities in mind, the Plan offers complete 
flexibility within the normal limits of science funding.  
The Strategic Plan designates “Interagency Working Groups” (IWGs) in key 
research areas, with members drawn from across participating federal agencies.  As 
program managers with budget authority within their own agencies,15 IWG members are 
in an ideal position to translate the goals of interagency climate science into requests for 
proposals, funding decisions, and the general management of climate science. However, 
the circularity of this arrangement (specifying priorities that they themselves will carry 
                                                      
14 There is an important distinction to be made here: research on how to apply climate 
science effectively, though quite necessary, does not in and of itself generate sustained 
capacity in that regard. 
15 The Strategic Plan specifies that IWG participants should have budget authority within 
their own agencies. In practice this is not always the case. One IWG co-chair complained 
to me that he was the only person in the group with budget authority, making it quite 
difficult from them to implement new priorities, even if they wanted to. 
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out and subsequently report on) combined with a lack of authority and resources on the 
part of the CCSP, leaves little incentive for program managers to initiate anything 
beyond, or at odds with, the expectations of their home agencies. Thus, if asked to 
specify a priority relevant to CCSP goals for the coming year, the easiest answer for an 
IWG member would be whatever he or she had planned to fund anyway.  
As one program manager put it: 
We get asked every year how much money are we spending on ________, so, I’ll 
come back and say, well, do you want a large number or small? Because I can go 
through my proposals and there’s some of them that have some relevance … so 
do you want me to say “half of that’s _______ money?” If you want me to, sure, 
fine, I don’t care. If you want to say “none of it,” that’s ok too. (blanks inserted 
to preserve anonymity) 
This account highlights structural issues and incentives that tend to discourage 
interagency climate science from moving in new directions, creating considerable inertia 
in the research portfolio.  
Observers and participants in the CCSP, including the NRC on multiple 
occasions (2005, 2007, 2009b), and many of the people I interviewed, have pointed out 
that the interagency process has very little authority when it comes to influencing the 
research agenda for climate science. In that sense, it promises more than it can deliver (as 
the example of budgets for human dimensions research demonstrates). Even so, it is not 
at all clear what the CCSP is trying to deliver. In other words, the CCSP has not offered a 
clear account of what kinds of scientific advance would help to satisfy the public values 
that motivate the program to begin with. Under the current structure, any good science is 
good enough. This logic works because of the influence of intrinsic values related to the 
conduct of science itself, what I term “science values.”  
6. Science Values and Public Values 
Whereas other cases have revealed the pitfalls of the “profit as progress” 
assumption (see Bozeman, 2007; other articles in this issue), the systemic problems in US 
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climate science stem from an equally problematic “knowledge as progress” assumption. 
Indeed, much of science policy is based on this rationale analogous to, but entirely 
separate from, the market failure model.16 In this section I describe a “science values” 
framework, which often motivates science policies and their implementation, and which 
helps to explain the public values failures described above. I then show how science 
values have led to the current structure of interagency climate science. 
6.1 The Linear Model 
The “linear model of science” (Pielke and Byerly, 1998) is a simplistic 
conception of scientific and technical advance that nonetheless remains an influential 
driver of science policy. According to the linear model, innovation happens in the 
following way: basic, or fundamental research contributes to a general pool of 
knowledge; that pool of knowledge provides a resource for engineers or other innovators, 
who then apply it to create products that increase productivity, drive economic growth, 
enhance military power, and otherwise enrich lives and benefit society. This model 
assumes that advances in knowledge are by and large beneficial to society, and that the 
benefits are both automatic and unpredictable. It also assumes a unidirectional flow of 
knowledge that privileges basic research above applied as the originator of all scientific 
benefit (Stokes, 1997).  
Sarewitz (1996, p.10) documents the implications of the linear model in a 
description of the myths that form a basis for science policy in the US. The first three of 
are particularly relevant here: 
                                                      
16 Richard Nelson’s (1959) account of basic science as a public good may describe an 
economic incentive for basic research investments in a general sense, but specific 
decisions to invest in, for example, biology, geology, or sociology may have a variety of 
drivers far removed from the logic of market failure. 
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1. The myth of infinite benefit: More science and more technology will lead to 
more public good. 
2. The myth of unfettered research: Any scientifically reasonable line of research 
into fundamental natural processes is as likely to yield societal benefit as any 
other. 
3. The myth of accountability: Peer review, reproducibility of results, and other 
controls on the quality of scientific research embody the principal ethical 
responsibilities of the research system. 
These assumptions about the nature of scientific progress have shaped, over many 
decades, what Shackley and Wynne (1995, p.113) call “the tacit commitments and 
assumptions which underpin a prevailing common culture of science and policy.”  
The most important elements of the linear model as it relates to the fulfillment of 
public values are the assumptions of automatic benefit and unpredictability. Taken 
together the three myths suggest that more basic research is an unquestionably, if 
unpredictably, good thing. Few would deny that public investments in basic science have 
the potential bring great benefit to society, often in unpredictable ways. However, these 
assumptions–when driving policy decisions–can compromise public values. For example, 
the unpredictability of outcomes renders nonsensical any attempt at reasoned choice 
among scientific activities. As Michael Polanyi (1962, p.62) wrote, “you can kill or 
mutilate the advance of science, you cannot shape it," and the sentiment remains strong to 
this day. It emerges, for example, in outrage over attempts to limit certain areas of 
science (e.g. stem cell research).  
But the history of government-driven innovation in the US shows that we can 
make sensible decisions about research investments in order to address particular 
problems. We would not, for example fund seismologists in the hope that their work 
might one day lead to an AIDS vaccine, and it is not only reasonable to expect that we 
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might make even finer grained choices with some success (see Toulmin, 1964; Kitcher, 
2003), but historically clear that this has been the case (e.g. Greenberg, 1967; Kevles, 
1977; Brooks, 1996). Furthermore, reasoned attempts to direct research toward the 
solution of particular problems compromise neither the quality of research, nor its 
potential to yield unexpected breakthroughs. 
Debate over how science should be funded, governed, and evaluated has a long 
history in the US (c.f. Polanyi, 1962; Toulmin, 1964; Jasanoff, 1990; Guston, 1994; 
Greenberg, 2001) and continues to spark controversy as issues such as stem cell research, 
climate change, and nanotechnology capture the public eye. The appropriate technology 
movement (e.g. Winner, 1986), the rise of the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment (Bimber, 1996), passage of the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) (e.g. Cozzens, 1995), and calls by President George W. Bush’s Science Advisor 
for a new research program on the Science of Science and Innovation Policy (Marburger, 
2005) are all examples of a trend toward increased expectations of accountability in 
science since the 1970s (Cozzens, 1999; Guston, 2000a). 
Beyond the problem of choosing among potential lines of research, the linear 
model also creates problems for the assessment of that choice. If the benefits of science 
are at once automatic yet unpredictable, then public investments in science need not be 
evaluated beyond the general expectation that they meet the requirements of “good” 
science in the sense of academic rigor and allegiance to the ideals of objectivity and 
independence. This syllogism raises a crucial concern regarding science and public 
values: under the linear model, it is not economic productivity that serves as a surrogate 
for social benefit, but scientific productivity. In other words, knowledge equals progress. 
There are two problems with this logical step. First, it is obvious that not all 
advances in knowledge are inherently good (Kitcher, 2003). Indeed judging the 
“goodness” of knowledge is impossible without consideration of the use of that 
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knowledge – its function in a broader context (Bozeman and Rogers, 2002). Second, if 
we accept the advancement of knowledge as an index to progress, then a complex social 
problem with many political and social facets, such as climate change or disease, is easily 
reduced to a science funding problem, wherein the solution is simply to fund more 
research, with little concern for the broader social context (Sarewitz, 2004; Sarewitz et 
al., 2004). Put differently, linear model thinking ignores the fact that, even if a particular 
advance in knowledge can be said to be “good,” beneficial use of that knowledge is not 
guaranteed. 
The linear model and its accompanying science policy myths add context to 
claims by mainstream institutions such as the NRC that US climate science has greatly 
advanced knowledge while failing to achieve its broader purpose. Yet it also helps clarify 
why appropriate solutions are rarely articulated or adopted. These very institutions exist 
to embody and protect science values as intrinsic public values. Figure 2.3 illustrates this 
problem by replacing the “market” axis of the grid in Figure 2.1 with an axis representing 
“science values.” The right side of this axis indicates a decision-making environment in 
which “knowledge advance” is taken as a reasonable and appropriate equivalent for 
public values. The left side indicates an approach to science policy that acknowledges the 
contingent and contextual aspects of scientific advance. 
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Fig. 2.3. Climate Science in the context of public values and science values 
 
As with market values in Figure 2.1, the key point of Figure 2.3 is that science 
values may or may not be consistent with the public values that motivate a policy or 
program. The outcome depends a great deal upon how different values are prioritized, 
and on how institutions and individuals contribute to the implementation of science 
policies. Examining how different sets of values impact policy implementation helps to 
reveal why public values failures occur. 
7. Recommendations 
There is no simple hierarchy of values within US climate science, and the 
relationships among values are complex, but the preceding analysis leads to two general 
observations. First, although decision making based on science values often seems to 
subvert public values, there are also many points of compatibility. Public values 3 and 4 
(coordination and collaboration; transparency and communication) are also important 
science values. And high quality science (value 2) is necessary (though not sufficient) for 
developing useful information. Moreover given the logical incoherence of the CCSP 
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structure itself, there can be no way to connect the program’s public values to its 
organization. In other words, CCSP reflects incoherence both in its organizing structure 
and in the relations among its public values. More careful thinking about how the 
program’s public values can relate to one another could provide a valuable framework for 
reconsidering program structure. 
The role of high quality science leads to the second point about value chains and 
public failures: high quality science and useful information are compatible as values; it is 
the flexibility and ambiguity of their relationship that leads to public values failure. When 
functioning as an intrinsic value, high quality science reinforces the linear model and 
subverts public values because advancement of knowledge serves as an end, rather than a 
means (i.e. an instrumental value). The interagency program should adopt language and 
institutional processes promoting high quality science that also contributes useful 
information. Without a structure that clearly identifies high quality science as a necessary 
(though not sufficient) step in generating useful information, potential for public values 
failure will remain.   
Strengthening and clarifying value chains is a matter of individual leadership, 
and institutional change. As long as program managers continue to view the public 
failures of CCSP as unrelated to their own work (as in a quotation offered previously), 
they may continue to operate under linear model assumptions, and on-the-ground 
implementation of science policies will remain divorced from public values. Any changes 
in this direction are likely to result from leadership at multiple levels, both within science 
agencies, and in those parts of government charged with oversight of the interagency 
program (e.g. Congress, the interagency coordination office, and the President’s Office of 
Science and Technology Policy). 
The ambiguity and weakness of CCSP’s value chains contribute to public values 
failure, but they are an advantage to the organization in other ways. To survive 
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politically, CCSP needs to be able to show progress over time, despite a lack of control 
over the activities it must report on. Put in this light, the Program’s goals (see Table 2.3) 
are quite convenient. They are a general prediction of what the collective agencies will 
accomplish over time as they pursue science values, rather than a reflection of what needs 
to be done to achieve public values. The CCSP should pursue public values by setting 
goals for science policy (e.g. measures such as budget allocation, breadth and depth of 
decision support activities, or the generation of useful information), rather than goals for 
science. However, given CCSP’s limited authority and resources, such goals might be 
unachievable, and thus politically untenable. Seen in this light, public values serve the 
Program as political cover, rather than as a firm basis for guiding both policy and 
practice. 
It is not clear that the US currently has the institutional capacity to achieve the 
public values promised from climate science. Probably no one knows exactly how an 
effective program should be structured. However, it is fairly clear that the current system 
has proven inadequate in several important ways. This failure can be attributed, in large 
part, to the prevailing assumption that “knowledge equals progress”—that any advance in 
understanding justifies the initial investment of research dollars. This is analogous to 
other public values analyses which trace the implications of the assumption, “economic 
growth (or efficiency) equals social progress.” Both cases may lead to or mask public 
failure. 
To enhance the achievement of public values, the CCSP and its successors need 
to reject science values assumptions and instead ask what kinds of knowledge would lead 
to desired progress toward public values? What kinds of institutions are needed to 
facilitate that progress? CCSP must strengthen its value chains and make them more 
explicit. Even more crucially, it should differentiate its own priorities from those of 
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participating agencies, and draw a distinction between goals that merely support science, 
and goals that connect science to public values.  
In its 2003 Strategic Plan (see Table 2.3), the Program tried to fit the whole of 
US climate science into a single, unified framework, which resulted in an incoherent 
internal logic. Instead, the CCSP should identify the concrete areas of climate science in 
which it can make progress toward its own public values-based goals, and focus on those. 
This would mean thinking small. For example, the CCSP could set a goal of incentivizing 
and supporting program managers who fund research that responds to stakeholder needs. 
This might mean providing additional funding for programs that qualify; convening 
workshops in which managers learn about ways of incorporating public values into their 
program solicitations, evaluations of proposals and progress reports; and lobbying 
agencies and the Office of Management and Budget to give additional recognition to such 
programs in the course of assessment and evaluation. This would not amount to a 
complete overhaul of the climate science enterprise, but it could have a visible impact in 
an important, but neglected area, and create conditions for further evolution away from 
science policy based on the linear model. 
The CCSP might take on the role of a boundary organization specializing in 
communicating between normally disparate policy and disciplinary worlds (e.g. Guston, 
2001), with a goal of strengthening the connections between science programs and 
regulatory or service programs that have particular information needs. With this 
approach, the CCSP could begin with federal agencies and programs that already have 
representation in various CCSP committees, such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Transportation, or the Forest Service, and work to ensure that 
the relevant research programs become more responsive to their needs. Such an effort, if 
successful, could grow to include state and local groups as well. 
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Either one of the two suggestions above would allow incremental progress in 
addressing some of the public value failures of US climate science over the last two 
decades. A key aspect of both examples is an approach grounded in public values—and 
the relations among such values—as a basis for planning, action, and assessment. At 
present, such values tend to serve simply as political cover for business as usual.  
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Chapter 3 
THE PREDICTION IMPERATIVE: RETHINKING THE PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 
OF SCIENCE POLICY DECISION MAKERS 
1. Introduction 
Science policy decision makers that manage government-funded science 
constitute an important venue for deliberation about the content and context of advancing 
knowledge. These institutional and human actors play a significant role in determining 
what kinds of science knowledge we are getting. They have a voice in discussions about 
what kinds of science knowledge we should be getting. And any attempts to change the 
way science works will have to confront the detailed social, organizational, and political 
realities of climate science policy. 
In the United States a large scientific enterprise investigates climate change 
through research on the complex interrelations of natural processes, as well the role of 
humans in impacting and reacting to these forces. Climate science17 engages a wide range 
of disciplines and institutions: thirteen federal agencies fund work in this area. But this 
structural complexity exists under a single mission, vision, and framework set out in law 
by the Global Change Research Act of 1990 (PL101-606, 1990), and maintained through 
an interagency coordination process. Since that time, more then $30 billion has gone to 
climate science under an interagency program I will refer to as the CCSP/GCRP.18 
                                                      
17As is common in many policy documents related to federal climate research, I use 
“climate science” and “global change research” interchangeably. 
18 The CCSP (Climate Change Science Program), as it was known during the Bush 
Administration, has under the Obama Administration reverted to its previous title, the 
Global Change Research Program (GCRP). There is considerable consistency in the 
structure of the program and the individuals involved across political regimes, and so 
these findings remain valid for the current program as well. I use “CCSP/GCRP” to refer 
to the program as a way of indicating this continuity. In citing specific documents, I use 
the acronym that applies to the date of publication (GCRP from 1990-2000, 2009-2010; 
CCSP 2001-2008). 
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The U.S. has funded climate science in order to produce useful information for 
society, but that goal has been difficult to achieve. This science policy challenge can be 
thought of as a problem of reconciling the supply and demand of climate science 
knowledge (e.g. Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). There is increasing demand on the part of 
society for information that is useful in dealing with climate-related challenges and 
opportunities (McNie, 2007; NRC, 2007, 2009b, a; Lemos and Rood, 2010). However, 
the government agencies that fund climate research have largely failed to meet that 
demand. The supply of climate knowledge from the CCSP/GCRP tends to be science-
driven, rather than user-driven (NRC, 2007, 2009b). It has emphasized improvements in 
knowledge of biophysical systems over products that take into account the particular 
needs of decision makers (Pielke, 1995a, 2000b, a; NRC, 2007, 2009b; Meyer, in review 
[Chapter 2, this volume]). 
 In a literature review focused on various dimensions the problem of reconciling 
supply and demand for useful information, McNie (2007, p. 32) notes that the dynamics 
determining research agendas are a crucial part of the system. For a given problem there 
are many possible research agendas, and many processes through which research agendas 
could be decided. “Despite such importance, the literature was virtually silent on the 
issue of decisions about scientific research agendas.” In a previous paper (Meyer, in 
review [Chapter 2, this volume]), I have begun to remedy this for the particular case of 
US climate science by examining the inner workings of the CCSP/GCRP, and the ways 
in which it has failed to generate expected public benefits. This paper adds to that initial 
effort by focusing on a particularly persistent and powerful idea about climate science, 
which I call the “prediction imperative.” 
 As I elaborate below in greater detail, prediction—that is, the process of 
generating information about future events—plays a central role in climate science. The 
prediction imperative is simply the idea that prediction is a crucial element in achieving 
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the aims of climate science—useful information for decision makers. It directly connects 
the problem of climate change itself to our ability to predict the future behavior of 
climate and related systems. A recent report by the National Research Council (NRC, 
2009b, p. 4) states very clearly the logic of the prediction imperative (with my emphasis): 
Further climate change is inevitable, even if humans significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore essential not only to have the capacity 
to explain what is happening to climate and why (attribution), but also to improve 
predictions of weather and climate variability at the spatial and temporal scales 
appropriate to assess the impacts of climate change. 
The simple logic of this statement (and many other like it, discussed below) has 
consequences for science policy.  
In placing a shared idea about the world at the center of my analysis of a policy 
problem, I am using the “Ways of Knowing” (WK) framework. The WK framework 
emphasizes the power that is created when a particular perspective gains wider 
acceptance (Feldman et al., 2006; Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Lejano and Ingram, 2009; 
Schneider, 2009). As Feldman et al. explain (2006, p. 90), “When actors ‘take up the 
token’ of a way of knowing a policy issue—by planning or accounting for their activities 
in terms of that way of knowing—the way of knowing gains power.” Ways of knowing 
have consequences for the behavior of individuals, the structure of organizations, and for 
the outcomes of policy implementation. The prediction imperative is a way of knowing 
that structures the “supply” of climate science in a variety of ways. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the prediction imperative and its role in 
climate science policy I conducted semi-structured interviews with more than 50 public 
managers involved with the CCSP/GCRP during the period from 2007-2009. I also 
observed meetings and reviewed strategy and planning documents associated with that 
Program. The CCSP/GCRP coordinates climate science policy across thirteen different 
federal departments and agencies in accordance with the Global Change Research Act 
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(PL101-606, 1990).19 The total annual investment in climate research and observations 
from these agencies has been between $1.5-2 billion over the last decade.  
The CCSP/GCRP has a responsibility to coordinate the Nation’s climate science 
activities around a mission and vision directly related to the goal of producing useful 
information. It does this through strategic planning, reporting to Congress on budgets and 
key accomplishments, synthesis and assessment of science around key issues, and 
convening officials and managers from across participating agencies through a variety of 
committees and thematic working groups (e.g. global carbon cycle, communications, 
observations & monitoring). 
The small staff of the CCSP/GCRP coordinating office operate in a complex 
environment. Like the “network managers” described by McGuire (2002; see also 
Imperial, 2005), they are reliant on multiple organizations to perform multiple tasks in 
order to achieve their goals. They do not have direct authority over research budgets, but 
many agency personnel who participate in CCSP/GCRP processes, for example through 
working groups and other committees, do exert some form of control over resources and 
programs. The CCSP/GCRP attempts to govern science through relationship building and 
collaboration. Most of the participants have only indirect influence on the research 
agenda, but they have considerable influence in the creation of relationships, in the 
structure and content of decision making processes, in the framing of problems, and in 
the creation of space for deliberation.  
                                                      
19 They are: Department of Commerce; Department of Defense; Department of Energy; 
Department of the Interior; Department of State; Department of Transportation; 
Department of Health and Human Services; National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; National Science Foundation; Smithsonian Institution; U.S. Agency for 
International Development; Department of Agriculture; Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
55 
In the rest of this paper I use data from interviews and participant observations, 
supplemented with analysis from reports and policy documents, to unpack the prediction 
imperative, examine its persistence within climate science policy, and explore the 
consequences of those dynamics for the goal of generating useful information. Before 
doing this, however, I must develop some key ideas. Section 2 clarifies my use of the 
word “prediction,” and gives some important background on the computer models 
(GCMs) used for prediction in climate science. Section 3 describes several key “myths” 
that underpin the prediction imperative, and critically reviews the logic of that way of 
knowing climate science policy. 
In section 4, I describe five different narratives about prediction that emerged 
from interviews with public managers involved with the CCSP/GCRP. Each narrative 
involves an opinion about climate prediction, and its role in achieving policy goals. The 
narratives lay the groundwork for a discussion in section 5 of the broader science policy 
context of the prediction imperative, and the political dynamics that both result from and 
help to reinforce this way of knowing. I end the paper by discussing the role of agency 
personnel in shaping research agendas and in managing the politics of prediction. 
2. Prediction and Modeling 
Some argue, following Popper (1968), that science is an inherently predictive 
activity. In this view of science as the pursuit of truth through deductive hypothesis 
testing, one cannot separate prediction from objective inquiry. Or in the flippant words of 
Toulmin (1961, p.24), “The proof of a pudding is in the eating, and the proof of a theory 
is in the predicting.” This is a more generalized philosophical assertion about science, 
itself highly contested on multiple grounds (see Toulmin, 1961; Dupre, 1993; Jamieson, 
2000; Oreskes, 2000), than what concerns me here. I use prediction in the sense of 
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information about events that will actually occur in the future.20 This conforms to the 
IPCC’s definition of the term (with my emphasis):21 “the result of an attempt to produce 
an estimate of the actual evolution of the climate in the future” (Solomon et al., 2007).22 
Prediction is one of a handful of terms applied to information about the future in 
the context of climate change. Others include forecast, projection, and scenario. Despite 
efforts by the IPCC and other prominent members of the climate science community to 
clarify and standardize (e.g. Moss and Schneider, 2000; Solomon et al., 2007), the use of 
these terms remains inconsistent. One commonly hears climate scientists lament the 
improper use of “prediction” instead of “projection” by lay people. But scientists use 
these terms inconsistently as well (Demeritt, 2001; Bray and von Storch, 2009). In some 
cases they are simply careless, but others appear to involve a political calculation. Bray 
and von Storch note, for example, that the “Illustrated guide to the findings of the IPCC,” 
written by IPCC scientists Michael Mann and Lee Kump is entitled “Dire Predictions.” In 
testimony before Congress scientists have been promising better, more certain predictions 
for decades (Demeritt, 2001; Meyer, 2006). 
 Semantic distinctions and their subtly embedded politics are unimportant to my 
own use of the term “prediction” in this paper. In the following sections, some of the 
quotations from interviews and documents involve the word projection rather than 
prediction. For my purposes it does not matter if the output of a climate model, or a 
statement by a scientist is called a forecast, projection, or prediction (see also Lemos and 
Rood, 2010). What matters is that this activity occurs in pursuit of a goal: increasingly 
                                                      
20 As opposed to predictions lacking a temporal component, or predictions about events 
in hypothetical closed systems. 
21 From here on, any emphasis within quotations is mine unless otherwise noted. 
22 See “climate prediction” in the IPCC Glossary: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/annex1sglossary-a-d.html 
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accurate and precise information about future events, provided by computer simulations. 
In that sense, my use of prediction is wider than the specific definition offered by the 
IPCC. Prediction is not just a piece of information, but the whole set of activities working 
toward the goal of better information about the future (Pielke et al., 2000).  
There are many ways of thinking about the future, and there are many ways in 
which science may inform our understanding of the future. Some argue that to make a 
decision is to act on one’s understanding of the future, or in other words, to predict 
(March, 1982). Adger et al. (2009, p.342) point out that “the goals and processes of 
[climate] adaptation cannot be separated from the nature, status and legitimacy of 
knowledge claims about the future.” Perceptions of the future will necessarily play a role 
in any decision making process about climate change or any other problem.  
We may think about the future in many different ways, bringing many different 
tools and frameworks to bear on that task. But in the context of climate science, the terms 
“prediction,” “projection,” and “forecast” almost always refer to a specific set of tools: 
complex computer simulations. Muller and von Storch (2004) refer to this set of tools as 
“quasi-realistic models” in an effort to distinguish them from simple cognitive models, or 
hypothetical “pre-theory” models (see also von Storch, 2010). Edwards (2010) uses the 
term “simulation models,” distinguishing them from reanalysis models and data analysis 
models. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the shorthand acronym, GCM23 (for General 
Circulation Model), as a reference to computer models that use physical theory to 
represent Earth systems with increasing complexity, detail, and realism.  
                                                      
23 The term General Circulation Model is a relic of early modeling efforts focused solely 
on atmospheric circulation. These days, large simulations couple ocean circulation 
models with atmospheric circulation models, and include many other parameters and 
components such as land surface and sea ice, but the simple acronym persists. 
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GCMs strive to maximize the complexity and realism with which they simulate 
the world, providing a platform for experimentation. In one sense these models are 
holistic and integrative. They have gradually incorporated more and more components of 
the Earth system as computing power has increased and the science has advanced 
(Edwards, 2000, 2001; Lovbrand et al., 2009; Sarewitz, 2010), and they are often judged 
on the degree to which they represent the complex systems comprehensively (Shackley et 
al., 1998). In other ways the GCM approach is reductionist. It assumes that sufficiently 
realistic portrayal of micro-scale processes and their interactions will yield realistic 
macro-scale behavior (Shackley et al., 1998; Demeritt, 2001).  
Holistic, integrative or reductionist; comprehensive or limited; throughout the 
years GCMs have retained their status as the best tools for investigating the climate and 
for revealing the implications of climate change (Demeritt, 2001; Solomon et al., 2007, 
see Chapter 8; CCSP, 2008d). They are not used solely for prediction,24 but their ability 
to predict is of central importance to climate science (CCSP, 2008a), and an important 
characteristic distinguishing them from simpler models of climate systems. As a modeler 
interviewed by Shackley et al. (1998, p.165) put it, “[simple models] are essential for 
understanding but useless for prediction.” Predictive capability and predictive potential 
are important justifications for investments in GCMs, and an important aim of climate 
science as a whole.  
3. The Prediction Imperative 
This study presents the first in depth look at the prediction imperative in terms of 
the views of managers who implement science policy within the broader system of 
                                                      
24 Models have a range of other uses, including theory testing and construction of data 
sets from heterogeneous observations (see von Storch 2010, Edwards 2010). 
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government and research institutions (but see Pielke, 2000b, a; Demeritt, 2001).25 
However, the idea itself has long been recognized in studies examining social and 
political dynamics of climate research. A recent policy statement by the World Climate 
Research Program (Shukla et al., 2009, p.177) clearly maps the prediction imperative as a 
way of knowing: 
Considerably improved predictions of the changes in the statistics of regional 
climate, especially of extreme events and high-impact weather, are required to 
assess the impacts of climate change and variations, and to develop adaptive 
strategies to ameliorate their effects on water resources, food security, energy, 
transport, coastal integrity, environment, and health. Investing today in climate 
science will lead to significantly reduced costs of coping with the consequences 
of climate change tomorrow. 
The WCRP, one of the international coordinating bodies that informs CCSP/GCRP’s 
agenda (CCSP, 2008d, p.9), embeds this logic in its core mission. Its activities “are 
designed to improve scientific understanding and knowledge of processes that in turn 
result in better forecasts and hence benefits to users of climate research” (WCRP, 2010). 
The prediction imperative, as illustrated above, involves three key assumptions: 
1. that predictions are necessary for effective action in response to climate change;  
2. that continued funding and research will lead to improvements in predictive 
capability; and  
3. that improvements in predictive capability will lead to better outcomes for 
society. 
This logic pervades the climate science community. Dessai et al. (2009a) document 
evidence of these views on the part of scientists, decision makers, and science funding 
organizations dating back as far as 1978 (see also Demeritt, 2001). The Global Change 
                                                      
25 In critiquing the reductionist, instrumentalist view of climate change reinforced by 
GCMs, Demeritt examines the discourse used by scientists, policy makers, and 
importantly, science funding agencies. Pielke describes the administrative (2000a) and 
legislative (2000b) development of the CCSP/GCRP, and discusses the role of the 
prediction imperative in shaping the interagency program. 
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Research Act (PL101-606, 1990) identifies quantitative, model-based predictions as an 
important component of developing usable information (see also Pielke, 1995b, 2000b, 
a). 
In the rest of this section I discuss the conceptual foundations of the prediction 
imperative, and then review several critiques which show that the prediction imperative is 
in considerable tension with what is known about the role of science in decision making. 
It should be noted that an argument against the prediction imperative, does not 
necessarily constitute an outright dismissal of prediction as one among many tools for 
dealing with climate change. The focus of the critique is on the logic of the prediction 
imperative and its embedded assumptions. 
3.1 Conceptual Origins of the Prediction Imperative 
The prediction imperative is based in four general understandings or myths. 
Lasswell uses the term “myth” to describe, non-pejoratively, “relatively stable and 
coherent patterns of perspective” (Lasswell, 1971, p. 25). Schwarz and Thompson 
describe conflicting “rationalities,” each of which, “when acted upon, both sustain and 
justifies the particular organizational form that goes along with it” (1990, p. 8). Ways of 
knowing differ from these broader culturally-based assumptions because they pertain to a 
specific policy issue. However, as Lasswell, Schwarz and Thompson, and others (e.g. 
Weinberg, 1970; Sarewitz, 1996) point out, policy implementation and pursuit of 
knowledge are inextricably linked to these tacitly embedded understandings of the world. 
The four myths about knowledge advance which contribute to the prediction 
imperative are: the linear model of science; rational choice; biophysical impacts; and the 
deficit model of public understanding of science (summarized in Table 3.1). I discuss 
each of these below. 
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Table 3.1.  
Myths contributing to the prediction imperative. 
Myth Summary 
1. Linear Model of Science Advances in knowledge are inherently useful and beneficial. 
2. Rational Choice The quality of human choice is entirely contingent upon information quality. 
3. Biophysical Impacts 
Vulnerability is best understood as stemming from future 
physical impacts of climate change (rather than the 
present-day adaptive capacity of social systems). 
4. Deficit Model More precise and accurate climate information will lead to decisive (desired) action on climate change. 
 
Shackley and Wynne (1995, p. 24) view prediction-driven science policy as a 
manifestation of the “surprisingly tenacious” linear model of science, an inaccurate and 
oversimplified model of the way in which advancing knowledge links with climate policy 
and decision making (see also Nelson, 2004; Lovbrand, 2007; Pielke, 2007, Meyer in 
press [Chapter 2, this volume]). The linear model assumes that advances in knowledge 
are inherently beneficial to society, and that the benefits are both automatic and 
unpredictable. It also assumes a unidirectional flow of knowledge that privileges basic 
research above applied as the originator of all scientific benefit (Stokes, 1997; Jasanoff et 
al., 1998; Pielke and Byerly, 1998). In this way of thinking any marginal improvement to 
climate predictions is assumed to potentially benefit those impacted by climate change. 
The intuition is at odds with decades of research on the role of technical 
information in human and organizational decision making, but consistent with the 
common assumption that humans make choices rationally, based on consistent, coherent 
preferences in full consideration of all the information available (Lindblom and Cohen, 
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1979; March, 1982). Yet people and organizations do not necessarily make choices 
rationally. They are limited in their ability and willingness to acquire information for 
decision making (Simon, 1981; March, 1982; Simon, 1983). They use heuristics based on 
simplified understandings of the world, which in some circumstances may lead to utterly 
irrational choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Camerer and Fehr, 2006). And decision 
making is contingent upon a variety of interacting factors unrelated to information quality 
or quantity, such as time horizon, institutional context, range of participants in decision 
making processes, and shifting understandings and political dynamics of the decision 
making context (Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 2003). Neither the linear model nor 
rational choice provides a realistic account of the role of knowledge in decision making. 
In a review of different approaches to uncertainty and probability in climate 
change adaptation research, Dessai and Hulme (2004) note that researchers who 
understand vulnerability to climate change in terms of adaptive capacity and social 
systems tend to place less emphasis on prediction of future climate events. Instead they 
may use present conditions or historical analogues as a means of understanding the 
implications of climate change. Biophysical researchers, on the other hand, tend to favor 
top-down approaches that take long- to medium-term predictions from GCMs as a 
starting point for deriving measures of vulnerability (see also Lahsen and Nobre, 2007). 
This disciplinary bifurcation helps to explain the prominence of the prediction imperative 
way of knowing among CCSP decision makers. Over the last two decades less than 2% 
of annual funding has been devoted to programs addressing the human dimensions of 
climate change (NRC, 2009b; Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this volume]). One program 
manager put it this way: 
From my perspective, I would rather they forget the decision support, forget all 
this other stuff, and figure out how to put those together—the top down and 
bottom up modeling. I would much rather look at that, because I think that will 
provide some of those answers to the scaling problem, and provide some of those 
things that people who make decisions are gonna need. 
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In her view, the “other stuff” is a distraction getting in the way of the important work of 
prediction. The statement illustrates the perspective of the biophysically-driven research 
agenda, but also highlights the political tension between science-driven and user-driven 
science policy. And it helps to explain why those who reject the prediction imperative 
(discussed further in section 4.5) express feelings of being marginalized and politically 
impotent in the current system. They note that social science research, to the extent that it 
does play a role, has been tacked onto biophysical science in a way that reinforces the 
linear model of science: 
Physical scientists are very good at organizing for big science, and for 
articulating and making a case – they are very good politically.  And social 
scientists…. You could do a whole other global change program just on social 
science, but it became the tail end of physical – and was a somewhat naturally 
defined program.  It was not at all coupled in its original vision, so it became the 
“and then we’ll deliver information that’s useful. Because better information 
always leads to better decisions.” 
Another agrees: 
That’s what this whole thing has been: it’s tacking [human dimensions] on at the 
end. That logic is not the best way to go. You have to have ‘em at the beginning, 
at the middle, and every step of the way. 
 A fourth influential myth is the deficit model of public understanding of science. 
The deficit model associates better public understanding and acceptance of predictions 
with desired policy progress, and greater public support for science. Extensively critiqued 
over recent decades, the deficit model assumes that a lack of public support for science 
stems from the public’s lack of knowledge about science. And from this logic it follows 
that better science literacy should correlate with stronger support for science. There is 
undoubtedly a link between a person’s general knowledge about science and their attitude 
toward science. But an extensive body of research shows that the relationship is far more 
complex than the classic deficit model would suggest (e.g. Miller, 1998; Miller, 2001c; 
Miller, 2004c; Sturgis and Allum, 2004; Wright and Nerlich, 2006). As a highly varied 
enterprise with many and different impacts on the human experience, science is not a 
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monolithic entity to be simply accepted or rejected, nor can rejection of science 
necessarily be attributed to ignorance. Highly informed lay communities may reject 
particular scientific institutions, processes, or conclusions based on a variety of concerns. 
The problem may not be that uncertainty is too high, or specificity too low, but instead 
that current approaches mis-frame a problem or leave out essential components (e.g. 
Wynne, 1991; Epstein, 1995; Jasanoff et al., 1998; Miller, 2000; Jasanoff, 2005). 
 The myths discussed in this section relate directly to various manifestations of 
the prediction imperative as a way of knowing climate science policy. This section has 
provided a brief critique of those myths. In the following section I critique the logic of 
the prediction imperative itself, before moving on to discuss five distinct ways in which 
the prediction imperative is expressed within climate science policy.  
3.2 Questioning the Prediction Imperative 
There are many different kinds of uncertainty associated with GCMs (CCSP, 
2009; Lemos and Rood, 2010; Mearns, 2010), some of which are irreducible, and others 
which cannot even be fully characterized (Rayner, 2000; Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Roe 
and Baker, 2007; Dessai et al., 2009b; Mearns, 2010). The spread among predictions by 
different GCMs is expected to increase as they incorporate more processes, and come to 
reflect the fullness of uncertainty associated with model parameters (Solomon et al., 
2007; Hefferman, 2010). There is also the added difficulty of evaluating model outputs 
and their relationship to the real world. Verification or validation of GCMs (or any model 
of an open system) are acknowledged to be impossible (Oreskes et al., 1994; Oreskes and 
Belitz, 2001; Edwards, 2010). And methods of model “confirmation,” such as agreement 
with observations, or agreement with other models, do not yet offer a reliable means of 
understanding the relationship between model results and real world processes (Tebaldi 
and Knutti, 2007; Abramowitz and Gupta, 2008; CCSP, 2008a; Gleckler et al., 2008; 
Parker, 2009; Abramowitz, 2010; Pirtle et al., 2010 [Chapter 5, this volume]). 
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Some argue that, despite the apparent fundamental limitations on the ability of 
GCMs to predict, any attainable improvement is desirable (Mearns, 2010). Yet there is no 
simple relationship between the technical quality of a prediction and the eventual 
outcome of prediction efforts. Indeed, failed attempts at earthquake prediction seem to 
have generated successes in public policy and increased resilience in the case of 
California (Nigg, 2000). One study found that hurricane evacuation radius actually 
increased (along with social and economic costs) in the 1990s despite increased forecast 
skill (Pielke, 1999a). Improved predictions of seasonal to interannual climate variability 
appear to have had adverse consequences in some cases as well. If provided without 
consideration of social and political systems, such information potentially widens the gap 
between rich and poor, worsens relationships between scientists and users, and negatively 
impacts intergenerational equity (Pfaff et al., 1999; Broad and Agrawala, 2000; Agrawala 
et al., 2001; Miller, 2004b; Lemos and Dilling, 2007). A US Climate Change Science 
Program Synthesis and Assessment Product focused on prediction and decision support 
in the water sector noted (CCSP, 2008b, p.1): 
It is now widely accepted that there is considerable potential for increasing the 
use and utility of climate information for decision support in water resources 
management even without improving the skill level of climate and hydrologic 
forecasts. 
The upshot of these examples is that the social outcomes of prediction efforts are 
tied not just, or even most strongly, to prediction quality, but to institutions and 
circumstances surrounding the delivery and receipt of predictive information. In many 
cases, institutions have prevented improved predictions from benefitting a targeted user 
or even led to the misuse of predictions, and adverse outcomes. For example, Rayner et 
al. (2005) found a variety of cultural, technical, and institutional barriers contributing to a 
general reluctance on the part of water managers to use improved short term climate 
forecasts (see also case studies inPielke, 1999b; Broad and Agrawala, 2000; Herrick, 
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2000; Nigg, 2000; Pilkey, 2000; Rayner, 2000; Miller, 2004b; Cash et al., 2006; Meinke 
et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, successful prediction efforts rely crucially on effective 
organizations that can navigate the social complexities of bringing technical information 
to bear on a particular problem context. Such “boundary organizations” facilitate the 
beneficial use of predictions (and other science outputs) by translating between social 
worlds (e.g. modelers and decision makers), creating meaningful opportunities for 
different actors to achieve their goals (Agrawala et al., 2001; Guston, 2001; Cash and 
Buizer, 2005; NRC, 2009a; Buizer et al., 2010). It should be noted that boundary 
organizations mediate between scientists and decision making communities, and thus do 
not allow scientists to labor in isolation. In general, the use of predictions by non-
scientific communities requires interaction and responsiveness on the part of scientists, as 
well as organizations and individuals who can facilitate that interaction (SPARC, 2005; 
McNie, 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). 
Regardless of the prospects for GCM development, and the existence of 
institutions for delivering GCM results effectively, the prediction imperative can itself be 
problematic for those working to support decision making with useful knowledge. For 
example, a researcher who works with local governments and communities to assess 
vulnerability and build adaptive capacity in the face of climate change said to me: 
We're not in the business of modeling. I don't want to go anywhere near that 
space because that conjures up all sorts of expectations…. That's the whole 
wrong message to be sending—that you can actually model the future. … We 
have to convince the politicians that we don't plan with perfect knowledge. We 
never will. We don't have all the answers. We never will.  
Another researcher called GCMs “the McDonalds of research—cheap and it fills your 
belly, but it's not food. It's crap.” There is a growing community of researchers that argue 
against the use of scenarios and predictions from GCMs (Glantz, 1988; Pielke, 1998; 
Handmer et al., 1999; Lempert and Schlesinger, 2000; Sarewitz et al., 2000; Dessai and 
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Hulme, 2004; Dessai et al., 2009a; Dessai et al., 2009b; Hulme et al., 2009). They see 
climate prediction as just one of many elements used to support decision making related 
to climate change, which is sometimes not even necessary (Dessai and Hulme, 2004; 
Dessai et al., 2009b). Climate change itself may become an important factor in the 
decisions of individuals, communities, businesses, and governments. But it will rarely be 
the most important, and almost never the sole factor upon which decisions are based 
(Adger et al., 2007). In this line of thinking, because a prediction-driven research agenda 
fundamentally misconstrues the problem of climate change as it is experienced and dealt 
with by society, it is unlikely to yield useful information. 
This point about prediction in decision making is made in support of arguments 
about epistemology and research policy. Why should one of many considerations—
climate—be subject to intense predictive modeling efforts, when equally important 
variables associated with political, social, and cultural change are not? Human responses 
to climate change will be inherently social, political, and cultural. Thus, it is at least 
plausible that any attempt to inform such responses should begin with an understanding 
of social systems, rather than biophysical systems dealt with in GCMs (e.g. Handmer et 
al., 1999; Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Nelson et al., 2007; Dessai et al., 2009a; Hulme et al., 
2009; Nelson et al., 2009b; Dovers and Adnan, 2010). 
  Alternative approaches to biophysically driven prediction may still focus on the 
future. For example, a group of researchers at RAND has developed an approach to 
decision support that purposely avoids detailed probabilistic or deterministic predictions 
(Lempert and Schlesinger, 2000; Bankes, 2002; Lempert et al., 2003; Dessai et al., 
2009b). Whereas a typical approach may begin with a search for the most likely future 
and explore its consequences in detail, the RAND approach begins with present day 
options for dealing with a problem. Researchers then work with users to explore the 
consequences of those options in a variety of different plausible (but not necessarily 
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probable) scenarios. The approach starts with the reality of decision contexts, and 
empowers decision makers to collaborate with modelers in exploring future scenarios. 
Note that this approach does not eschew information about the future. Rather, it explicitly 
recognizes that when one starts with the decision context, rather than physical systems, 
highly complex predictions of GCMs are no more useful to decision makers than simple, 
plausible scenarios. 
 Others advocate a focus on present and historical examples as way to understand 
how societies cope with change going forward (cases in Glantz, 1988; Pielke, 1998; 
Handmer et al., 1999; e.g. Barnett, 2001; Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Marshall, 2010). The 
case study or “forecasting by analogy” approach may suffer from the false assumption of 
stationarity in environmental conditions, when it is clear that those conditions are 
changing. But as Glantz noted in 1988 (p.3-4): 
The purpose of looking back is to determine how flexible (or rigid) societies are 
or have been in dealing with climate-related environmental changes. …we must 
not expect analogues to tell us what that future will be. No forecasting system has 
been successful in that endeavor.  
In total, there is no reason to expect that marginal improvements in predictions 
(to the extent that they are even achievable) should result in improved outcomes for 
decision makers, and there is no reason to view predictive capability as the primary 
limiting factor in decision making related to climate change. Furthermore, there are a 
variety of ways in which research may help society to deal with the effects of climate 
change without relying on predictions from GCMs. The arguments presented above do 
not completely delegitimize prediction as one of many tools for addressing problems such 
as climate change. However they do refute the logic of the prediction imperative, which 
reduces problem solving to little more than a quest of marginal improvements to 
predictive capability. 
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4. Prediction in US Climate Science Policy 
Feldman et al. (2006, p. 89) argue that “the fluidity of knowing an issue is an 
opportunity for public managers to use inclusive management practices to facilitate 
deliberation.” The prediction imperative is not a static idea. As with any way of knowing, 
it takes different forms in different contexts, and it is constantly being renewed as the 
policy context evolves, and different actors become involved. Science funding agencies 
and the public managers they employ help to define the structures, relationships, and 
deliberative spaces in which science is governed. They contend with, participate in, and 
influence the terms of debate over what science is worthy of public investments. In 
interviewing and observing individuals who work in the CCSP/GCRP, I aimed to 
examine the role of the prediction imperative in this process of science management. 
In my analysis of interviews and policy documents, I identified several key 
narratives associated with the prediction imperative. These narratives reflect particular 
ways of speaking about or thinking about climate models and prediction, but it is 
important to note that the narratives do not map neatly onto individuals. In other words, 
an individual may have multiple ways of talking about prediction, depending on the 
context in which it arises. In fact, over the course of a one-hour interview, a subject might 
make statements that reflect very different understandings of the role of prediction and its 
importance to climate science.  
Although I give a rough indication of the prominence of each prediction narrative 
below, the goal of the interviews was to map the landscape of opinion rather than 
measure quantitatively the frequency or impact of any particular perspective.  
4.1 Prediction: Inherently Useful and Necessary 
The CCSP/GCRP quite explicitly positions prediction as an essential element of 
dealing with climate change. One of the five core goals of the program is to reduce 
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uncertainty, but as the Program’s most recent science plan notes (CCSP, 2008d, p.18), 
this goal is ultimately about making better predictions: 
Reducing uncertainty is crucial to providing decisionmakers with useful, reliable 
tools for assessing strategies for adaptation, mitigation, and other forms of risk 
reduction. However, … “reducing uncertainty” is only part of the story. 
Improving the projections themselves and understanding both the nature and 
implications of uncertainties are equally important….The thrust of this goal is 
therefore to improve projections, and to characterize their uncertainty, in order to 
improve the utility of projections of how the Earth’s climate and related systems 
may change in the future in response to natural and human-induced forcings. … 
The primary tools for Earth system prediction and projection are computer 
models that reflect the best available knowledge of Earth system processes. 
This statement depicts climate projections from GCMs as essential to achieving one of 
the Program’s overarching public values: useful information for decision makers (see 
Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this volume]). Both useful information and climate 
prediction have been prominent integrating themes in US climate change science since 
the interagency program was formally established in 1990 (PL101-606, 1990; CCSP, 
2008a).  
Program managers implementing climate science policy within the CCSP/GCRP 
tend to hold this view as well. The vast majority of interviewees agreed with the basic 
proposition that prediction is a crucial element of dealing with climate change. As one 
program manager said, “If you can do better prediction, then you can do better adaptation 
prior to impacts; you know—better management.” Another acknowledged, “prediction 
has to be a component of it. It is important. At the same time you have to be careful about 
overselling what predictions can do for you given the uncertainties.” Despite caveats in 
the latter quotation, both examples emerge from a way of knowing in which prediction 
quality (e.g. accuracy, precision) relates directly to decision quality on the part of policy 
makers, managers, and other potential users, and the idea that dealing with climate 
change requires predictions.  
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A less absolute version of the “necessary predictions” narrative acknowledges 
that decision makers can operate without predictions, but insists that predictions are 
always helpful. For example, one program manager said: 
There are many kinds of decision makers. What’s good for one kind of decision 
maker might be useless for another. … Prediction is very helpful. I don’t think 
it’s an absolute must…. Prediction is clearly gonna be useful. … I think it’s 
another way of saying reduce the uncertainties. If you can reduce the 
uncertainties of what’s gonna happen, that’s always useful. 
According to another program manager: 
Prediction is crucial for some things. And prediction is crucial if you want to take 
some big bold actions. So there’s a lotta little actions we can take to have a big 
impact. But it’s these big bold actions where it’s really crucial to get predictions 
right. 
4.2 Predictions of the Future; in the Future. 
A variant of the necessity narrative uses similar logic, but with a focus on current 
limitations and expected advances in prediction. In this view, whatever uses predictions 
have (or lack) today, future improvements to GCMs through increased government 
investment are essential for dealing with the future challenges associated with climate 
change. Shackley and Wynne (1996) identified this “scheduling” of uncertainty 
reductions as a strategy used by scientists to limit the political liability of uncertainty in 
“science-led” debates (see also Congressional testimony cited in Demeritt, 2001; Meyer, 
2006). Shackley et al. (1998, p.166) showed that the value of GCMs as tools for 
understanding the climate and providing policy advice is often assessed in terms of their 
future potential, rather than current capabilities. Assertions that with enough investment 
predictions will become useful are also common among institutions that frame, fund, and 
implement climate science (e.g. NASA, 2007; CCSP, 2008d; WMO, 2008; Doherty et al., 
2009; NCAR, 2009; Shukla et al., 2009; GISS, 2010; WCRP, 2010). Many of the 
quotations in the previous section reinforce the idea that the benefits of predictive 
modeling are just around the corner. In that sense, the necessity narrative and future 
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predictions narrative appear to be compatible: predictions are useful now and will 
become more useful as they improve. 
But in some cases the future predictions narrative involves a focus on the many 
ways in which current predictive models are failing. While this is not necessarily at odds 
with the “inherently useful” narrative, it can sometimes appear that way. The first 
narrative focuses on the idea that prediction is inherently useful; the future narrative is 
related to the idea that incremental advances translate directly into increased utility. The 
WCRP in some instances emphasizes the usefulness of climate predictions, while in 
others it focuses on their limitations (Shukla et al., 2009 p.175): 
Current climate models have serious limitations in simulating regional weather 
variations and therefore in generating the requisite information about regional 
changes with a level of confidence required by society. Use of high-resolution 
regional models to downscale regional climate change is questionable if the 
global models from which lateral boundary conditions are prescribed are not 
realistic. In short, the limitations of current modeling methods are forcing the 
climate science community to consider fundamental changes in its approach to 
meeting the urgent demands of a concerned society. 
One program manager, after emphatically stating the need for predictions on the decadal 
to centennial scale in order to preserve ecosystems, said: 
GCMs are using… despicably horrible representations of how ecosystems 
actually are placed where they are and how they might change with respect to 
changes in climate. They’re completely non-mechanistic, they’re completely 
untested, and when they are tested they fail miserably. They’re not based on any 
science. They’re not based on any science, because we haven’t done any of the 
science, largely. 
Such statements illustrate some tension between the need to demonstrate current 
usefulness (more on this in section 5.3), and an argument that more investments are 
needed to address deficiencies. In any case, the predictive potential narrative draws on 
the linear model of scientific advance in which incremental improvements in knowledge 
can be expected to yield incremental increases in societal benefit. One program manager 
acknowledged the difficulty in demonstrating such a relationship while reaffirming her 
faith in the idea: 
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We don't have the information we need to tell us that if we improved _____ 
forecasting x percent, that it would actually save some lives. And we all kind of 
get to the point in the discussion and don't know what to do about it. …The 
problem is that we get to something like _____ forecasting and have to say, 
“where is the evidence that this is something we should be doing?” And we don't 
have that evidence. But it's just so intuitive that we've just gotta fix this problem 
even though we don't have data that says what it means if we do fix the problem. 
So we're in a bit of a, you know, build it and they will come kinda thing. (blanks 
inserted to preserve anonymity) 
Another person ironically communicated faith that predictions would become more 
useful while describing a warning from a climate modeler that this might not be a valid 
assumption: 
We had a climate modeler at a meeting a couple of weeks ago talking about, you 
shouldn't be mitigating the climate until he had regionalized his climate model 
and advanced things, and it was going to be about ten years from now, because if 
you really started to mitigate it would mess up his ability to understand how his 
model was performing. And he was totally serious. ... this is the kind of laser-
beam focus you need to have in order to be an expert. He's an expert in what he 
does, and we need him to keep doing that. We just don't want him anywhere near 
mitigation policy. 
Interestingly, the program manager completely ignores the climate modeler’s warning 
that his model cannot be validated in a world where emissions reduction policies have 
become a reality. The value and inevitable advance of the science are taken for granted, 
whatever the surrounding policy context. The instinct, consistent with the prediction 
imperative as a way of knowing climate science policy, is to keep working on and 
funding these tools in faith that they will become useful. 
4.3 Predictions as Policy Motivators. 
A third narrative casts predictions as a means of spurring action, rather than a 
resource for those who would take action of their own accord. As one interviewee put it, 
you need to predict because “it’s the forecast of what’s to come that scares the shit out of 
people.” His statement suggests a normative presumption about what “people” should be 
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feeling when it comes to climate change, and he views prediction as a tool for bringing 
that about.26 
Even if it is not about scaring people, the policy motivator narrative reflects the 
idea that better predictions can align the public with the level and type of concern held by 
the manager. One program manager explained it this way: 
Program managers need to feel like we're doing something about getting that 
message out there. These are important problems, whoever the administration is, 
and whatever the agenda is.... We still need better climate projections, and we 
need better assessments of what those things are going to mean for water 
resources, food production…. If you could convince the public—not convince, 
communicate—to the public that in fact a large fraction of the alpine ecosystems 
in the Rocky Mountains will be gone in a few decades, potentially, if tree lines 
actually move up, I think a lot of people would be up in arms about that. 
The subject’s momentary stumble over the words “convince” and “communicate” 
illustrates the tension between his personal views and his official role. He also delineates 
his views from those of the elected officials he serves, making it clear that his values play 
a role in his pursuit of better predictions. In other words, he funds prediction as a way to 
bring about particular actions consistent with his beliefs. Many interviewees linked their 
support of science to the goal of a better informed, more thoroughly convinced public.  
In the view of prediction as a policy motivator, science’s most important role is 
not a process of inquiry or discovery; it is a means of confirmation and demonstration. 
Whereas the necessity narrative assumes a public that is ready, willing, and able to act on 
predictions, the motivator narrative seeks via predictions to overcome perceived 
complacency on the part of society and its political representatives. All three narratives, 
to this point, are variations on the same way of knowing. They posit a causal link 
between prediction and action, but draw on subtly different general myths. The motivator 
narrative is more explicit in articulating how that link actually operates, calling on the 
                                                      
26 It is also worth noting that the subject did not mention any expertise in social 
psychology. 
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deficit model of public understanding of science (in addition to the linear model and 
rational choice).  
4.4 Predictions as Existential for Climate Science 
In the policy motivator narrative, predictions are tools for convincing people to 
do something about climate change. In a few interviews, predictions were seen as 
important for convincing people of the importance of climate science itself. For example, 
one program manager said: “Reducing uncertainty is crucial. Credible predictions are 
crucial. Otherwise we lose credibility and we couldn’t sustain it.” The program manager 
explicitly recognizes that in order to sustain a research program around climate 
prediction, both scientists and science policy makers need to maintain credibility in the 
eyes of a broader public. The statement illustrates a political alignment between scientists 
involved in prediction and the program managers who fund prediction, which I discuss 
further in section 5.3.  
4.5 Dissent 
A small handful of interviewees expressed views in opposition to the dominant 
narratives described above. One of these individuals agreed that there is an overwhelming 
focus on predictions from GCMs, and asserted that this dominance is a distortion of 
climate science priorities: “sometimes scenario development is all a decision maker 
needs. They don’t need a prediction, they just need to know what their options are.” 
Another explicitly rejected on epistemological grounds the idea that better predictions 
will necessarily be helpful: “People who want deterministic knowledge—that’s the refuge 
of small minds. They’re uninformed and don’t understand the nature of knowledge.” 
One program manager had mixed feelings about the role of predictions in 
communicating effectively about the science of climate change: “[Outreach] requires way 
more than the physical modeling. These predictions are almost counter-productive, you 
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know. This one goes that way, and this one goes that way. As far as the outreach goes, 
that’s just totally counter-productive.” 
Only a few individuals expressed entirely negative attitudes toward GCM 
predictions. Several others raised concerns about the dominance of these tools at the 
expense of other options. For them the problem is an imbalance between different viable 
approaches to generating useful knowledge about environmental change. Some of the 
dissenters are social scientists, some are physical or biological scientists, and some have 
no science background whatsoever. Regardless of background, the dissenting view tends 
to come from experience working directly with non-science communities and confronting 
the complexity of decision making contexts. 
5. The Power of the Prediction Imperative 
The narratives described above indicate a stable way of knowing that manifests 
itself in different ways. The same person or organization may express multiple, even 
conflicting versions of the prediction imperative. Some people disagree strongly with the 
it, but they readily acknowledge its dominance in climate science policy. Those 
individuals are well aware of their minority status in a broader community that, for a 
variety of reasons, embraces the idea of predictions as essential to climate science and to 
human responses to climate change. 
In the following section I describe power of the prediction imperative, stemming 
from its wide acceptance in climate science and climate science policy, and the political 
dynamics that help to explain its persistence. Power is an important focus of the WK 
framework. A way of knowing gains power when actors use it as a basis for their 
activities. “Power, in other words, is not what holds the network together but what results 
from the network being held together” (Feldman et al., 2006, p. 90). This section 
examines the ways in which the prediction imperative holds together through interactions 
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among various actors. I focus on three different loosely defined groups: lay communities, 
the scientific community, and science policy decision makers. 
5.1 The Prediction Imperative in Lay Communities 
Those who work on and are professionally invested in GCMs benefit from wider 
acceptance of the prediction imperative. The anecdotes in this section illustrate dynamics 
outside of the science community which reinforce the prediction imperative, and thus 
lend power to a particular approach to climate science. 
I spoke with a researcher whose work focuses on developing adaptation plans 
and vulnerability assessments in local communities. Though not a modeler himself, he 
views climate modeling as an essential component of his work, but not for the reasons 
one might expect: 
You’re basically checking a credibility box that will also give you a security 
blanket against court challenges, skeptics, and perhaps other groups like state 
government. But part way into the process you know that you’re just going to 
chuck the climate data. It’s not even part of the discussion really, because all you 
really need are climate scenarios that are plausible. 
In this person’s experience, even if they don’t use them, many people with an interest in 
adapting to climate change identify predictions as an important part of climate science. 
This is consistent with my own observations of encounters between various “stakeholder 
communities” and members of the broader climate science community at CCSP/GCRP-
sponsored events. Ability to speak about and participate in climate model discourse can 
be important for individuals and organizations looking to gain acceptance to the climate 
regime (Miller, 2001a). Prediction has developed symbolic importance. If they are taking 
climate change seriously, those actors want to feel like GCMs—cutting edge science—
are playing a role in their decision making even if that role is ultimately unhelpful.  
 Participation in climate modeling has become a prerequisite to participation in 
climate policy processes. Australia, for example, makes this reasoning explicit in its 
climate science policy. A key objective of the 2004-2008 Australian Climate Change 
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Science Program is to “maintain world-class expertise to ensure Australia’s key science 
questions are answered and influence the international understanding of climate change 
science” (ACCSP, 2004, p.9). Australia’s current climate science framework (DCC, 
2009a, p.4) continues this logic and applies it specifically to GCMs: 
Australia’s global contribution to climate change science has returned significant 
benefits through access to international knowledge. For example, our investment 
facilitated international collaboration on the development of ACCESS, enabling 
Australian scientists to focus our efforts where we have specific national interests 
and a comparative advantage. 
The aptly named ACCESS is organized around prediction:  
It will deliver a new generation of numerical models to improve our predictive 
ability across the full gamut of time scales from weekly weather forecasting to 
seasonal prediction to climate prediction at the decadal to century scale. (p.4)  
International climate politics, driven in many ways by prediction (Demeritt, 2001; Miller, 
2004a), reinforce the dominance of climate prediction within climate science at the level 
of national science policy. In this view, GCMs are useful in generating political power, 
rather than for informing deicisions. 
The modeling community uses this dynamic to their advantage. The quotation 
from the WCRP in section 3.1 (p. 60) comes from a meeting report that discusses these 
politics explicitly. For example, the report suggests strategies for linking prediction to 
human welfare: “The importance of stressing the global, humanitarian aspects was noted 
when making the case for new and substantial investment” (Shukla et al., 2009, p.178). 
The quotation does not imply cynicism on the part of the report’s authors. They may 
believe strongly in the logic of the prediction imperative and the public value of their 
work. But it does demonstrate a heightened awareness of how public perception and the 
“performance” elements of climate prediction are important in maintaining the cultural 
authority of GCMs (Hilgartner, 2000).  
These anecdotes at the level of local communities through to international policy 
illustrate the symbolic and rhetorical power of GCM predictions. Symbols and rhetoric 
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have practical consequences for public policy (Farmer and Patterson, 2003). If people see 
models as essential, then it is easy for modelers to argue that indeed they are essential, 
and the science policy decision making process must contend with that. In the context of 
limited resources for science, institutions and individuals with a vested interest in 
predictive modeling can only benefit from broad public acceptance of the prediction 
imperative. Public acceptance of the prediction imperative becomes a tool for shaping 
science policy. 
5.2 The Prediction Imperative’s Power Across Scientific Disciplines  
A series of papers by Shackley and colleagues explores the complex internal 
politics of GCM development (Shackley and Wynne, 1995, 1996; Shackley et al., 1998; 
Shackley et al., 1999; Shackley, 2000). One key conclusions from this research is that 
GCMs occupy the pinnacle of a scientific hierarchy within climate science. This 
dominant role is not based on practical or objective evaluations of those tools. Rather, the 
social and political dynamics internal to climate science help to reinforce the notion that 
GCMs are the best tools for producing and applying climate knowledge. They provide a 
detailed account of these dynamics, noting that “GCMers” form “loose coalitions” with 
three different groups: policy makers, the climate impacts community, and the wider 
science community (see Shackley et al., 1998). The shared interests resulting from these 
associations help to augment the perception of GCMs as better than other models or other 
scientific approaches to climate change.27  
As GCMs expand their reach across scientific disciplines through such coalitions, 
they also expand their influence over climate science policy. The CCSP/GCRP and the 
IPCC illustrate the process with a diagram that shows how models have come to include 
                                                      
27 They also note that these relationships are characterized by systematic and mutual 
misunderstandings about what information GCMs can provide and what information 
decision makers need. 
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more and more biophysical processes, in turn calling on more and more areas of science 
(see Figure 3.1). As with any massive presence, GCMs exert gravitational pull on the 
objects around them. Disciplines benefit from this dynamic, capitalizing on a new 
justification for research funds if they can demonstrate their relevance to climate science, 
while in turn taking up the token of the prediction imperative, and adding to its power 
(Shackley et al., 1998). The pull of GCMs can be felt throughout the climate science 
community. Almost every climate-relevant area of science now has programs focused on 
working with GCMs (Edwards, 2010).  
As disciplines take on practices and projects associated with GCMs they are 
influenced and shaped by this very particular approach to representing and understanding 
the world. Edwards (2010, see chapter 15) documents the ways in which the temporal and 
spatial scale of ecological research have evolved to accommodate GCMs (see also Neff 
and Corley, 2009), and Sundberg (2007) describes some general tensions that emerge 
when experimental meteorologists shape their work around the norms of climate models 
in order to gain additional funds. 
The political and epistemic dynamics described above help to explain why 
GCMs have been called “obligatory passage points” for climate knowledge (following 
Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). In Edwards’ sense (2001, 2010), the term obligatory passage 
point simply refers to the fact that global climate change is beyond the limits of 
individual human experience. We cannot know about global climate change without the 
use of a model. But for others (c.f. Shackley and Wynne, 1995; Shackley et al., 1998; 
Sundberg, 2007) the term indicates a political gatekeeper function relating to the role of 
GCMs in producing knowledge. It suggests that the prediction system centered around 
GCMs “wants” to remain a crucial organizer and producer of climate science knowledge. 
In this view, to the extent that new disciplines become involved with climate change, 
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GCMs are constantly repositioned so that they remain central. New knowledges must 
contend with, relate to, and ultimately become a part of GCMs as they evolve. 
But this process does not emerge spontaneously from the actions of scientists. It 
requires the support of organizations that fund climate science, and the managers working 
within them. 
 
Fig. 3.1. Disciplinary expansion of GCMs, illustrated in a diagram used by the 
CCSP/GCRP (2008a, p. 9) and IPCC (2001). 
5.3 GCMs and Science Policy 
US climate science policy is suffused with projects, programs, and infrastructure 
that internalize the prediction imperative. However, it is difficult to measure the precise 
presence and influence of GCMs and prediction relative to the climate research enterprise 
as a whole. The views of program managers on this question differ. One said, “everything 
you do in climate science leads in one way or another to improving models.” Not all 
agree with this, and some fund work that is not in any way aimed at model development. 
For others the combination of observations and models make up the bulk of the program: 
“if you remove GCMs and remote sensing you’re not left with much.”  
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One obvious measure would be the total amount of federal money allocated to 
work on prediction using GCMs, relative to the overall budget for the CCSP/GCRP. The 
percentage is undoubtedly large. However, the entanglement of agency budgets, coupled 
with the ambiguity and inconsistency of budget reporting (NRC, 2009b; Meyer, in review 
[Chapter 2, this volume]) make even a roughly accurate compilation of such a number 
unrealistic. Even with clarity and consistency in budget reporting, the true presence of 
GCMs would remain murky. Simply citing the amount of funding allocated to the three 
major US GCM efforts each year would fail to capture other important elements that rely 
on and contribute to prediction. Other categories of funding, such as global observations 
and monitoring are crucial to building, running, and testing GCMs. But then again, 
observing systems have many uses outside of predictions from GCMs (e.g. Trenberth et 
al., 2006; Edwards, 2010), so one cannot just lump them together into a single category. 
And thousands of government-funded studies spread across thirteen different agencies, 
and across many programs within those agencies, make use of GCM results. Identifying 
and aggregating those studies would be ambiguous at any level of detail.  
In terms of political commitments one can, however, make meaningful 
observations about the presence of GCMs in the CCSP. Of the thirteen federal agencies 
that participate in the CCSP/GCRP, three can claim ownership of a GCM,28 and a fourth, 
the Department of Energy (DOE), contributes major resources to those three efforts in 
terms of funding and computational facilities. In 2008 those four agencies comprised 
88% of the research budget of the CCSP/GCRP. Taking into account space-based 
                                                      
28 NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), NOAA’s Geophysical Fluid 
Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL), and NSF’s National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR), all house GCMs. 
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observations related to global change, that figure climbs to 92% (USGCRP, 2010).29 
Certainly not all of that money is focused on GCMs, or on predictions from GCMs. But 
the four agencies exerting control over the majority of the budget all have a vested 
interest in sustaining that infrastructure.  
Devoting a substantial portion of finite climate science resources to a GCM 
creates inertia in the supply of climate knowledge with long term financial, political, and 
institutional consequences. One program manager noted, “agencies tend to throw their 
supply at the problem, rather than thinking about how the problem should define where 
their investments are.” It is not just that GCMs tie up resources for years (i.e. the 
opportunity cost of funding models, which itself is significant); the simple fact of their 
existence limits future decisions about science investments, and limits opportunities for 
reflection on the range of potential approaches to generating climate knowledge 
(prediction-oriented or not). As one manager noted, when agencies fund an expensive 
tool, “they need to use it. They need to show that it’s useful.”  
And the science community plays an important role in reinforcing this science 
policy dynamic. Another program manager echoed this point with an account of the ways 
in which scientists set their own research agendas: 
One of the ways in which we’re a little bit insular is—look at the [National 
Academy of Sciences], which came out with a report …that can guide what ____ 
and other agencies do. Where do they get their information? Well, they got it 
mostly from academic professors—[primary investigators]. So where do they get 
their funding? Well, they get it from us. Wait, they just told the Academy what 
needs to be done, and the Academy tells us what to do! So there’s this sort of 
circle. 
As the “loose coalitions” of GCMs expand within the scientific community, so does the 
constituency for funding. The creation of GCMs, and the many institutions that house, 
                                                      
29 See Table 3 of the 2010 “Our Changing Planet” report to Congress, which details 
actual expenditures of the Program in 2008 by agency. 2008 is roughly representative of 
spending in other years. 
84 
manage, and coordinate among modeling efforts has endowed a scientific approach to a 
problem, and an entire scientific community with long term support. And in supporting 
and expanding that community, funding for GCMs has created an interest group that 
lobbies hard for the continuation of this policy. As one program manager noted, “the 
scientists, who are CCSP’s traditional major stakeholder group, are watching to make 
sure that you’re not selling them down the river.” The result is a constellation of 
technology, infrastructure, and social institutions with power to align interests of climate 
science and climate science policy. Those associated with a GCM—scientists or 
bureaucrats—benefit from the perception that these are worthwhile investments.  
6. Implications for Public Managers 
A fundamental problem for science policy lies in the choice of how to invest 
resources in scientific inquiry in a way that best serves the public good (Toulmin, 1964; 
Brooks, 1996; Guston, 2000a; Kitcher, 2003; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). The prediction 
imperative presents a significant challenge along these lines: predictions from GCMs are 
not inherently useful, yet the assumption that they are greatly simplifies the task of 
implementing climate science policy and at the same time, satisfies a wide array of actors 
involved with climate science. This section discusses some of the opportunities and 
challenges facing the public managers of climate science. 
6.1 Management Opportunities 
The alignment of interests around GCMs resonates strongly with Braun’s (1993) 
application of principal-agent theory to mission agencies in the US and Europe. The 
agencies participating in the CCSP/GCRP programs are mandated to fulfill the public 
values of science funding by government principals that hold the purse strings, but lack 
the necessary expertise to manage a research enterprise. But the agents (public managers 
and federal agencies) lose much of their power to a third party—the scientific 
community—which can dictate the terms of performance and ensure a researcher-driven 
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science agenda. In this view, the steadily expanding disciplinary scope of GCMs seems to 
inexorably strengthen the position of this third party with respect to science policy.  
For example, as in the quotation above, the National Academy of Sciences plays 
a significant role of the in providing advice and feedback to agencies, and to the US 
Congress. With the satisfaction and guidance of the scientific community serving as a 
powerful indicator of agency performance, the role of the manager appears both passive 
and neutral.  
Braun’s account suggests a limited role for individual managers and agencies in 
countering the “science-push” dynamic of science policy and managing the politics of 
prediction. But others point out that principal-agent theory of public management gives a 
very limited account of what it means to implement policy within a bureaucracy. 
Government is increasingly managed as a complex network of relationships, where 
managers play multiple roles, and exercise different kinds of influence, depending on the 
context. Simple “command and control” models of management break down amid this 
complexity. Managers do not simply execute instructions to achieve easily measured 
results; they actively govern (Feldman and Khademian, 2002; McGuire, 2002). And in 
turn, they are not only responsible for what gets done, but for how it gets done (Denhardt 
and Denhardt, 2000). Managers wield considerable indirect power through their ability to 
create and sustain new relationships, build programs, structure the context of deliberation, 
and cultivate new understandings of policy problems (Feldman and Khademian, 2002; 
Feldman et al., 2006). 
Managers participating in the CCSP/GCRP have many opportunities to influence 
the makeup of research agendas, and shape the terms of debate over science policy. They 
may cultivate relationships with different communities of scientists and decision makers, 
actively seeking ways to involve them in the program, for example as peer reviewers or 
grant applicants. Additionally, they may seek to build relationships with other managers 
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within their agency or in other agencies to leverage resources and create new programs. 
By seeking advice from particular sources on particular issues, agencies and managers 
influence the terms of debate. One manager said to me: “you only commission a 
[National Academy of Sciences] report if you’re looking for a sword or a shield.” 
Managers and agencies also provide advice on policies and programs, both to Congress 
and the Executive. 
A highly networked community such as the CCSP/GCRP offers many 
opportunities for managers to participate in activities through which problems are framed, 
and agendas are formed. The decision to participate actively, or refrain from 
participating, affects the outcomes of these processes. Higher level managers can assign 
staff to participate, or they may withhold resources. The outcome of a program is partly a 
product of the individual personalities involved, and how they choose to engage or 
disengage with the policy process. 
These examples suggest opportunities to renegotiate ways of knowing climate 
science policy, and the prediction imperative.30 In other words, there is a strong argument 
that agencies and public managers can manage the politics of prediction. But this does 
not mean that they will. After all, the processes described above are also ways in which 
the prediction imperative gains influence over climate science policy.  
 Some individuals and communities are already making efforts to combat the 
prediction imperative and offer alternatives. The “dissent” narrative (section 4.5) and the 
literature reviewed in section 3.2 are both examples of this. And on the surface, a shift in 
rhetoric has been occurring over the last several years in climate science policy. One 
program manager described this change: 
                                                      
30 For more general insight on how program managers can innovate within the science 
policy system as well as change the system, see Dilling et al. (2010), and Clark and 
Holliday (2006). 
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There's basically been a paradigm shift. The question before was, fundamentally, 
is it happening? And what's the cause? And now the question is, how fast is it 
happening, what does it mean for us, and what can we do about it? Those are 
fundamentally different questions, and that has changed in the last year, year and 
a half. 
In the course of my interviews with managers in the CCSP/GCRP, I observed many 
similar statements. The Program’s “Revised Research Plan” also reflects the shift toward 
informing responses. While still reinforcing the need for its traditional basic research, it 
indicates (CCSP, 2008d, p.ii) new areas of emphasis: 
CCSP will increasingly address emerging needs for research to more fully 
understand the  impacts of climate change on unmanaged and managed 
ecosystems, human health and  infrastructure, economic, and other human 
systems. 
CCSP will continue to generate science in support of decisionmaking … with an 
increased emphasis on generating scientific results at regional and local scales. 
CCSP will place greater emphasis on communicating with users and stakeholders 
… both to gain the benefit of their experience, perspectives, and input and to 
ensure that the results of CCSP research, monitoring data, and assessments are 
widely and easily available and accessible to potential users of this information. 
The statements do not necessarily cut against the prediction imperative. Indeed, the first 
two statements are compatible with the biophysically-driven linear model. But increased 
emphasis on the role of human dimensions research in delivering outcomes, and a focus 
on involving the users of science in setting agendas are both prominent themes in the 
rhetorical shift which suggest a renegotiation of ways of knowing climate science policy. 
These narratives are compatible with a view of prediction as just one of many 
approaches, rather than an obligatory passage point. 
6.2 Management Limitations 
It remains to be seen whether the rhetorical shift described above will translate 
into a substantive change in the makeup of research portfolios (Meyer, in review [Chapter 
2, this volume]). Below the surface, the both the inertia and gravitational pull of 
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prediction are working against these trends. Some managers noted that promising shifts 
in rhetoric can end up being co-opted by those who favor business as usual: 
At some point, you have all these interacting things going on… and suddenly 
people take it, make a policy change, rearrange deck chairs, and co-opt.  So the 
point is, if you want to do something new and innovative, … you have to learn to 
work with existing structure to keep them moving in the direction that’s similar 
to the one you established when you were an outlier.  When it becomes 
mainstream … you have to keep pushing and pushing to find innovative ways of 
doing things. 
The statement shows the inertia in the system and its tendency to co-opt new ideas, but 
also that this particular manager is actively pursuing the types of opportunities listed 
previously. Another program manager expressed a similar frustration with the way 
evolving high-level rhetoric masks the inertia of the underlying system (emphasis 
original): 
On one hand you're told by Congress, OMB, even department leadership, “we 
have to see results. You've got to put your money where your mouth is.” And yet, 
the moment you direct a penny away from basic fundamental science in a science 
agency like this, everybody—EVERYBODY—stands up and claims that you're 
taking money away from science! The assumption is always that applications 
will grow with new money, never at the expense of science. Well, that's not 
reality. If we get new money, there'll be the expectation that all of it will go to 
basic fundamental research, not applications. 
The quotation refers to a general tension between basic and applied climate science, 
illustrating the biophysically driven mentality described in section 3.1. The role of 
prediction in this dynamic is obviously a powerful one. Another program manager 
complained of the agencies funding GCMs: “they’re building a monopoly instead of 
helping a customer.” Existing programs and new resources both must contend with the 
prediction imperative, limiting the opportunity for entrepreneurial managers who might 
seek new approaches. 
Conservatism in science policy presents barriers to managers trying new 
approaches. A report on the importance of program management in linking knowledge to 
action described these barriers (Clark and Holliday, 2006, p. 16): 
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Systems to bridge research and decision making in the federal government are 
innovative and often entail relatively radical institutional innovations, such as 
new dialogues between users and producers of knowledge, new links across 
agency or discipline stovepipes, intrusion into others’ turf, and generally doing 
things that have not been done before. The response to such efforts by established 
interests may involve resistance, efforts to co-opt, or more generally efforts to 
turn the radical innovation into something less threatening that has been done 
before, or something that is more likely to survive existing evaluation systems. 
Successful projects and programs create safe spaces in which to carry out their 
experimental innovations. Such spaces protect innovators from hostile takeovers, 
encourage experimentation, and embrace error.  
There is no simple way to overcome such barriers. Insulating innovative programs from 
normal institutional pressures may be effective for the purposes of an individual program, 
but it can also prevent positive feedbacks and lessons learned from impacting the system 
more broadly (e.g. SPARC, 2005).  
7. Conclusions: Should Managers Challenge the Prediction Imperative? 
 Pielke et al. (2000) review a series of case studies in which “the quest for 
prediction products can in some cases undermine the societal goals that originally 
motivate the quest,” and in which “decision making might be improved through less 
reliance on predictions” (p. 363; original emphasis). A key problem, they argue, lies in 
the view of prediction as a discrete product, rather than a process with many moving parts 
both social and technical: 
…the existence of a prediction enterprise has not been recognized as such, in 
part, perhaps because prediction seems like such a natural part of science…, 
society…, and policy…. Yet the prediction enterprise is as real and pervasive as 
“the economy” or “the medical system.” As with the medical system, for 
example, one can look in many directions for accountability: to scientists, the 
media, government regulators, politicians, special interests, the nonexpert public. 
But unlike the economy or the medical system, little attention has been focused 
on the prediction enterprise.” (p. 363) 
GCMs, of course, are not lacking in attention. The predictions of GCMs undergo 
relentless scrutiny and evaluation through intercomparison projects; the assessment 
process of the IPCC; and a variety of formal and informal venues such as the 
blogosphere, where debates rage over issues such as data quality, transparency, the 
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conduct of scientists, and the validity of model results. Controversies such as the 
University of East Anglia scandal, in which thousands of emails among climate scientists 
were made public, demonstrate that the scrutiny goes far beyond the rightness or 
wrongness of predictions. Some have argued that the mere fact of this relentless process, 
which far exceeds any normal scientific standards, justifies accepting GCM predictions as 
the basis for legal decisions (e.g. Farber, 2007).  
 But one important kind of accountability is still missing. Scrutiny of GCMs has 
focused on the product and the underlying system for producing it, but there is little space 
for reflection on whether that system is creating public value. Are GCMs helping? In 
what ways should they be expected to help? What is the opportunity cost of prediction as 
an obligatory passage point for climate knowledge? And who is responsible for opening 
up space for that deliberative, reflective process?  
  One answer is that the agencies and their employees who fund science on behalf 
of the public are responsible. Recalling the RSD framework, science policy decision 
makers do not just ensure supply; they also have a duty to ensure that supply and demand 
are appropriately reconciled. However, the many barriers described above suggest a 
flawed system, in which reconciling supply and demand requires challenging existing 
norms and structures.  
Some argue that the inevitability of flawed governing systems provides a 
rationale for managers to take the initiative and become strong leaders, promoting 
institutional change (Behn, 1998; Feldman and Khademian, 2002; Feldman et al., 2006) 
In this spirit, WK framework offers a perspective that managers can use to “create 
opportunities for new ways of knowing to emerge” (Feldman et al., 2006, p. 89). Ways of 
knowing are not static. As shown by the evolving rhetoric of climate science policy, they 
are continuously renewed, contested, and rearticulated. Managers have a duty to use this 
process to expand opportunities for participation in climate science, and to create space 
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where new relationships can form around new articulations of climate science (see also 
Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). 
This paper has shown the role of the prediction imperative in shaping climate 
science policy. It is a powerful way of knowing that reinforces a science-driven agenda 
and crowds out other approaches that might generate public useful information more 
effectively, but which do not involve the use of predictions from complex models.  
The prediction imperative’s entanglement with climate science policy is far from 
straightforward. It is embodied in physical, cultural, political, and institutional structures 
that both rely on the prediction imperative and help to reinforce it. It is deeply entrenched 
in climate science policy through myth, political dynamics, institutional structures, and 
CCSP/GCRP participants’ shared ways of knowing. It stems from broad science-driven 
myths about knowledge advance, and the political realities resulting from the support of 
large, expensive, and complex technologies such as GCMs.  
The vision of a climate science policy system focused on decision context, rather 
than a prediction agenda, does not exclude GCMs, nor would it eliminate predictions. 
The intent of this paper has not been to argue that predictions from GCMs are useless, but 
rather that they are not inherently useful. They represent only one among many means of 
advancing knowledge about, and action on, climate change. The prediction imperative 
resists this idea. When GCMs function as obligatory passage points, they effectively 
foreclose other options for generating public benefits through scientific research.  
The politics of prediction result from a set of mutually reinforcing relationships. 
While these do create inertia in the system, they are not immovable. The task of 
managers (and others) seeking to support user-driven climate science is to understand 
those dynamics and work to cultivate new relationships and new structures that expand 
the opportunities for democratic deliberation and science policy innovation. 
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Chapter 4 
MANAGING ADAPTATION RESEARCH: SCIENCE POLICY CHALLENGES IN 
AN EMERGING OUTCOMES-FOCUSED RESEARCH ENTERPRISE 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the belief that climate change had to be prevented by mitigation 
of greenhouse gas emissions has given way to a recognition that some climate change is 
inevitable, regardless of future emissions. If some impacts from climate change are 
unavoidable, and already under way, then the need for adaptation is also unavoidable (see 
Adger et al., 2007; Pielke et al., 2007). In 2008, the Australian government solidified this 
growing recognition, by making climate change adaptation (hereafter referred to simply 
as adaptation) one of the three pillars of its climate change programs (the other two are 
reducing emissions and helping to shape a global solution).31 
Recognizing adaptation as necessary raises a host of follow-on questions. What 
specifically will people, places, institutions, and ecosystems be adapting to? What does it 
mean to adapt? What will change? What should change? What must be preserved? How 
does adaptation relate to, or balance with, mitigation? Debates over spatial scale, 
temporal scale, level of governance, intellectual frameworks, and values frameworks all 
arise. Though it remains small in comparison with climate science, adaptation research 
focused on these and other questions has grown rapidly in the last ten years as measured 
by articles published on the topic, and by the breadth of involvement from a wide range 
of disciplines (Preston and Stafford Smith, 2009; Barnett, 2010).  
 Science necessarily plays a complicated role in these debates. Adaptation is, to 
use Weinberg’s (1972) term, a “trans-science” issue. One may pose questions about 
                                                      
31 See http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/government.aspx, accessed 8 September, 
2010. Since 2008 the Department has absorbed a fourth priority: energy efficiency.  
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adaptation in scientific terms, but the choice of how to answer the question, embedded as 
it is in complex social systems, inevitably involves value judgments (see also Toulmin, 
1964; Kitcher, 2003). Thus, adaptation can be addressed by science, but it is not 
ultimately resolvable through science alone. Science under such circumstances demands, 
some have argued, participatory processes and user-oriented approaches to ensure 
democratic accountability (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Gibbons, 1999; Nowotny et al., 
2001). There is also increasing recognition by researchers that both adaptation research 
and climate science in general require various forms of ongoing interaction between 
scientists and potential users (who also possess and produce various forms of important 
knowledge) in order produce useful results which are promised in arguments for funding 
(Meinke et al., 2006; McNie, 2007; NRC, 2009a; Buizer et al., 2010). These trends 
suggest processes and goals not traditionally supported by science-driven institutions 
focused primarily on advancing knowledge, yet most climate change research has been 
sponsored by and performed in such institutions.   
Governments are beginning to grapple with these science policy32 challenges. For 
many years adaptation research was fragmented and ad hoc, but it has recently emerged 
as an organizing principle for research, and governments have begun funding it often in 
conjunction with emerging adaptation policy programs. These are not just new pots of 
money. As Corley et al. (2006, p. 976) point out, “creating and managing large research 
collaborations has become, essentially, an exercise in building institutions and multi-
organizational frameworks.” New research organizations such as these can be thought of 
as attempts to “promote planned change” (Corley et al., 2006, p. 979). Governments are 
                                                      
32 Science policy is the set of processes through which organizations and individuals 
fund, manage, prioritize, and evaluate scientific research. 
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organizing research around this trans-scientific issue for a specific purpose, which creates 
expectations that the research will conform to a specific set of values and goals.  
How should adaptation research be organized? Examining early efforts can yield 
some valuable insights into the general science policy challenges posed by adaptation 
research, and offer recommendations for these specific efforts as they move forward. 
Science policy is an important component of the recognized need to, in the words of 
Barnett (2010, p. 314), “understand the ways in which institutions—i.e., the reasonably 
predictable arrangements that structure transactions and relationships in a society—
enable and/or constrain adaptation to climate change” (see also Adger et al., 2007; 
Dovers and Adnan, 2010). This paper uses the Public Values Mapping (PVM) framework 
(Bozeman, 2003, 2007; Bozeman and Sarewitz, in review) to assess the progress of two 
new national-level adaptation research efforts in Australia against the criteria of public 
values that underpin those investments.33 
The study adds to a growing body of work investigating science policy in the 
context of government-funded, mission-driven organizations with a mandate to deliver 
science outcomes consistent with user needs (Campbell and Schofield, 2007; Dilling, 
2007; Lahsen and Nobre, 2007; Logar and Conant, 2007; Lovbrand, 2007; Logar, 2009) 
and with the public values that justify the use of government funds (Gaughan, 2002; 
Maricle, in review; Slade, in review-b; Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this volume]). 
Among many findings, this work consistently identifies and traces the impacts of 
assumptions about the relationships between knowledge advance and societal benefit. 
These “science values” (Logar, in review; Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this volume]) 
                                                      
33 The existence of two parallel efforts in the same general policy context provides an 
excellent opportunity for comparison. It is also important that Australia has created these 
institutions in a policy space distinct from climate science (as opposed to the US, where 
adaptation related research occurs in the general context of climate science). 
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construct links between a particular scientific product or process and the public values 
that motivate science investments in the first place. By making explicit the interplay of 
science values and public values, PVM invites reflection on the practice of science 
management and its organizational context. 
Over the course of six months in 2010 I conducted 42 semi-structured interviews 
with individuals in the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility 
(NCCARF) and CSIRO’s Climate Adaptation Flagship (CAF) to examine how these two 
organizations have implemented adaptation research with respect to public values and 
science values. Subjects included researchers, administrative staff, high-level managers, 
and departmental officials. I interviewed people who are managing these organizations, 
as well as scientists who are, to varying extents, managed by the organizations, and 
managing science within them. Some interviewees play multiple roles within the system, 
for example by maintaining a personal research program, while leading a larger group of 
scientists. Most interviews consisted of two parts: general questions about the nature of 
adaptation and adaptation research, which were recorded; and specific questions about 
NCCARF and CAF, which were not recorded due to the sensitive nature of these 
questions and the small size of the adaptation research community in Australia.  
I also conducted participant observations while attending meetings, workshops, 
and conferences associated with the two programs. My data are supplemented with 
analysis from a variety of policy documents and reports from each of the two programs, 
including a recent consultancy report for NCCARF (Campbell and Morvell, unpublished) 
not yet released to the public. After a brief description of CAF and NCCARF in section 2, 
I present an inventory and description of the public values and science values associated 
with adaptation research in Australia in section 3. This lays the groundwork for an 
account of individual challenges facing each organization in section 4, and a discussion 
of the interplay between public values and science values in section 5. 
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2. Adaptation Research in Australia: NCCARF and CAF 
2.1 Policy Context 
 The term “adaptation” is often presented as relatively new to Australian policy 
discourse on climate.34 However, the problem of coping with extreme and variable 
climate is deeply embedded in Australian identity. Shifting weather patterns play an 
important role in many stories of early European settlement (Meinke et al., 2006). Several 
interviewees, speaking about the origins of adaptation as a concern in Australia, 
mentioned to me the iconic and patriotic poem, “My Country,” by Dorothea Mackellar. 
Written in the early 1900s, the piece makes reference to recurring flood and drought in 
this “sunburnt country” (see also Leith, 2009). More recently, improved understandings 
of climate variability have led to a variety of programs focused on connecting climate 
science knowledge to policy frameworks related to sustainability in a variety of sectors, 
and to user communities, particularly in agriculture (Meinke and Stone, 2005; Meinke et 
al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2007; Buizer et al., 2010; Lemos and Rood, 2010). The potential 
for synergies between climate variability focused programs and climate change 
adaptation programs is well recognized (McKeon and Howden, 1993; Meinke et al., 
2007). 
 In recent years, adaptation policy discourse in Australia has focused on the 
knowledge needs of governments, businesses, and other groups affected by the 
unavoidable impacts of climate change.35 Interdisciplinary research is cast as a crucial 
                                                      
34 Recent government reports on adaptation (e.g. Allen 2005, PMSEIC 2007) have 
asserted the newness of adaptation as a category of research. But some interviewees 
pointed out that agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, 
were issuing calls for proposals focused on climate change adaptation as far back as the 
early 1990s.  
35 For the sake of tractability, this study focuses primarily on adaptation research policy at 
the national level. At the state-level, where adaptation has been on the agenda for longer 
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ingredient for dealing with these challenges successfully. A report on adaptation policy 
commissioned by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)36 in 2004 called for 
increased financial support and better coordination of the research required to support 
adaptation policy at all levels of government (Allen, 2005). This advice was reflected in 
COAG’s (2007) National Climate Change Adaptation Framework, which discusses 
Australia’s ability to adapt primarily in terms of the knowledge and information needs of 
decision makers. The Framework called for the establishment of a National Climate 
Change Adaptation Centre, which would coordinate adaptation policy and research: 
Establishing the new ‘Australian centre for climate change adaptation’ will 
provide governments, industry and the community with clear and reliable 
information to assess risks and develop adaptation strategies. The centre will 
have a strong focus on the needs of decision makers and will synthesise and 
communicate existing and emerging knowledge for adaptation. Its central role 
will be to strategically focus research efforts in areas of common benefit, link 
existing research organisations and coordinate multidisciplinary and cross 
sectoral investigations. Its form will be uniquely Australian, reflecting the diverse 
and varied nature of expected climate change impacts in a country as big as 
Australia, and enabling a flexible approach that can quickly respond to changing 
needs of governments, industry and the community. (p.6) 
In 2007 Prime Minister John Howard followed through on this framework by pledging 
AUD$170 million in funding for adaptation research.  
 From that pool of funding, two major research programs have emerged: the 
National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) in the Department of 
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE), and the Climate Adaptation Flagship 
(CAF) at CSIRO.37 Each aims to build capacity in the area of adaptation research, deliver 
                                                      
in some cases, there are many policy and research programs. Wilkins (2008) provides a 
list, although the landscape is evolving quickly, and it is already out of date. 
36 COAG is the highest level coordinating body in Australia which includes national, 
state, and local government representation. 
37 The “Centre” referred to in the Framework was never created. It was meant to be an 
umbrella organization that coordinated adaptation research and adaptation policy. Instead 
of creating the Centre, the incoming government that replaced John Howard shortly after 
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useful information to decision makers, and coordinate research across a wide range of 
disciplines and institutions. Though similar in motivation, each of these adaptation 
research programs exists in a distinct organizational and political context. This has led to 
different structures and modes of operation, and to a different set of experiences with 
respect to science management and the implementation of science policy. These are 
summarized in Table 4.1, and described below. 
                                                      
his announcement left the $80 million that was not allocated to CAF or NCCARF for use 
by DCCEE. 
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Table 4.1. 
Key Elements of NCCARF and CAF 
 
NCCARF CAF 
Network of networks across universities. 
Mixed top-down and bottom-up planning. 
Matrix management across CSIRO. 
Top-down planning. 
Purpose 
To lead the Australian research community in a 
national interdisciplinary effort to generate the 
information needed by decision-makers in 
government, and in vulnerable sectors and 
communities, to manage the risks of climate change 
impacts 
 
Delivering the best available scientific information 
and expertise to support Australia's efforts to adapt 
to climate change today in a practical and effective 
way. 
 
Thematic Structure: 
• Terrestrial Biodiversity;  
• Marine Biodiversity &  
• Resources;  
• Freshwater Biodiversity;  
• Primary Industries; 
• Settlements and Infrastructure;  
• Human Health;  
• Social, Economic & Institutional Dimensions;  
• Emergency Management; and 
• Indigenous Communities.* 
 
• Species and Ecosystems; 
• Adaptive Primary Industries; 
• Cities and Coasts; and 
• Pathways to Adaptation. 
Funding Sources 
DCCEE 
$20 million for core operations 2008-2012 
$30 million potential support of research plans 
(administered externally) 
 
Internal funds: 
$44 million over 4 years 
Leveraged from industry and other sources: 
[unavailable] 
Use of funds 
Create networks, build capacity, prioritize for future 
research, workshops and other events, 
communications. 
 
Conduct research, build capacity, influence research 
culture, workshops and other events, 
communications. 
Metrics and Evaluation 
Output- and operations-focused deliverables such as 
networks and NARPs (as opposed to outcomes) 
Operational review conducted by Triple Helix LLC 
 
Deliverables: capacity, knowledge output, and 
impact (with some tension between the latter two) 
Corporate stakeholder surveys and interviews 
 
Major Challenges 
Insufficient science management experience and 
capacity. 
No mechanism for building substantive, lasting 
stakeholder relationships. 
No mechanism for aligning research with public 
values. 
Unclear role for institutional partners. 
 
 
Tension between capability side and flagships. 
Insufficient translation and cooperation among 
research themes. 
Professional advance of scientists based on 
publications and not public values. 
Rejection of public values in favor of science values 
on the part of some researchers. 
 
* The Indigenous communities theme was added only recently. 
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2.2 The National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) 
 The National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) is a 
university-based initiative funded by Australia’s Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency (DCCEE).38  That department, which also manages the Australian 
Climate Change Science Program (ACCSP), solicited competitive bids for program 
funding in 2007. The Department Minister at the time, Malcolm Turnbull, selected a 
proposal put forward by Griffith University in partnership with the Queensland state 
government and seven other universities, and NCCARF was officially established at the 
Griffith’s Gold Coast campus in May, 2008 (more on this selection process below).  
Following directly from the COAG adaptation framework, NCCARF’s mission 
(NCCARF, 2010b, p.2) is: 
To lead the Australian research community in a national interdisciplinary effort 
to generate the information needed by decision-makers in government, and in 
vulnerable sectors and communities, to manage the risks of climate change 
impacts. 
Despite the focus of the mission on generating information, NCCARF’s activities support 
very little research. Especially in its early phase, NCCARF’s operations have consisted 
mainly of priority-setting for scientific research, capacity building, synthesis and 
integration of existing research, and communication.  
As a first step in building a research agenda, NCCARF identified eight priority 
areas (listed in Table 4.1) around which to develop National Adaptation Research Plans 
(NARPs). Each NARP drafting team was led by a prominent academic in the field, and 
involved researchers from across the country. The purpose of the NARPs as stated on the 
NCCARF website (NCCARF, 2010a) is to: 
                                                      
38 The term “energy efficiency” (the “EE” of DCCEE) was added to the Department’s 
title in early 2010, which explains a number of reports cited as “DCC” rather than 
DCCEE. Before 2007 the Department was known as the Australian Greenhouse Office 
(AGO). 
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identify critical gaps in the information available to decision-makers in key 
vulnerable sectors and regions, set national research priorities, and identify 
science capacity that could be harnessed to conduct priority research. 
NCCARF has also established research networks for the eight themes, each 
convened and hosted at universities around the country. These networks, according to 
NCCARF, aim to: 
1. Promote and facilitate open exchange of information and sharing of resources. 
2. Contribute to the work of NCCARF in synthesising existing and emerging 
research. 
3. Contribute to the development and implementation of National Adaptation 
Research Plans. 
4. Nurture the careers of young investigators and research students by promoting a 
sense of community, collaboration and strong, effective mentoring. 
Each network has drawn in hundreds of participants through email lists and other 
communications, with total membership reported at 2800 in the NCCARF Phase 1 report 
(NCCARF, 2010b). They have also worked in various ways to raise the external visibility 
of adaptation research through events, publications, and other outreach. Additional 
activities carried out by some research networks include support for students, synthesis of 
existing and ongoing research, workshops, seminars, and visits by international scholars. 
For the initial 4-year phase, DCCEE contributed $10 million to NCCARF’s core 
operation, and another $10 million to the administration of the eight Adaptation Research 
Networks. DCCEE also has $30 million for a research grants program targeting the eight 
identified themes, but little of this money has been disbursed at this point, and NCCARF 
is not administering those funds directly. 
The goals of building capacity and benefitting stakeholders are not 
unprecedented in Australian research policy, but NCCARF’s approach to fulfilling them 
is unique. Two main features of NCCARF set it apart from other long-term, multi-
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institutional, stakeholder focused research efforts such as cooperative research centers 
(CRCs). The first is its management structure. Although DCCEE has contracted with an 
external group—Griffith University—to manage the program, the Department has 
maintained a highly active role in most of the decision making processes, often down to 
the level of individual projects. By contrast, the role of the partners (the Queensland state 
government and six other universities) in management and high level strategy was never 
formally clarified.  
A second unique feature of NCCARF’s structure is its lack of significant funds 
for research. Control of research funds remains in the hands of DCCEE, which is 
distributing $30 million according to processes it sets up and manages internally, in some 
cases through partnerships with external groups such as the National Health and Medical 
Research Council or the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation. This is a 
notable departure from the Australian Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) model, in 
which partner institutions contribute resources to the enterprise in return for the exclusive 
right to compete for funding (Campbell and Schofield, 2007; O'Kane, 2008).39 
2.3 The CSIRO Climate Adaptation Flagship 
 The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) is 
Australia’s largest public science organization, with an annual budget of roughly $1.2 
billion (CSIRO, 2010b). As stated in its recently updated “Code of Conduct,” CSIRO’s 
core functions are to (CSIRO, 2010c): 
carry out scientific research to: assist Australian industry and further the interests 
of the Australian community; and contribute to national and international 
objectives and responsibilities of the Australian Government; and encourage or 
facilitate the application and use of the results of CSIRO scientific research.  
                                                      
39 Similar to NCCARF, CRCs are generally undertaken in situations where a long term 
effort to build scientific capacity in a priority area is needed. Partner institutions 
contribute fiscal and intellectual resources in exchange for exclusive rights to compete for 
government funds. See Campbell and Schofield (2007), and O’Kane (2008). 
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Since the 1990s, CSIRO has been gradually moving from a structure organized around 
academic disciplines to one focused on broad, high-profile problems of national 
significance (Syme, 2005). A major step in this evolution came with the announcement of 
the National Research Flagships program in 2003. CSIRO Flagships organize 
collaborative, multi-disciplinary research around national priorities (e.g. climate 
adaptation; energy; light metals; preventative health) in a top down fashion. They draw 
from across the organization’s disciplinary strengths (often referred to as the “capability 
side”), and by building partnerships with external groups (CSIRO, 2006; O'Kane, 2008; 
CSIRO, 2010a). The Climate Adaptation Flagship (CAF) was established in 2008, and is 
now one of ten National Research Flagships.  
 A key aspect of the current CSIRO structure is the divide between the problem-
focused interdisciplinary flagships, and the “capability side,” which is organized around 
disciplines. Researchers are employed through the capability side and are typically 
evaluated by their supervisors based on quantity and impact factor of publications in 
academic journals, and patents (Syme, 2005). These key indicators are reported up 
through the hierarchy (e.g. CSIRO, 2009). But in order to conduct research, CSIRO 
scientists must become involved in projects and pursue funding. Flagships increasingly 
represent opportunities to do both of these things, and they use their resources to 
influence researchers. Ideally, scientists doing research under the auspices of a flagship 
are bringing their work in line with Flagship priorities, goals, and values, and leading to 
beneficial social outcomes. 
 CAF is organized into four themes (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1), three of which 
focus on broad sectors (Species and Ecosystems; Adaptive Primary Industries; and Cities 
and Coasts). The stated purposes of the fourth theme, Pathways to Adaptation, is to: 
develop a systematic approach to identifying how different types of regions, 
sectors and communities may respond to climate change at different scales, to 
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provide an evidence base for tailoring research, information and policy to meet 
specific needs.  
The name “pathways to adaptation” is thus somewhat misleading. In practice the tangible 
pathways to adaptation occur in the other three themes as they build relationships with 
government, community, and industry stakeholders through individual projects. As 
indicated by Figure 4.1b, the Pathways theme aims to provide research to the other three 
sector-focused themes in various forms (methods, tools, data), and takes a more academic 
and theoretical approach to the problem of identifying pathways.  
CAF leadership consists of high-profile scientists filling the positions of Director, 
Science Director, and Theme Leaders, who work together to manage the Flagship with 
the support of a small staff. Though they continue to participate in research, they devote a 
significant amount of their time to administration. Each theme leader is responsible for 
the overall strategy and performance of his theme,40 and for delivering “research 
outcomes which have a significant impact for the economy, society and/or the 
environment.”41 There is also an element of mentorship in this role. Theme leaders must 
establish an internal culture that is consistent with Flagship values and priorities. In 
addition to funding projects, each theme holds regular internal workshops that bring 
participants together, publishes reports, commissions white papers, and develops outreach 
materials.  
 All CSIRO flagships are evaluated individually and in the aggregate based on 
several criteria (CSIRO, 2009): 
" Impact (Demonstrated adoption of outputs; Progress along “path to impact”); 
                                                      
40 As it stands, all four theme leaders are male. 
41 Theme leader position description as of 2007. 
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" Science (Number of refereed publications and inventions; Journal impact 
factor); 
" Relationships (External earnings from partners; Number of partnerships); and 
" Resources (Total investment; Use of “Collaboration Fund”) 
CAF’s leadership are responsible for demonstrating progress in all of these measures, so 
it is in their best interest to communicate very clearly the expectations they have of 
participating researchers.  
 
Fig. 4.1. CAF Structure: a) long term vision of each CAF theme (adapted from CSIRO, 
2009, p.13); and b) CAF thematic structure and feedbacks among themes (adapted from 
CSIRO, 2007, p.2). 
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3. Public Values and Science Values Inventory for Adaptation Research in Australia 
My interviews with adaptation researchers and science policy decision makers 
show a wide diversity of views about what adaptation is, what adaptation research is, and 
how the two should function. But despite this variation within the research community, a 
consistent set of public values forms a basis for government support of adaptation 
research (Table 4.2). By justifying investments in adaptation research, public values 
provide a set of criteria against which to assess the programs managing those 
investments. Bozeman (2007, p.13) defines the public values of a society as: 
those providing a normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and 
prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the 
obligations of citizens to society, the state and one another; and (c) the principles 
on which governments and policies should be based. 
Public values do not prescribe specific policy action. Acceptance or use of particular 
public values such as air quality, public health, or human dignity (in other words, 
agreement that these are good, desirable things), by no means precludes deep conflict 
over the way in which they might be achieved, or over their importance relative to one 
another. Furthermore, the term “normative consensus” is not meant to imply universal 
agreement. Public values may simply be asserted as justification of a policy or program, 
or in other cases even posited by the researcher conducting a PVM analysis (Bozeman, 
2007). The key feature of public values is that they serve as a basis for collective action. 
Public values failures occur when programs fail to fulfill public values that explicitly 
motivated them. 
Public Value Mapping (Bozeman, 2003, 2007; Bozeman and Sarewitz, in 
review) uses public values as a basis for policy assessment, and thus makes a distinction 
between the public values framework and other value systems which might guide policy 
implementation. Market value, for example, is a powerful and widely used concept in 
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policy analysis. But a positive market-based outcome (such as economic growth, or 
industry profits) does not necessarily correlate with success in terms of public values. A 
variety of case studies has demonstrated this logical disconnect (Gaughan, 2002; 
Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2005; Feeney and Bozeman, 2007; Maricle, in press; Logar, in 
review; Maricle, in review; Slade, in review-a, b; Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this 
volume]). Recognizing that economic gains do not necessarily lead to public value does 
not invalidate economic frameworks, but it demonstrates that tools such as PVM have an 
important role to play in policy analysis (see Bozeman, 2007).  
“Science values” are based on assumptions about how knowledge works in the 
world. Many are based in pervasive myths and norms about advancing knowledge, such 
as the linear model of science (e.g. Rosenberg, 1982; Stokes, 1997), or Weinberg’s 
(1970) “axiology of science.”42 As with the market values framework, success in terms of 
science values does not necessarily translate into public values success. Yet science 
values play an influential role in the establishment and implementation of science policy. 
Previous PVM case studies (Meyer, in preparation [Chapter 3, this volume]; Logar, in 
review; Maricle, in review; Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this volume]) have shown 
incorrect or problematic science values often supersede public values in the 
implementation and evaluation of research policy. 
A variety of sources can provide information about public values, including 
public law, a government’s founding documents, the results of surveys and public polls, 
or the missions and visions of public institutions (Bozeman, 2007; Bozeman and 
                                                      
42 In the linear model, sometimes also referred to as the “reservoir model,” advances in 
applied science rely on new findings from basic research. Stokes demonstrates that this is 
both oversimplified and in many cases inaccurate. Weinberg’s axiology is a set of norms 
within the scientific community relating to what kinds of research is “best.” For example, 
“pure is better than applied,” and “general is better than particular.” For the purposes of 
science policy, such subjective assumptions may or may not be appropriate depending on 
circumstances. 
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Sarewitz, in review). This study uses statements that consistently appear throughout 
government reports and policy documents as assertions of both public values and science 
values against which science policy may be assessed. Such statements from high level 
policy discourse do not themselves establish public values. Rather, they use existing 
public values (following Bozeman’s definition above) as a basis for policy making.  
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present public values and science values statements from a 
variety of sources associated with the Australian government’s policies for, and planning 
of, adaptation research. Consistent with the explanation of public values above, the 
statements are not universally accepted, nor are they necessarily compatible with one 
another in the context of adaptation research (indeed a key element in PVM, addressed in 
section 5, is to identify interconnections among values and examine them for logic, 
consistency, and plausibility). Yet they have all been put forward as a basis for using 
public funds for adaptation research, and thus provide a framework for assessing the two 
national level adaptation research efforts that have emerged from that policy process.  
In the rest of this section I provide a brief description and background for each of 
the public values (Table 4.2) underpinning adaptation research in Australia and 
commonly expressed science values from a similar range of sources(Table 4.3). I 
supplement these descriptions with results from my interviews with researchers and 
managers, and document analysis, in order to show how these values manifest in the 
Australian adaptation research community. This context lays the groundwork for an 
assessment of the two cases, CAF and NCCARF, a discussion of the dynamics 
surrounding public and science values, and some concluding recommendations. 
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Table 4.2.  
Public Values Underpinning Australian Adaptation Research. 
Public Values 
PV1: Meeting User Needs for Decision Making 
" “[The Government] is developing a comprehensive adaptation policy to help Australia manage the 
serious social, economic and environmental risks from these impacts and investing in the research, 
tools and information needed by communities, industry and governments for effective adaptation 
planning.” (DCC, 2009b, p.vi) 
" The Government’s key role in adaptation should be to facilitate informed decision making across 
the economy. (Wilkins, 2008, p.8) 
" “[National Government should] provide decision support tools that could assist local government, 
the private sector and households to integrate climate risks into key decisions.” (Allen, 2005, p.xv) 
" “Sound advice for decision makers is essential for vulnerability assessment and adaptation 
planning.” (COAG, 2007, p.6) 
" “The Working Group recognises the need to increase the planning capacity of industries, 
communities and regions so they can engage more effectively in adaptation research and 
development. We need to communicate our knowledge and develop practical adaptation tools.” 
(PMSEIC, 2007, p.2) 
" Communicate practical adaptations and encourage stakeholders to participate in adaptation 
research. (PMSEIC, 2007, p.3) 
" “The Australian Government is best placed to generate most of the important public good science 
and other information that will be needed for Australia to effectively adapt to the impacts of climate 
change.” (DCC, 2010, p. 10) 
 
PV2: Mainstreaming and Coordination (across governmental scales and departments) 
" “As a fundamental guiding principle, adaptation considerations and responses will be embedded 
within existing policy and institutional frameworks. This is because, in most instances, climate 
change is likely to exacerbate existing risks and therefore can be dealt with most efficiently through 
existing institutions and frameworks.” (DCC, 2010, p. 12) 
" “It unlikely that an intrusive or directive approach to adaptation would be as effective as one 
motivated by local interests.” (Garnaut p. 364) 
" “[The] central role will be to strategically focus research efforts in areas of common benefit, link 
existing research organisations and coordinate multidisciplinary and cross sectoral investigations.” 
(COAG, 2007, p.6) 
" “There is a range of existing policies, institutions (such as Landcare) and capacities that can have 
climate change included so as to ‘mainstream’ adaptation rapidly and effectively.” (PMSEIC 2007 
p.45) 
" “Because of the sheer complexity and variety of issues in this area, having well designed systems 
for coordination, cooperation, and exchange of information is critical.” (Wilkins, 2008, p.6) 
" “Careful thought should be given by governments at all levels, the private sector and communities 
to managing climate risk.” (Allen, 2005, p.xv) 
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Table 4.3.  
Science Values Underpinning Australian Adaptation Research. 
Science Values 
SV1: Linear Model of Science 
" “fundamental climate system science… provides essential system knowledge to understand climate 
change impacts, develop adaptation strategies, and manage carbon emissions.” (DCC, 2009a, p.1) 
" “Information about climate change and its likely impacts is the first requirement of good adaptation 
and mitigation policies. This requires strengthening of the climate-related research effort in 
Australia.” (Garnaut, 2008, 363) 
" “neither the existing knowledge of researchers or stakeholders is currently adequate to assess 
effective adaptation options for climate change.” (PMSEIC, 2007, p.41) 
" “In addition to climate projections, businesses and communities will need information about the 
impacts these changes are likely to have and options for adapting to them.” (DCC, 2010, p.14) 
SV2: Prediction Imperative 
" “An effective national science effort, which delivers on these challenges, must be based on a 
scientific capability encompassing observations, process studies and model development, leading to 
quantitative prediction.” (DCC, 2009a, p.9) 
" “Adaptation to climate change we cannot avoid requires an understanding of the effect of current 
levels of greenhouse gases on the future climate.” (Wilkins, 2008, p.164) 
" “Individuals and businesses can only take effective action to adapt to climate change if they are 
well informed about its potential impacts and risks.” (DCC, 2010, p. 10) 
SV3: Integration and Interdisciplinarity 
" Emphasized focus on “removing current impediments to multidisciplinary collaborative 
programmes of research relevant to climate change adaptation.” (PMSEIC, 2007, p.2; see also DCC 
2009a) 
" “[National Government should] provide a framework within which the necessarily collaborative 
and multi–disciplinary effort required to advance it can be structured.” (Allen, 2005, p.xv) 
" “Knowledge and methods will need to span a range of disciplines, including climate science, 
biophysical sciences, engineering, social sciences and economics, and planning. Inter-disciplinary 
studies will also be important.” (DCC, 2009c, p. 6) 
" “Of particular importance are efficient and effective systems for identifying and accessing social 
and economic data relating to climate change impacts and adaptation measures.” (PMSEIC, 2007, 
p.43) 
" “Effective decision-making will need to be supported by integrated, multi-disciplinary assessments 
of vulnerability to climate change.” (COAG, 2007, p.7) 
 
 
3.1 Public Values 
3.1.1 Meeting User Needs 
 The quotations in Table 4.2 illustrate the prominence and breadth of the “useful 
information” public value (PV1). Adaptation research efforts are not just focused on the 
needs of particular federal departments or policy processes; they are meant to serve any 
part of Australian society dealing with climate change. In more than 40 interviews with 
scientists and managers associated with CAF and NCCARF, only five individuals offered 
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a definition of adaptation research that did not involve decision makers or users in some 
way. There is a broad awareness in the adaptation research community that informing 
decisions is a core goal of adaptation research. 
Useful information is a motivating public value for climate science in general, 
both in Australia (see ACCSP, 2004; DCC, 2009a, b), and elsewhere (NRC, 2007, 2009b; 
Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, this volume]). But a growing literature has repeatedly 
shown that traditional approaches to climate science, focused purely on advancing 
knowledge about physical processes, are inadequate for producing useful information.43 
Careful consideration of the circumstances in which science is produced, managed, 
delivered, and received is also needed. Successful delivery of useful information relies 
crucially on institutions (whether formal organizations, or informal relationships) that can 
navigate the social complexities of bringing technical information to bear on a particular 
problem context. Such “boundary organizations” facilitate the use of research by non-
scientists by working across social boundaries (e.g. science and non-science), and 
creating meaningful opportunities for different actors to achieve their goals (Agrawala et 
al., 2001; Guston, 2001; Cash and Buizer, 2005; Cash et al., 2006; Holmes and Clark, 
2008; NRC, 2009a; Buizer et al., 2010). They also help to shape the research agenda to 
be more responsive to user needs. In general, the use of climate science by non-scientific 
communities requires interaction and responsiveness on the part of scientists, as well as 
organizations and individuals that can facilitate that interaction (SPARC, 2005; McNie, 
2007; Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007).  
                                                      
43 This problem is certainly not unique to climate science. Lindblom and Cohen (1979) 
and Lindblom (1990), for example, discuss a variety of general problems associated with 
making technical knowledge useful to non-technical communities. More recently, the 
Knowledge Systems for Sustainable Development project has taken up this issue in the 
context of sustainability science (Buizer et al., 2010; Cash et al., 2003; Clark and 
Holliday, 2006). 
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 Many of the authors cited above point out that producing useful information 
through interactions with users is a challenge for both scientists and science policy 
organizations. Such activities are not traditionally supported or valued in science (e.g. 
SPARC, 2005; Clark and Holliday, 2006; Dilling et al., 2010). Nevertheless, a substantial 
number of interviewees stated that such practices are an important part of doing 
adaptation research.  
A variety of reasons were given for using participatory processes. For example, 
one researcher tied it to the goal of developing options for users to consider: 
You do need to go through an impact assessment before you can move into an 
adaptation phase, but you view it in a very different way if you are in an 
adaptation framework and are all the time looking at the adaptation options you 
may have and importantly, what are the limits of those options. It has really 
changed the way I've done research. I've never taken this approach in the past. 
I've sometimes talked to industry, but have never undertaken these participatory 
processes before. 
One researcher agreed that participation on an individual project level is essential, and 
that this is one thing that makes adaptation research so hard to define: “it depends on the 
questions the stakeholders have…. It involves different disciplines depending on the 
questions.” Another interviewee described user input as fundamental to adaptation 
research because of its practical value to the researcher: “you need to do it because you 
can't possibly access all the necessary knowledge without their participation. It's part of 
doing a good job with complex systems.” There is an important distinction between 
engaging users in order to better serve their needs, and engaging them in order to better 
answer a research question. One social scientist said to me, “I participate with people all 
the time. People participate in my surveys. But they don't tell me what questions to ask.” 
 The idea of directly involving users in shaping research agendas and processes 
was not universal among interviewees. Some did not feel that participation should be an 
intrinsic part what it means to do adaptation research: 
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[Adaptation research is] the generation of previously unknown or inaccessible 
knowledge that has bearing on our ability to adapt. That can be pure or that can 
be incredibly applied. Cranking the handle on an assessment methodology is a 
consultancy job which is extremely useful. But I would not call that research. … 
We develop a methodology in ours, and apply it and test it and prove it. But as 
researchers, we'd not be then interested in just marching around the country 
doing the same sort of thing. 
In this view, adaptation research appears to accommodate user-oriented approaches, but it 
is not defined by them. Some are even resistant to what they perceive as a threat to their 
normal mode of operation. As one researcher said, “it's not that I don't want to do useful 
research; I've just always enjoyed doing fundamental stuff.”  
3.1.2 Coordination and Mainstreaming 
The IPCC defines mainstreaming as “integration of climate change 
vulnerabilities or adaptation into some aspect of related government policy such as water 
management, disaster preparedness and emergency planning or land-use planning” 
(Adger et al., 2007, p. 732). Within Australian policy discourse, as evidenced by the 
statements in table 4.2, there is widespread conviction that as a policy problem, 
adaptation cannot be centralized. A review commissioned by the Government to inform 
the COAG framework (Allen, 2005; see also Wilkins, 2008) points this out while making 
it clear that science plays a role in the process of mainstreaming:  
An adaptation strategy, to be effective, must result in climate risk being 
considered as a normal part of decision making, allowing governments, 
businesses and individuals to reflect their risk preferences just as they would for 
other risk assessments. In this sense, adaptation strategies will fail if they 
continue in the long run to be seen in a ‘silo’ separate from other dimensions of 
strategic planning and risk management. (p.viii) 
If policy processes focused narrowly on climate change adaptation do not make sense, 
then does it make sense to organize research in this way? This is an ongoing debate 
frequently mentioned in my interviews with researchers and managers. It also reflects the 
fact that many of the problems posed by adaptation are not new. As one researcher put it: 
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A lot of adaptation is about doing what we're doing, but better. Just saying that 
something is needed for adaptation does not make it easier to achieve. The 
barriers to doing it better are the same, and they're still there. 
Redefining an existing problem, such as flooding or heat waves, in terms of climate 
change adaptation will not necessarily help researchers and practitioners seeking 
improved outcomes. 
Both NCCARF and CAF take adaptation research as the organizing principle, 
into which all relevant disciplines feed knowledge, tools, and problem frames. But as one 
participant pointed out: 
“the problem with making it a new field is that people forget what has come 
before. Adaptation has existed as a concept for more than a hundred years, and 
has been taken up in many different ways.” 
Some believe that adaptation research is more effective when folded into ongoing 
research in other programs (especially those with existing strong ties to policy and 
stakeholder communities), so that climate may be considered as one among many 
important factors. This approach avoids what one researcher called “climate fixation and 
meteorological determination.” He went on: 
Climate's become so big so quickly, that if you're in that game, you're totally 
absorbed in the climate literature. And the idea that there could be a parallel pre-
existing literature that is extremely valuable, or setting practical examples—it’s 
actually just beyond our brains to do that. 
Both in CAF and NCCARF, some believe that climate change adaptation should be 
considered along with many other social and environmental issues. In the long-term it 
might make more sense for adaptation research efforts to be dissolved into a larger effort 
(or a variety of smaller ones) focused on mainstreaming science into processes that deal 
with regions, sectors, and other entities impacted by environmental change. Indeed, this is 
reflected somewhat in CAF’s Cities theme, which does not always make climate a central 
focus of its adaptation work. However, CAF participants also need to justify the focus on 
climate adaptation, and demonstrate the success and value of the Flagship’s work. There 
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is also an argument for building capacity and knowledge in a focused way before 
attempting to mainstream adaptation research into other areas (Allen, 2005; Howden et 
al., 2007). This introduces a tension between the incentives for growing and expanding a 
climate-centric operation, and working toward a model that potentially makes more sense 
from the user perspective, but which undercuts the organizations and communities so 
many are working to build around adaptation research. 
3.2 Science Values 
3.2.1 Linear Model of Science 
The linear model is a simplistic and inaccurate conception of scientific and 
technical advance that, though thoroughly repudiated by scholarship in numerous 
disciplines, nonetheless remains an influential driver of science policy. The generalized 
version of the linear model assumes that advances in scientific knowledge are inherently 
beneficial to society, and that the benefits are both automatic and unpredictable. It also 
assumes a unidirectional flow of knowledge that privileges basic research above applied 
as the originator of all scientific benefit. The logic of the linear model has been 
extensively critiqued both in the context of climate science (Shackley and Wynne, 1995; 
Jasanoff et al., 1998; Cash et al., 2006; Meyer, in preparation [Chapter 3, this volume], in 
review [Chapter 2, this volume]), and in general (e.g. Stokes, 1997; Pielke and Byerly, 
1998; Nelson, 2004).  
Another key aspect of the linear model, demonstrated by the quotations in Table 
4.3, is an assumption that scientific information represents the key limiting factor in 
policy making and other decision making processes. By this logic, policy failures are best 
remedied through continued funding for science in order to improve understanding and 
reduce uncertainty. Yet this assumption is also demonstrably inaccurate. People and 
organizations are limited in their ability and willingness to acquire information for 
decision making (Simon, 1981; March, 1982; Simon, 1983). They use heuristics based on 
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simplified understandings of the world, which in some circumstances may lead to utterly 
irrational choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Camerer and Fehr, 2006). Decision 
making is contingent upon a variety of interacting factors unrelated to information quality 
or quantity, such as time horizon, institutional context, range of participants in decision 
making processes, and shifting understandings and political dynamics of the decision 
making context (Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 2003). 
In the context of adaptation research, the linear model takes on a specific form. It 
begins with research on climate change, which leads to research on the impacts of climate 
change, which then feeds into research and policy processes related to human responses 
to those impacts. The quotations in Table 4.3 demonstrate this view. In two previous 
papers focused on climate science in the context of the US, I have documented science 
policy dynamics that reinforce this model of scientific advance (Meyer, in preparation 
[Chapter 3, this volume], in review [Chapter 2, this volume]). Similar dynamics, in which 
actors with an interest in maintaining funding for basic research position themselves as 
“obligatory passage points” for climate science knowledge, are evident in the Australian 
context. 
Among adaptation researchers and managers, there is a tension between 
biophysically driven “impacts research,” and research that takes human systems as a 
starting point. One proponent of the latter view expressed it this way: 
The point of adaptation is to sustain things that are important and are at risk. That 
fundamentally means that adaptation research is about investigating risks and 
responses to things that are important to people, which pretty much means that 
it's more about social systems and processes and things that they value, rather 
more than environmental [inaudible] and risk.  
The implications of this tension between biophysical and social orientations are discussed 
further in section 5. 
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3.2.2 Prediction Imperative 
The prediction imperative is the idea that climate science or adaptation research 
must produce information about the future in order to be useful (Dessai et al., 2009a; 
Meyer, in preparation [Chapter 3, this volume]). The prediction imperative is closely 
related to the linear model, and it incorporates similar assumptions. For example, it 
assumes that a particular kind of information (predictions) is the key limiting factor in 
decision making related to climate change, and that incremental improvements to 
predictions will automatically yield public benefits. 
I discuss the prediction imperative separately from the linear model here because 
it stands out so prominently among the other types of knowledge that are seen as 
necessary for achieving public values of adaptation research. For example, the Australian 
government’s position paper on climate adaptation only mentions two specific kinds of 
(improved) knowledge needed from science in order to address adaptation: predictions of 
climate behavior, and predictions of climate impacts (DCC, 2010). 
Among the researchers and managers I interviewed for this study, there were 
mixed views as to the importance of prediction for achieving beneficial outcomes from 
research. There is a tension, parallel to the biophysical vs social framings mentioned 
above, between present-day or historical studies, and model based studies of future 
events. One interviewee felt that a focus on predictions should be a prerequisite for 
adaptation research: 
There's also a sense that if you do work on heat, that's obviously climate change 
because climate change will lead to more extreme heat days. But with adaptation 
we want to actually build in projections of extreme heat days rather than just look 
back at heat to tell us about the future. We need to embed the idea that the future 
is not the same as the past. 
Conversely, some felt that prediction offers a less reliable guide to the future than 
improved understanding of the present day: 
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I think people … find that excuse to do detailed empirical investigations by the 
claim that adaptation is new, and therefore all that exists today is irrelevant, and I 
completely disagree with that. I think you need to understand whatever you can 
from the evidence that you can get now. Now, everything that we learn about 
now isn’t going to be a perfect guide to the future because the future is going to 
change. On the other hand, it's a better guide than making it up. So, I think it's 
important to go and get the evidence. 
Again, this tension between science values is discussed further in section 5. 
3.2.3 Integration and Interdisciplinarity 
Among interviewees, one of the most commonly mentioned features of, and 
challenges for, adaptation research was that of working across multiple scientific 
domains. As one interviewee said, “how do you build support for your [interdisciplinary] 
work if the institutions are built on single issues?” Adaptation research is one of many 
areas in which interdisciplinarity and integration across disciplines in science are seen as 
necessary (e.g. Dovers, 2005; Syme, 2005; Sarewitz, 2010). One interviewee 
summarized: 
It demands a more interdisciplinary lens, but that's not unique to adaptation. It's 
been an epiphany for some people working on adaptation research. But there are 
a lot of other issues that have probably needed the same thing, we just haven't 
done it. 
Another one pointed out that the “integration imperative” (Dovers, 2005) applies across 
scientific disciplines, as well as boundaries between science and other sectors: 
It must be done in an integrated manner. Researchers must understand the 
community that is doing the adapting. You need to understand the context of that 
community which is part climate, and part other things. … It’s particularly 
interdisciplinary. It’s not uniquely interdisciplinary, but that’s a core to doing 
well. 
This science value is obviously very similar to the public value of “mainstreaming and 
coordination,” but there is an important conceptual distinction between them, even if they 
are similar in practice. The integration imperative, as a science value, is an assumption 
about what is needed to produce the right kind of knowledge. Thus it involves working 
across disciplinary boundaries, as well as other boundaries as mentioned above. 
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Furthermore, integration is not always necessary to solving a problem (Dovers, 2005), 
and undertaking interdisciplinary research does not necessarily involve placing a practical 
problem at the center of that work.  
 The public value of mainstreaming and coordination is about what will be needed 
in order to actually achieve outcomes related to successful adaptation policy. In other 
words, it does not necessarily require interdisciplinary scientific knowledge. Indeed, 
mainstreaming adaptation as a concern in multiple existing policy processes does not 
necessarily require formal adaptation research at all. 
The structures of both NCCARF and CAF aim to facilitate integration, but there 
will always be contentious boundaries somewhere in the system. Some NCCARF 
researchers expressed frustrations with the seemingly arbitrary boundaries imposed by 
the eight themes during the NARP process. Most of the themes are related in some way 
to the social, economic, and institutional dimensions of adaptation, for example. But 
some participants from other NARPs felt that they were not allowed to deal substantively 
with those issues, because of the existence of a separate NARP on that theme. Divisions 
among CSIRO flagships occasionally cause similar tensions. One researcher, for 
example, lamented that water was a crucial part of his research, but that it “belongs” to 
the Water for a Healthy Country Flagship. Incorporating significant research on water 
required navigating a mine field of politics and turf issues that in his view, was not worth 
it. Another interviewee had a similar story: 
One of the major things that makes it challenging to write these reports about 
water and adaptation, because most of the issues you have as a result of climate 
change are the same problems you have just as a result of development and 
people taking more water out of systems. And this means that you run into 
jurisdiction problems. 
At the same time, pressure to collaborate across boundaries can lead to similar 
frustrations. As the saying goes, with interdisciplinarity, you do less and less with more 
and more people, until eventually you do nothing with everybody. One scientist warned 
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that the pressure to collaborate can lead to the “jack of all trades; master of none 
problem.” Some researchers complained that the imperative to build links between 
NCCARF research networks was taking time away from the valuable connections they 
were building within their network. As with other science values, there is a risk that 
collaboration across boundaries will become an end in and of itself, rather than a means 
to solving a problem or moving forward in a meaningful way. Put differently, if research 
is judged solely on the basis of whether or not it involved integration across disciplines, 
this is not necessarily an indicator of public values success. 
4. Public Values Failure in NCCARF and CAF 
 This section uses interviews, reports, and analysis of organizational structure to 
assess NCCARF and CAF against the public values identified in section 3 (Tables 4.2 
and 4.3).  
4.1 NCCARF 
4.1.1 Engaging and Meeting the Needs of Users 
At this stage, the NCCARF is generally seen as having had success in terms of 
networking and capacity building. It has cultivated interdisciplinary communities of 
researchers around adaptation in particular thematic areas, and raised the profile of 
adaptation research in general. However, a host of procedural, structural, and political 
issues has prevented NCCARF from leveraging this progress toward fulfilling the public 
values underpinning the effort.  
The NCCARF operational review (Campbell and Morvell, unpublished) praises 
the NARPs as representing an important first step in clarifying national level priorities 
and a valuable resource for future planning. But it also notes that they are generally 
uneven in their inclusion of industry and government participation, and in their breadth 
and depth. Most of those I interviewed agreed with the broad outlines of these 
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conclusions that the documents are valuable, if uneven.44 The NARP drafting teams 
involved very few participants from outside academia. The drafting process included 
stakeholder workshops and a public comment period, with highly variable participation 
rates across the eight themes (Campbell and Morvell, unpublished), but by that point the 
researcher-driven structure and contents of the plans were mostly settled. In any case, 
such public comment processes do not allow for strategic, targeted interactions with the 
groups most likely to form lasting partnerships with NCCARF. One participant lamented 
the “squeaky wheel” process, and felt that her NARP was not representative of anything 
more than the “pet issues” of those at the table.  
Recently, targeted activities, including a series of “roadshows” and a forum 
aimed at state government, have sought to raise the profile of NCCARF among 
stakeholders, inform them about NCCARF activities, and elicit feedback. Those events, 
as well as information resources recently made available online reflect early attempts by 
NCCARF to communicate more effectively outside of the scientific community. 
However, with the NARPs already in place, and given that the funding for research 
against the NARPs is disbursed externally, the current structure does not include a 
pathway through which non-scientists can influence NCCARF’s research agenda.  
Some interviewees expressed frustrations over the ambiguity of the NCCARF 
structure, and many questioned whether the priorities specified in the NARPs would ever 
be reflected in actual research funding opportunities. If the money is simply channeled 
through existing research funders outside of NCCARF, each with its own previously 
established guidelines and priorities, why bother with setting up a separate planning 
entity in the first place? Some of NCCARF’s partners feel they have not benefitted 
                                                      
44 But perhaps this is to be expected given that most of the participants interviewed for 
this study were themselves academics. 
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enough from the relationship to justify further participation under the current 
arrangement, but it remains to be seen whether the program will change as a result of the 
recent operational review (Campbell and Morvell, unpublished). 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether NCCARF can simultaneously build long-term 
relationships with a broad base of stakeholders as long as DCCEE plays a dual role as 
manager and stakeholder.45 The conceptual model for NCCARF (see Figure 4.2) places 
stakeholder engagement at a remove from the planning and implementation of research, 
and does not indicate any formal process for assessing and responding to decision-maker 
needs. At the same time, DCCEE has had significant involvement and control over the 
processes listed under “Thematic Research Activities” in Figure 4.2. Under this 
arrangement the Department, with its dual manager and stakeholder role, has far more 
access and control than any other potential stakeholder. While an exclusive relationship 
with one user—DCCEE—may yield some positive outcomes in terms of science for 
federal policy, this is at odds with the broad mission defined for NCCARF, which is 
meant to serve many different sectors, communities, and levels of government. 
4.1.2 Mainstreaming and Coordination 
The role of DCCEE is highlighted as a major problem by the NCCARF 
Operational Review (Campbell and Morvell, unpublished). Judging from accounts 
provided in numerous interviews with NCCARF personnel and outside observers, the 
somewhat unorthodox and cumbersome structure is partly the result of the political 
context of the selection of Griffith University over Australian National University (ANU) 
to host the Facility. The final decision on NCCARF funding rested with the Minister, 
                                                      
45 Interviews suggested that some in DCCEE view NCCARF as a “departmental research 
arm,” whose primary responsibility should be to the internal information needs of 
department staff. This is similar to the very close relationship DCCEE has with CSIRO 
and the Bureau of Meteorology through its Climate Change Science Program, which does 
not have a mandate to serve stakeholders directly. 
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who chose the Griffith proposal against the advice of Department staff, who favored 
ANU. There are different explanations for the divergence between the Department’s 
advice, and the Minister’s final decision. Some cast ANU as the victim of election 
politics. Others believe Griffith to have been saved from the unfairly elitist views of 
Department staff and the cozy relationships they have with ANU. Regardless of the 
explanation, the situation has undoubtedly had negative impacts on the relationship 
between NCCARF staff at Griffith, and DCCEE. 
Intense and overly controlling involvement by DCCEE with NCCARF staff at 
Griffith has led to a situation in which other partners (the Queensland State Government 
and other universities) have difficulty engaging, and see little role for themselves in 
guiding the Program (interviews; Campbell and Morvell, unpublished). Even with a more 
prominent role, these partners only include one government group, at the state level. 
Forming substantive connections with other governments at the state and other levels, 
remains a challenge. 
Many observers and participants emphasized the experimental nature of 
NCCARF (see also NCCARF, 2010b; Campbell and Morvell, unpublished). In this early 
phase of the effort, organizers were faced with the task of creating a broadly inclusive 
and highly visible identity for adaptation research, a previously fragmented and largely 
unrecognized category of science in Australia (Allen, 2005; COAG, 2007). The task is 
not made any easier by the novel and somewhat ambiguous and incoherent structure of 
NCCARF, which one interviewee described as “the child of rushed decisions.” 
Depending on DCCEE’s reaction to the operational review, NCCARF will be considered 
for a second phase of funding to begin some time between now and 2012. In that case the 
Program faces challenges associated with its structure and management, as well as some 
conceptual issues related to the connections between science values and the public values 
that justify its very existence. 
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Fig. 4.2. NCCARF conceptual model for delivering outcomes (solid lines). Dashed lines 
indicate program elements under way. Question marks indicate unplanned elements. 
(modified from NCCARF 2010, p.12) 
4.2 CAF 
4.2.1 Engaging and Meeting the Needs of Users 
In workshops and other internal events, CAF leadership explicitly lay out their 
philosophy of adaptation research and point to examples of best practice. Science that is 
demonstrably useful to a targeted group emerges as a strong value throughout this 
discourse, with many discussions and workshop exercises focusing on the development 
of project ideas that include realistic “pathways to impact.” In presentations, CAF 
research is routinely situated in “Pasteur’s Quadrant,” thus emphasizing that even “basic 
research” should, under the auspices of CAF, be “use-inspired” (Stokes, 1997). 
Researchers are encouraged to explore frameworks and practices that enable them to 
pursue an identifiable “pathway to impact.” There are some institutional barriers to this 
goal, however. 
 The first barrier is evaluation of impacts. CAF leadership (and flagships in 
general) face a challenge in the tensions between impact and traditional science metrics 
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that institutionalize the linear model. From interviews and observations it is clear that, at 
least rhetorically, social benefit is the most important goal. But from the standpoint of 
evaluation it is also an elusive one. There is pressure to find ways of summarizing the 
various uses and benefits of CAF research, but so far none that provide straightforward 
indicators along the lines of a journal impact factor. Some of the most compelling 
examples of benefit are anecdotal, and not susceptible to aggregation and quantification. 
One researcher pointed out that some of the most positive impacts of effective 
engagement come from the relationships built in the creation of products that may or may 
not be used: “It's not that the decision makers use the outputs that you produce, but they 
use the knowledge that you have in your head." It is difficult to report on such outcomes 
at the theme or flagship level. 
In one attempt to measure impact more broadly, CAF has undertaken a 
longitudinal survey of potential stakeholders across Australia. This survey looks at the 
general awareness of adaptation, and the role CSIRO and DCCEE may have played in 
informing attitudes toward adaptation planning among public and private sector 
organizations. The first round of surveys (Gardner et al., 2010) did show a positive 
correlation between the likelihood of adaptation planning and contact with CSIRO, but 
no causal link can be drawn from these results (i.e. it is not clear whether CSIRO and 
DCCEE stimulate adaptation planning among their stakeholders, or if organizations that 
are already more likely to undertake adaptation planning are also more likely to connect 
with organizations like CSIRO and DCCEE).   
Even with more effective measures for social impact, the tension is likely to 
persist, due to the simple fact that researchers must choose whether to spend time writing 
articles in high impact journals, or on activities and products more likely to be useful 
outside of the science community. One researcher said: “They’re very much about, ‘what 
is your path to impact?’ But when you’re judged as a scientist, it’s publications, so it’s 
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hard to see how they value this stuff.” Many of the CAF participants I interviewed stated 
that social benefit is important both to them and to the Flagship. But most were unaware 
of how that kind of work could be evaluated effectively, and also felt that it was 
unimportant to pursuing their own professional advance within the Organization.  
 This points to a broader challenge of scientist buy-in to practices valued by CAF. 
Not all researchers relevant to CAF’s scope and mission are willing to participate in the 
culture that CAF seeks to create. A handful of interviewees expressed blunt cynicism 
about the operation. For these individuals, CAF is just another bureaucratic exercise 
requiring them to adopt particular jargon in order to fit their activities into a new 
framework. As one said, “Research adapts to where the money’s coming from. [In CAF] 
I see a plethora of research in areas that is basically adapting to new funding streams, and 
the funding stream’s now called ‘adaptation research.’” Another CAF researcher echoed 
this idea: 
In my case, and this is probably at least partially true for many of us, it is the 
same research, it’s only now couched in terms of “and climate change.” I was 
doing my own projects… and so now I’ve simply couched what I’m looking at in 
terms of its possible implications for climate change…. We all have our research 
agendas that are set by other factors than possible climate change effects. 
These quotations illustrate the potential effects of inertia in a science portfolio. Some 
CAF participants expressed frustrations over the tendency of some groups to take 
advantage of new funds by claiming conceptual relevance to adaptation, without 
demonstrating an ability to fulfill the public values of adaptation research, or even a 
willingness to adopt new practices that would do so. One researcher called this a 
“mapping exercise.” In this view, CAF is simply a response to the question: “How can 
we fit our current activities into big questions like adaptation?”46 
                                                      
46 One might argue that bringing on researchers who reject CAF values initially is a 
necessary first step in changing research culture. On the other hand, to the extent that 
researchers view CAF as nothing more than the latest in a series of temporary and 
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One participant attributed the tendency of researchers to resistance new priorities 
to allegiances that researchers form within the capability side. The matrix-managed 
Flagship model, with two axes of accountability related to disciplines and problem areas, 
assumes that you can feed personnel in and out of Flagships as needed, but “the people 
are the research. And they want to identify themselves with it. So they either think of 
themselves as CAF and buy into the priorities, or they don’t.” Another researcher 
suggested that resistance to CAF is partly a reaction to the “rise of the bureaucracy” in 
CSIRO. For this person (and many others I interviewed) CAF represents an onerous extra 
layer of bureaucracy that continues the trend of “taking [choice of research questions] out 
of the hands of the individual CSIRO scientist.” It pulls resources away from “smaller” 
questions that might be appealing to an individual researcher, or forces a reframing of 
those questions.  
 It bears emphasizing that these statements from interviewees do not say anything 
in particular about whether CAF researchers are or are not fulfilling the public values of 
adaptation research. But they highlight a practical challenge for a new interdisciplinary 
organization attempting to implement planned change. It appears that some researchers 
are actively seeking ways to take advantage of CAF resources but resisting the values 
framework that CAF is trying to institute. 
4.2.2 Mainstreaming and Coordination 
A recently completed Masters Thesis by Meharg (2009), a CAF employee, 
focused on attitudes toward, and understandings of, government decision makers among 
CAF researchers. Most respondents viewed engagement with decision makers as an 
                                                      
bothersome bureaucratic structures to which they must justify themselves, a change in 
values may not be possible, especially if they can successfully “map” themselves without 
substantive change. This is an interesting topic for further exploration, as my interviews 
did not address these dynamics directly. 
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important part of their responsibilities, and of CSIRO leadership, suggesting good 
potential for fulfillment of the “mainstreaming and coordination” public value. 
However, the opinions of researchers about how best to engage varied widely 
among the four roles put forth by Pielke (2007): pure scientist, science arbiter, issue 
advocate, and honest broker.47 This is consistent with my interviews and observations 
from both NCCARF and CAF. For some, engagement is simply a matter of answering 
questions in a factual manner—in other words, a reactive and neutral stance. For others it 
is proactive and supportive—an iterative process by which researchers learn about the 
decision context in which they seek to enable adaptation. And for others, engagement is 
an opportunity to influence events in an effort to bring about change that is consistent 
with their personal views and policy preferences.  
There is no simple (or single) answer to the question of how researchers should 
engage with decision makers. And in an emerging field with a significant emphasis on 
these kinds of interactions, guidance from CAF as to how such engagement should work 
has been inconsistent. 
A potentially problematic form of engagement, from the standpoint of 
democratic accountability, is that of the issue advocate. One researcher, having noticed 
this trend among his colleagues, feels it is inappropriate: 
There is an issue for research in adaptation, because adaptation actually involves 
making management or policy decisions, or trying to change human behaviors in 
some way. And that's actually not the job of researchers. There's a number of 
reasons why that's a good separation. As a researcher I don't have jurisdiction. I 
can work with a local government or state agency to assess vulnerability, and that 
leads to thinking about adaptation options. But I don't get to write the local 
environmental plan or the emergency plan. So you have to look at who the 
                                                      
47 A pure scientist eschews policy engagement. An arbiter answers factual questions 
within the scope determined by the decision maker. An advocate narrows choice toward 
options consistent with personal preferences. And an honest broker seeks to expand and 
clarify the range of options available. 
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responsible authority is; who has the statutory confidence, the legal confidence, 
and the democratic legitimacy to do that. It is not the job of the researcher. 
Researchers adopting the advocate role are potentially making decisions for people, 
rather than supplying information to support them in making their own decisions. 
Nevertheless, interviews and observations indicate that it is quite common for 
researchers to describe the goals of their research in terms of their own desired policy 
outcomes or how the public must change its behavior in their view. Regardless of the 
appropriateness of such a position, it puts organizations like NCCARF and CSIRO in a 
potentially awkward position with the elected officials to whom they are ultimately 
accountable. A highly publicized paper by former CSIRO economist Clive Spash (2010) 
brought these tensions to the fore in late 2009. Spash’s paper, which commented very 
negatively on the general concept of carbon markets, was held back by CSIRO leadership 
for fear that it would be seen as tampering with delicate negotiations over Australia’s 
own proposed carbon trading scheme. In the fallout, Spash resigned (Harrison, 2009). 
Internally, CSIRO does not always communicate such a conservative message. 
When addressing CAF researchers, CAF leadership speak openly about the need to 
combat climate skepticism, increase public understanding of climate change, and 
advocate for a variety of climate and related environmental policies. Such discourse does 
not necessarily represent official CSIRO policy. But it occurs in an environment in which 
CAF leadership are establishing the framework in which participants understand their 
role and their mandate to engage with the outside world. In another example, a recent 
CAF working paper (Gardner et al., 2009) presents a model in which the primary purpose 
of stakeholder engagement is to convince stakeholders to adopt a particular view of 
climate change adaptation and vulnerability. The working paper views engagement as 
primarily a tool for communication, and for demonstrating CSIRO’s impact. It ignores 
the idea (which is, it should be said, common elsewhere in CAF and the adaptation 
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literature more generally) that the potential users of CSIRO science are also knowledge 
holders in their own right, and that an important function of stakeholder engagement is to 
inform research agendas through consultation. The working paper is one example of a 
departure from policy neutral science, and from the idea of supporting and enabling 
decisions, as opposed to influencing them. 
CAF has created an organizational structure and deliberative space that 
emphasizes public values and encourages researchers to embrace them. However, it has 
not fully capitalized on this opportunity to clarify those public values, define appropriate 
ways of pursing them, and delineate them from science values. Instead, discourse about 
researcher engagement with ongoing policy processes and other forms of decision 
making is a muddle of public values, science values, and privately held policy 
preferences. I argue in the next section that making the connections among these values 
and preferences explicit can help both CAF and NCCARF work toward structures that 
are more likely to fulfill the public values of adaptation research. 
5. Value Chain Analysis 
 Within the community of researchers associated with adaptation research 
programs, there are very diverse views about the content, practice, and goals of 
adaptation research. One interviewee said that the biggest challenge for adaptation 
research is “deciding what it wants to be when it grows up.” Another noted: 
The community is young, and it's struggling to identify what is high quality 
research and what is sloppy. This is a crucial challenge. Adaptation will have to 
manage its relationship with mitigation and the political context to preserve it's 
credibility as a research community. 
This statement highlights the newness of adaptation as formal category of government 
funding, and the experimental nature of both cases examined in this paper. Another 
interviewee pointed out that the internal politics of defining a new space such as this can 
be messy: 
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It's purportedly a new space, and it's a hot topic, so there's a lot of conflict and 
movement of people trying to claim the space which is pretty unhelpful and 
counterproductive and time consuming. You can spend quite a bit of time just 
doing the political economy of the whole fucking thing rather than actually doing 
the research. 
In the end, the emergent definition of adaptation research may be a function of who in the 
research community is able to “claim the space.” But on the other hand, governments 
pursuing particular outcomes for society have a stake in these battles. And they clearly 
have a role in shaping them through the establishment and management of organizations 
such as CAF and NCCARF, and the articulation of science values and public values in 
association with adaptation research. 
 Throughout this process of defining “the space,” the interplay of science values 
and public values is usually a subtext. It is part of what Shackley and Wynne (1995, 
p.113) call “the tacit commitments and assumptions which underpin a prevailing common 
culture of science and policy.” PVM makes “chains” of values explicit, thus clarifying 
science policy problems and creating opportunities for deliberation and innovation. This 
section examines value chains in Australian adaptation research. 
5.1 Competing Science Values 
 The three science values described in Table 4.3 belie a more complex system of 
perspectives on how adaptation research should go about generating knowledge. As 
described briefly above, there are three prominent pairs of competing science values in 
adaptation research, which I summarize in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4 
Tension between science values in adaptation research. 
    
Researcher-framed # ! User-framed 
Researchers choose the problems worthy of 
investigation, based on disciplinary norms, 
or personal preferences. 
 
  Research process includes formal or informal 
mechanisms that elicit information about user 
needs, which in turn influences investigation. 
 
Biophysical systems # ! Human systems 
Research begins with investigation of 
physical processes, which define the 
problems of climate change adaptation. 
(also referred to as impacts driven research). 
 
  Adaptation examined through an understanding 
of social processes and human experience. 
 
Prediction # ! Present/Historical investigation 
Knowledge about future events is essential 
to understanding adaptation. 
  Present-day conditions or past experiences are 
useful for understanding potential options for 
dealing with future change. 
 
The columns in Table 4.4 are suggestive of two broad “camps” (see Mearns, 
2010)48 within adaptation research: one based in traditional models of climate research, 
and another embracing contemporary norms associated with “trans-science” issues. 
Dessai and Hulme (2004) reinforce this notion with their finding that researchers who 
understand vulnerability to climate change in terms of adaptive capacity and social 
systems tend to use a user-driven model of research. Biophysical researchers, on the other 
hand, tend to favor science-driven, top-down approaches that take long- to medium-term 
predictions of system behavior as a starting point for deriving measures of vulnerability 
(see also Lahsen and Nobre, 2007). 
But the columns are by no means definitive or mutually exclusive. They do not 
represent inherently competing, and internally consistent sets of values. For example, 
both Australia and the US have a history of developing programs in seasonal to 
interannual forecasting that incorporate user needs into the research process (Cash and 
                                                      
48 Mearns describes two “camps” of researchers with differing perspectives on the need 
for reducing uncertainty in order to adapt to climate change. In this study, uncertainty 
was not as prominent in interviews, or in the values inventory, as the three pairs 
identified in Table 4.4. 
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Buizer, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2005; Meinke and Stone, 2005; Lemos and Dilling, 2007; 
McNie, 2008; Buizer et al., 2010; Lemos and Rood, 2010), an approach that unites the 
user-framed agenda with prediction. A quotation above from a social scientist (“People 
participate in my surveys. But they don't tell me what questions to ask.”), suggests 
another example of cross-over between columns. That person’s researcher-driven agenda 
focuses on present-day human systems. 
Both NCCARF and CAF are struggling with the structural problem of 
embedding public values and making their connection to science values explicit, but in 
very different ways. For CAF, a top-down structure gives the leadership a mandate to 
define “the space,” by establishing the cultural norms and best practices likely to yield 
progress. But incentivizing researchers to embrace those values remains a challenge 
(indeed, simply knowing what the norms and practices should be is a challenge). 
NCCARF, with its bottom-up, researcher-driven NARP process, has in some ways ceded 
control over the discussion, allowing scientists to define their own approach on an 
individual basis, or through the terms of research funding disbursed using mechanisms 
external to NCCARF. 
The three tensions in Table 4.4, as well as each of the six cells in its own right, 
represent an important, but rarely articulated, consideration for science policy decision 
makers.49 The structures of both CAF and NCCARF indicate a focus on substantive 
themes and boundaries. They are the answer to the questions, “which problem areas 
should be included,” and “how should boundaries be drawn?” NCCARF began with eight 
problem-oriented themes, and later added a ninth on indigenous issues. CAF has three 
broad problem-oriented themes, and a fourth focused on underpinning theories. Amid the 
                                                      
49 The prominence of these debates in the interviews may suggest otherwise, but in terms 
of high-level science policy, and the documents setting out the terms of adaptation 
research, the interplay of these science values is rarely discussed. 
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debates over thematic boundaries, careful consideration of the science values and 
practices of research receive little attention. Put differently, science policy discourse has 
not addressed the question of how to engage identified problem areas, both within and 
across the specified boundaries, and how science policy organizations should manage that 
process.  
The point of this paper and of the dynamics illustrated in Table 4.4 is not to argue 
that science occupying any particular grouping of cells is the “right” way to approach 
adaptation research. Rather, I argue that, similar to Schwarz and Thompson’s (1990, p. 8) 
account of culturally based understandings of the world, “each of these rationalities, 
when acted upon, both sustains and justifies the particular organizational form that goes 
along with it.” In other words, when actors adopt an intellectual orientation for research 
based in some combination of the cells in Table 4.4, they simultaneously (and tacitly) 
adopt an organizational form of science policy implementation. Table 4.4 illustrates a 
framework for considering research policy that makes science values explicit, opening up 
a space for deliberation and, importantly, empirical research about ways of connecting 
science values to public values. Although high-level policy discussions (as represented in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3) do not yet take this approach, some interviewees are considering 
these issues.  
5.2 Value Chain Advocacy: PVM in practice? 
Public values failures may occur when science values become ends in and of 
themselves, rather than means of achieving public values (Meyer, in review [Chapter 2, 
this volume]). The PVM framework, as mentioned above, makes these dynamics explicit. 
However, it is one thing to use PVM as a research tool, and quite another to use it in 
shaping science policy. How does this work in practice? At the individual level, there are 
several examples.  
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Consider the following story from an adaptation researcher, who complained, 
“we’re forever having to remind people of the difference between impacts research and 
adaptation.” She went on to describe a situation in which a funder was asking for a 
biophysical climate impacts study within a particular sector, “and we said, ‘hey it would 
add a lot of value for you to consider adaptation options.’ and that’s how it turned out to 
be.”  
Another researcher told me: 
We're not in the business of modeling. I don't want to go anywhere near that 
space because that conjures up all sorts of expectations, and the community, the 
government, politicians, policy makers—that’s the whole wrong message to be 
sending—that you can actually model the future. So, ... this is that cultural 
change that I'm talking about. We have to convince the politicians that we don't 
plan with perfect knowledge. We never will. 
At first glance, these statements appear to be the kind of direct policy advocacy discussed 
in section 4.2.2. The researchers have clear opinions about what the government should 
be doing. However, these opinions relate to the kinds of knowledge the government 
should be seeking, and they are based in experience working with knowledge users in 
communities. In other words, the researchers are making value chains explicit, and using 
their experience of what works to argue for a particular science-public value chain. 
 Another researcher provides a similar example: 
In government there is strong feeling that we need to know what we're going to 
be adapting to, and I kind of agree with that, but I also think actually we're never 
going to really know, so maybe what we need to do is just become better at 
dealing with pervasive change. In that case, impacts research is really not the 
most critical, but moving people's mindset in terms of what they need, being 
mindful of the fact that policy folk and decision makers are very intolerant of 
researchers who don't listen to what it is that they say they want…. And so I 
think in many ways the research community who is engaged in adaptation 
research is perhaps a little more advanced in its thinking than the practitioners 
[policy decision makers]. There's a risk of a disconnect between what research 
the researchers think needs to be done, and what government folks think is useful 
to them. And my concern about focusing too heavily on research is that once that 
research is done and proven to be inaccurate then a whole bunch of new impact 
research has to be done and it still doesn't take us any further. So how do you 
short-circuit that problem without disenfranchising the very people for whom you 
want to do the research? 
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Again, this statement is dealing explicitly with the problem of how to influence the kinds 
of knowledge sought by governments funding adaptation research. She is reacting to the 
assumptions embedded in the linear model and the prediction imperative, which are so 
central to government policy for adaptation research. She feels that researchers have 
experience with alternative approaches that have better potential to achieve public values. 
Another researcher offered a similar critique applying to both funders and researchers: 
I don't think funding agencies have got it yet. The mainstream - the majority of 
the research on climate change adaptation hasn't got it yet. So we're getting 
incremental extensions and adjustments to [research on] biophysical processes 
that are trying to reach out to include social systems. That's not gonna work. You 
have to stop and do it in other ways. 
The quotations above are examples of individuals demonstrating a degree of 
reflexivity in regard to value chains within adaptation research. The suggestion is that 
those who commission and manage research need to consider new approaches to doing 
research, and not just adding new disciplines, or generating new knowledge within the 
same framework of metrics and incentives.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has applied the PVM framework in an analysis of programs funding 
climate change adaptation research in Australia. NCCARF and CAF are still negotiating 
and establishing value chains that link research with desired outcomes. The problem, I 
argue, is that these negotiations are not an explicit part of science policy discourse, which 
tends to be concerned with questions of funding levels, inclusivity (the integration 
imperative and knowledge gaps), and the drawing of disciplinary or thematic boundaries. 
Consideration of science values, public values, and their interrelationships is not 
strongly institutionalized within CAF or NCCARF. The previous section suggests that 
some researchers are actively working to make such considerations an explicit part of 
their own practice, but in an intuitive informal way. This analysis using PVM offers a 
more formal approach to analyzing these relationships, with the goal of stimulating 
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discussion and reflection on science policy implementation by researchers and managers. 
By identifying problems in the structure and process of policy implementation, PVM also 
offers recommendations for improved practice, and raises questions that deserve further 
investigation. 
As I pointed out above, close examination of science values within adaptation 
research reveals a much more complex landscape than suggested by the “camps” 
narrative pitting social scientists against biophysical scientists (Dessai and Hulme, 2004; 
Mearns, 2010). It is important to avoid such polarization and its accompanying 
stereotypes and misunderstandings. Social scientists may engage in curiosity driven 
research that is not even vaguely relevant to decision makers. Physical scientists may 
base their research firmly in an understanding of a social problem context. Any science 
value, when taken as an end in and of itself, may lead to a public value failure. 
Adaptation research is funded, not just to generate new knowledge, but to support 
an enormous range of potential stakeholders. The underlying variability and complexity 
of stakeholder communities means that no single approach to adaptation research is likely 
to be universally appropriate. Thus a key recommendation of this study is that science 
policy decision makers need to consider not only what we know and what we don’t know 
(i.e. knowledge gaps), but also what works and what doesn’t in terms of scientific 
practice. For example, what are the various forms of participatory research? How should 
their implementation be assessed, and what are some heuristics for choosing among them 
under varying circumstances? In this particular example, a wealth of experience and 
literature on the general topic of public participation in decision making is already 
available (e.g. Jasanoff, 1990; NRC, 1996; Fischer, 1999; De Marchi, 2003; Rowe and 
Frewer, 2005; NRC, 2008). There are also insights into the various ways that public 
participation can be and have been integrated with scientific research (e.g. SPARC, 2005; 
NRC, 2008, see Chapter 6). The literature on participation does not provide simple 
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answers for organizations like CAF and NCCARF, but it does provide a starting point for 
evidence-based discussion about how to structure adaptation research efforts from the 
project level, up to the level of government departments, so that they facilitate 
participation in a way that makes sense in the context of broader goals and public values. 
 Prediction is another example of knowledge production with important 
implications for the fulfillment of public values and the delivery of useful information. 
Quotations in previous sections indicate a range of views on this issue within the 
adaptation research community: some feel that prediction is literally essential to 
adaptation research; others view it as problematic. Of course, for organizations such as 
NCCARF and CAF, the appropriate role of prediction is not simply a “yes-no” question. 
Instead, these organizations must address a host of questions related to how existing 
predictive capacity can be most useful, and the ways in it may be worth pursuing 
increased capacity. Again, there is a range of research and advice upon which science 
policy decision makers could draw in addressing this challenge. For example, Sarewitz et 
al. (2000) provide based on results from a range of case studies a set of criteria for 
thinking through the questions of how and when prediction can be useful for decision 
makers. Debate over the role and utility of prediction in adaptation research offers an 
opportunity for researchers and science policy decision makers to promote uses of 
prediction (or other methods) based on evidence of what works and what doesn’t. 
The ongoing theme of these recommendations is evidence-based science policy 
discourse that recognizes science values and public values. Examining synergies and 
tensions among science values and public values adds a new and important dimension to 
science policy evaluation and strategic planning, and also suggests a range of questions 
for further research. As with participation and prediction, each cell or combination of 
cells in Table 4.4 suggests a potential area where existing research could be very helpful 
in informing science policy, and where further research may help to achieve broader 
139 
goals of adaptation research. Ideally such research should be tailored to the needs of 
specific research portfolios at one or more specific levels of management (e.g. the theme 
level within CAF, or the research network or department level within NCCARF). The 
proposed research could be useful at any organizational level; what is important is the 
specific choice of an appropriate scope, so that findings can be usefully integrated into 
the practice of science policy decision makers. 
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Chapter 5 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN CLIMATE MODELS AGREE? A CASE FOR 
ASSESSING INDEPENDENCE AMONG GENERAL CIRCULATION MODELS 
By Zachary Pirtle; Ryan Meyer; and Andrew Hamilton 
Foreword 
This  chapter was recently published in Environmental Science and Policy (Pirtle 
et al., 2010). The three coauthors, Pirtle, Hamilton, and I, have contributed equally to 
conceptual development, research, and writing of this paper. Pirtle is listed as the first 
author for professional considerations, as he will be continuing to apply the robustness 
framework through additional case studies and theoretical work. Both Pirtle and 
Hamilton have given me their explicit permission to reproduce the paper here as Chapter 
4 of this volume. In accordance with ASU Graduate College guidelines, this foreword 
provides an account of individual contributions of each author, although it should be 
noted that all three of us were involved in every part of the process. 
The three of us came together through a shared interest in the philosophical and 
practical implications of simulation modeling, but we have each brought different 
perspectives and knowledges to the project. Hamilton, a philosopher of biology, 
introduced Pirtle and me to a variety of perspectives on the general problem of 
connecting model results to the real world, including Richard Levins’ work on 
robustness. He edited vigorously, wrote with clarity, and at times cooked us very tasty 
food.  
Pirtle, with his background in earth and environmental engineering, brought 
much needed technical expertise, as we worked to understand some of the fundamental 
structural and computational features of climate models. Pirtle also spearheaded the 
assembly of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, which help in thinking through shared properties among 
models. 
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From the beginning I was interested in making climate models a focus of my 
work on climate science policy, and of the informal “model reading group” that the three 
of us formed a few years ago. My own unique contribution to the group, and to the paper 
we eventually produced, came from a knowledge of literature in social studies of climate 
science, and of ongoing debates in climate science and climate science policy. I also 
identified the regional case studies we would use to illustrate our arguments, and initiated 
and oversaw the survey of climate science literature.  
All three of us spent time writing and editing this work, and assembling the 
relevant data and literature needed to complete our analysis. We are also grateful to 
Melissa Baker, who helped us out with gathering and processing data for our literature 
review.  
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…we attempt to treat the same problem with several alternative models each with 
different simplifications but with a common biological assumption. Then, if these 
models, despite their different assumptions, lead to similar results, we have what 
we call a robust theorem which is relatively free of the details of the model. 
Hence our truth is the intersection of independent lies.  
Levins (1966) 
Abstract:  
Climate modelers often use agreement among multiple general circulation models 
(GCMs) as a source of confidence in the accuracy of model projections. However, the 
significance of model agreement depends on how independent the models are from one 
another. The climate science literature does not address this. GCMs are independent of, 
and interdependent on one another, in different ways and degrees. Addressing the issue of 
model independence is crucial in explaining why agreement between models should 
boost confidence that their results have basis in reality. 
1. Introduction 
Predicting the Earth’s future climate is an important part of climate science (c.f. 
CCSP, 2008a; Shukla et al., 2009).50 This task is undertaken by combining scenarios of 
socioeconomic change with highly complex models that simulate the atmosphere and 
other key Earth systems. Many believe that in order to be useful, these general circulation 
models (GCMs) will need to provide accurate, reliable, and timely results on a regional to 
local scale (for example, see a recent declaration by the World Modelling Summit for 
Climate Prediction (Shukla et al., 2009)). Some question whether climate prediction is a 
                                                      
50 We use the word “predict” in a very specific sense, denoting the production of 
deterministic information about some future reality. This may be distinguished from the 
ideas of generalization, extrapolation, or physical laws with abstract predictive power.  
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necessary ingredient for decision making,51 but prediction-based decision making 
remains a powerful motivator for present and future investments in climate science. As 
the promised role of GCMs shifts from “demonstrating warming” to supporting important 
regional and local decisions with predictive models, uncertainty will rise, and so will the 
political stakes.  
This paper focuses on a conceptual issue surrounding climate models and the 
interpretation of their results that is also relevant to science policy and epistemology. In 
short, we note that GCMs are commonly treated as independent from one another, when 
in fact there are many reasons to believe otherwise. The assumption of independence 
leads to increased confidence in the “robustness” of model results when multiple models 
agree. But GCM independence has not been evaluated by model builders and others in 
the climate science community. Until now the climate science literature has given only 
passing attention to this problem, and the field has not developed systematic approaches 
for assessing model independence.  
In raising the question, “what does it mean when climate models agree?” this 
paper aims to: 
1. demonstrate that this question is of crucial importance to climate science; 
2. point out that the question has nonetheless been largely ignored by climate 
scientists; 
3. evaluate what few attempts have been made to address the question thus far; 
and 
                                                      
51 Even accurate and reliable predictions are not necessarily useful for policy and other 
kinds of decision making. See cases in Sarewitz et al. (2000), Hulme et al (2009), and 
Dessai et al. (2009). Rather than address this argument, our paper focuses on a 
fundamental issue related to the generation of reliable and accurate predictions. The 
question of whether increased predictive accuracy among GCMs would be useful to one 
group or another is an important area of study. 
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4. discuss what it would take to address the question more thoroughly. 
As we make clear below, we cannot provide a definitive answer to the question raised in 
our title. We argue only that a satisfactory answer must provide an account of the 
independence of models from one another, and that coming up with such an answer will 
take the combined efforts climate scientists, and perhaps scholars in other fields as well.  
In the next section we spell the independence problem out in detail, and in 
Section 3 we discuss the few instances in which the climate literature has addressed the 
topic. In Section 4 we use the history of GCM development, along with some 
contemporary examples of particular model studies to illustrate various ways climate 
models may or may not be independent from one another. In a final section, we address 
the broader significance of this issue for climate science, and draw conclusions. The main 
lesson is that agreement of model results is not necessarily robustness because agreement 
without independence is not confirmatory. It is crucially important for climate policy, and 
climate science policy, that modelers give attention to the relationships between the sets 
of models they consider.  
2. Models and Reality 
The logistics of building GCMs that simulate the behavior of complex interacting 
natural systems with multiple feedbacks give rise to an important and well-known 
problem: in order to build a tractable model, it is often necessary to make dramatic 
assumptions and simplifications. This is a reality for any numerical model of a complex 
system. Examples from climate science are the continuum assumption,52 and the 
                                                      
52 Commonly used in fluid mechanics, the continuum assumption ignores the fact that 
physical matter is actually made up of individual particles that collide with one another, 
and assumes that properties such as pressure and temperature are consistent. This is 
necessary for the application of the most common mathematical equations, without which 
problem solving would in many cases be impossible. 
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assumption that landmasses on Earth reach only 3.5m in depth, as in the GISS model.53 
These assumptions may be adequate, appropriate, and even necessary for modeling 
purposes, but they are clearly false. Simplifying assumptions are the price of tractability, 
and in some cases, they are also necessary for precision.  
One challenge facing modelers and policy makers is to understand the ways in 
which the inherent limitations on models impact their relationship with reality. As 
population biologist Richard Levins (1966, p.421) has pointed out, many modelers of 
biological systems generally do not even try to capture the world as it is, because doing 
so would mean “using perhaps 100 simultaneous partial differential equations with time 
lags; measuring hundreds of parameters, solving the equations to get numerical 
predictions, and then measuring these predictions against nature.” Furthermore, Levins 
notes, more realistic models would require attention to many more salient parameters 
than we can measure, as well as the use of equations that have no analytic solutions and 
no outputs that we know how to understand. According to Levins, these constraints leave 
mathematical population biologists working at some distance from the phenomena they 
are studying, and creates the problem that it is sometimes difficult to know whether 
model outputs reflect their system of study appropriately or depend instead on the 
“details of the simplifying assumptions” (Levins, 1966, p.423).   
The challenges described by Levins also face climate modelers, whose GCMs are 
at a far enough remove from reality that it is sometimes difficult to discern whether 
particular results are artifacts of the modeler’s practice or whether the model captures and 
                                                      
53 Information on the model developed at the Goddard Institute for Space Studies, along 
with other models referenced throughout this paper can be accessed through the Program 
for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (http://www-
pcmdi.llnl.gov/ipcc/model_documentation/ipcc_model_documentation.php). That 
website includes specifications for all 24 of the models used in the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report. 
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explains real patterns and processes. Indeed, GCMs arguably have more parameters, 
more equations in need of solutions, and more solutions that have to be tested against 
nature than do the models of population biology that Levins discusses. 
Climate modelers, of course, are well aware of all this, so they not only compare 
their model results against observations, they also check their models against other 
models. In a recent paper, for instance, Seager et al. (2007) assert that eighteen of 
nineteen general circulation models (GCMs) agree that the Southwestern United States 
will experience increased aridity and drought over the next one hundred years. The notion 
that agreement across models increases confidence in particular aspects of model 
projections is common. Take, for instance, this statement about climate warming from the 
fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR4):  
…models are unanimous in their prediction of substantial climate warming under 
greenhouse gas increases, and this warming is of a magnitude consistent with 
independent estimates derived from other sources, such as from observed climate 
changes and past climate reconstructions. (Solomon et al., 2007 p.601) 
Here the IPCC authors are reporting agreement among models, and counting this 
agreement as one reason (among many others) to believe that the models are correct in 
their projections. In a rough survey of the contents of six leading climate journals since 
1990,54 we found 118 articles in which the authors relied on the concept of agreement 
between models to inspire confidence in their results. The implied logic seems intuitive: 
if multiple models agree on a projection, the result is more likely to be correct than if the 
result comes from only one model, or if many models disagree.  
As our epigraph indicates, this logic only holds if the models under consideration 
are independent from one another. In Levins’ terms, using multiple models to analyze the 
                                                      
54 Geophysical Research Letters; the Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres; the 
Journal of Atmospheric Sciences; the Journal of Climate; Climate Dynamics; and 
Climatic Change. 
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same system is a “robustness” strategy. Every model has its own assumptions and 
simplifications that make it literally false in the sense that the modeler knows that his or 
her mathematics do not describe the world with strict accuracy. When multiple 
independent models agree, however, their shared conclusion is more likely to be true. As 
Levins puts it, “our truth is the intersection of independent lies.”  
By contrast, the more dependent the models are on one another, the less one 
should be impressed by their intersecting results. No one is or should be surprised when 
very similar microscopes yield very similar observations after being trained on the same 
slide. This consideration has not gone completely unnoticed among climate modelers. In 
an extensive review of climate model reliability, Räisänen (2007, p.9) laments the 
“limited number of quasi-independent climate models,” noting later that “the risk that the 
uncertainty in the real world exceeds the variation between model results is obvious: even 
if all models agreed perfectly with each other, this would not prove that they are right” 
(see also Tebaldi and Knutti, 2007).  
A common response to this problem is to compare model results to past climate 
observations, but this measure of performance presents its own set of analytical problems. 
A match between model results and observations guarantees neither an ability to predict 
future system behavior, nor that the model accurately captures underlying causal 
mechanisms (Oreskes et al., 1994; Tebaldi and Knutti, 2007).55 While there are many 
ways to assess the performance of a GCM, there is little consensus on which are most 
effective, or on how to determine the most appropriate measures for a given set of 
circumstances (Gleckler et al., 2008).  
                                                      
55 Indeed, models, or their subcomponents, may be “tuned” specifically to match past 
observations. See discussions of tuning in Tebaldi and Knutti (2007). 
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As evidenced in the results of our literature search (mentioned above), and its use 
by the IPCC, agreement across models has become an important tool for evaluating the 
robustness of model outputs. Many see agreement among models as support for the 
assumption that they represent the world in the relevant ways. 
3. Robustness in the GCM Literature 
How much and in what ways should models differ from one another for modelers 
to have increased confidence in convergent results?56 What does it mean to say that a 
model or set of models is robust? The climate modeling literature has devoted little 
attention to the problem of model interdependence. We have found no discussion of the 
ways and degrees to which climate models should be independent of one another for 
agreement among them to constitute confirmatory evidence of their outputs. Though 
some have recognized this as an issue (e.g. Collins, 2007; Raisanen, 2007; Tebaldi and 
Knutti, 2007; Abramowitz, 2010), we have found only one limited attempt (Abramowitz 
and Gupta, 2008, more on this later) at developing a method for evaluating the 
independence of models. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report only brushes against 
concepts related to robustness and independence.57 
Below we summarize three instances in which scientists have addressed model 
independence: (1) the ensemble approach, which assumes that models differ due to errors 
                                                      
56 Simply assessing whether or not (or the degree to which) models agree with one 
another is difficult and complicated. See Raisanen Raisanen, J. (2007) How reliable are 
climate models? Tellus A 59, 2-29., and citations therein for more on this. It is also worth 
noting that as models become more complex, so too does the task of assessing their 
independence. With simple models one can see much more easily the ways and degrees 
to which models are independent (IPCC 1997) IPCC, (1997) An Introduction to Simple 
Climate Models Used int he IPCC Second Assessment Report, in: Houghton, J.T., Filho, 
L.G.M., Griggs, D.J., Maskell, K. (Eds.), IPCC Technical Paper II. Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change.  
57 See the discussion and justification of the use of multi-model ensembles in IPCC AR4 
(Solomon et al. 2007, p.805-806). 
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in coding and processing (e.g. “truncation errors”); (2) in the use of differing model 
outputs to indicate model independence; and (3) an argument that the range of model 
parameterizations should accurately reflect current uncertainties surrounding those 
parameters.  
3.1 Ensembles 
For the most part, discussions of model independence occur in the context of 
model ensembles. Ensembles, in which results are averaged across a group of models, are 
increasingly used for their ability to reproduce observed climate behavior accurately 
(Lambert and Boer, 2001; Palmer et al., 2004; Hagedorn et al., 2005; Wang and Swail, 
2006). As with comparison of model results (such as with the Seager et al. study 
mentioned previously), the ensemble approach relies on the assumption of independence 
among models. Hagedorn et al. (2005) describe this assumption:  
Every attempt to represent nature in a set of equations, resolvable on a digital 
computer, inevitably introduces inaccuracy. That is, although the equations for 
the evolution of climate are well understood at the level of partial differential 
equations, they have to be truncated to a finite-dimensional set of ordinary 
differential equations, in order to be integrated on a digital computer… The basic 
idea of the multi-model concept is to account for this inherent model error in 
using a number of independent and skilful models in the hope of a better 
coverage of the whole possible climate phase space.  
This account implicitly assumes model independence exists due to different cut-off errors 
resulting from the coding of differential equations within each model. But this 
assumption ignores the important question of whether the use of different coding 
schemes, with correspondingly different truncation errors, is enough to constitute 
independence. Truncation error is not the only significant source of error and uncertainty 
within our understanding of the climate, nor is it the sole dimension along which models 
can be deemed independent.  
The focus of our argument is on modelers’ claims that agreement among models 
increases the robustness of their results. The ensemble approach would benefit from a 
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clearer account of model independence, which is only implicitly assumed in the ensemble 
literature. 
3.2 Independence Based on Differing Results 
In one of the few direct examinations of model independence, Abramowitz and 
Gupta (2008) argue that, given that models may share similar biases, the use of multiple 
model ensembles should involve some understanding of the extent to which models differ 
from one another, and thus the extent to which they may share the same biases. To 
demonstrate, they analyze different land-component models using a state-space approach, 
examining how each model behaves under different combinations of initial conditions. 
Abramowitz and Gupta define a “distance,” or degree of independence between models 
based upon the divergence of their outputs. This enables a quantitative measure of the 
“distance” between the different land-use models examined in the study.  
The underlying motivations of Abramowitz and Gupta are directly in line with 
our central argument. However, their solution only evaluates differences in model results, 
rather than differences in the way the models represent the world and its causal structure. 
They essentially treat models as black boxes, ignoring the causal reasons for 
disagreement between models. It is possible that two models could agree with respect to 
outputs despite their having different causal assumptions, but such a result, using this 
approach, would falsely indicate model “dependence,” because these models would yield 
the same output despite the fact that they make different and possibly conflicting claims 
about the underlying mechanisms. A more thorough analysis of why models disagree 
should complement the output-oriented independence metric of Abramowitz and Gupta 
with an understanding of the causal assumptions of the models, though we recognize that 
the technical and cognitive difficulties involved in doing so might be significant. 
Abramowitz and Gupta encounter another difficulty in balancing concerns for 
independence with concerns to accurately predict known observations. If two models are 
151 
accurate in predicting observed results, then they would be deemed dependent on one 
another by an outcome-oriented metric, and thus the significance of their agreement 
would be minimized. As Abramowitz and Gupta acknowledge, it is a difficult task to 
balance concerns for independence with concerns for performance. To try to resolve this, 
they state that the utility of a given model is a function of the model’s performance 
multiplied by how different it is from all of the other models, divided by the utility given 
for all of the other models. Again, this makes the problem clearer but does not resolve it. 
If two models have a large “distance” between them because their outputs disagree in a 
number of hypothetical cases, but the models agree with observed results, does this 
increase confidence that their agreement is significant? Or does it indicate that their 
agreement might be a special case (or perhaps the result of error)? Looking at where the 
models diverge under different possible conditions and understanding why they disagree 
would provide the key to understanding the significance of their agreement.  
3.3 Parameters and Uncertainty 
Discussion by Tebaldi and Knutti (2007) points to a third way of examining 
independence among multiple models, by focusing on the different parameters that are 
encoded within models. They raise a concern that the parameters for a given process 
within a GCM may not represent the full range of scientific uncertainty about that 
process:  
Once scientists are satisfied with a model, they rarely go back and see whether 
there might be another set of model parameters that gives a similar fit to 
observations but shows a different projection for the future. In other words, the 
process of building and improving a model is usually a process of convergence, 
where subsequent versions of a model build on previous versions, and parameters 
are only changed if there is an obvious need to do so…[I]t is probable that the 
range covered by the multi-model ensemble covers a minimum rather than the 
full range of uncertainty. (Tebaldi and Knutti, 2007, p.2069)    
Tebaldi and Knutti point to different parameters as sources of independence among 
models, suggesting that it could be possible to choose different parameters within model 
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ensembles in ways that better reflect the scientific uncertainties surrounding model 
parameters. An example of this is the perturbed physics ensembles approach, in which 
very large ensembles are used to investigate the effects of slight changes in parameters on 
model output (e.g. Stainforth et al., 2005; Ackerley et al., 2009). Pushing different 
models to reflect different probability distributions for specific parameters can generate 
more context for understanding uncertainty in model predictions, and perhaps even 
differences across GCMs. However, as Tebaldi and Knutti recognize, this cannot fully 
address the problem, as it ignores structural uncertainties stemming from the somewhat 
subjective art of selecting parameters for inclusion in the model. 
The treatment of models as independent from one another is widespread. Yet this 
brief review of the literature reveals only a limited recognition that this assumption needs 
investigation, and an almost complete absence of methods for doing so. The nascent 
existing literature on model independence supports our argument that the climate science 
community needs to address this issue more explicitly.  
4. Climate Models in Historical and Conceptual Perspective 
 In addition to these concerns about independence raised by climate modelers, 
both the history of climate modeling and a look at cases of ensemble modeling show 
further reasons for skepticism about the independence of many GCMs from one another, 
and for a better conceptual grasp on independence. In the next subsection we draw on the 
work of Paul Edwards to offer a quick history of climate modeling, pointing to some of 
the ways the various projects shared data, personnel, and computer code with one 
another. Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 contain detailed examinations of two ensemble-
modeling exercises and shift concern about independence in the abstract toward a 
discussion of independence in particular cases.        
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4.1  The History of GCM Development  
While serious attempts at numerical weather prediction date from early in the 20th 
century, working GCMs were not developed until the mid-1950s. These early models 
were apparently developed more or less independently of one another, and all were based 
on based on Lewis Fry Richardson’s simplified versions of Vilhelm Bjerknes’ seven 
“primitive equations” (Bjerknes 1921). These equations could, in principle, capture 
atmospheric physics well enough to predict general circulation. By the 1960s, there were 
four efforts to develop realistic GCMs, two of which eventually became institutionalized 
as the present-day Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory and the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research. In the next decades, many more modeling groups developed 
around the world, but crucially, they did so in close relationships with the existing 
groups. According to Paul Edwards (2000, p.79):  
GCMs and modeling techniques began to spread by a variety of means. 
Commonly, new modeling groups began with some version of another group’s 
model. Some new groups were started by post-docs or graduate students from 
one of the three original GCM groups. Others built new models from scratch.  
By the mid-1980’s, still more groups were building GCMs with increasing levels of 
sophistication. GCMs then included coupled ocean-atmosphere models, representations 
for clouds, higher resolution grid scales, and new, faster numerical methods for writing 
and solving equations. Building GCMs de novo, however, would have been expensive 
and very time consuming, so virtually no one did.  De novo codings remain rare.   
Even this very brief look at the history of GCMs indicates that a few prominent 
research groups have contributed greatly to defining the field. Some of the historically 
prominent modeling groups still exist today, along with new groups from around the 
world, and have made major contributions to the IPCC-AR4. The long-standing and tight 
relationships among many GCMs, combined with the constant interaction among 
researchers at contemporary modeling centers, raises questions about independence and 
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interdependence. If these models are independent, it is not because they are separately 
housed or administered: modeling groups often share ideas, data, personnel, and 
computer code. At the same time, increased collaboration among scientific research 
groups may aid in the generation of new and different approaches, and it may encourage 
criticism and increased accuracy in different models. We cannot fully answer what the 
overall effect is, but it is worth highlighting that the societal interconnections among 
research groups may add to and at the same time take away from the independence 
among different modeling groups. 
4.2 GCMs Used in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC-AR4) 
IPCC’s AR4 devotes considerable attention to models, their evaluation, and their 
results. But it does not discuss which kinds and degrees of differences across models 
point to the kind of model independence that would make agreement between model 
predictions significant. This presents a problem to anyone who would make use of model 
results, whether for further research, or for important policy decisions. The authoritative 
and comprehensive account of climate science gives very little attention to model 
independence beyond citing a few articles relating to the justification of multi-model 
ensembles. Directly examining the models used in the IPCC-AR4 strengthens the 
argument that model independence needs to be more thoroughly explored. The IPCC 
AR4 drew upon the results of the 23 GCMs, listed in Table 5.1. Analysis of the table and 
the models it references reveals several ways in which the models are both similar and 
dissimilar: there are variations in grid resolution (though some are the same); some model 
the basic physical equations using different methods (finite differencing as against the 
spectral-transform approach), though some do it the same way; there are probably also 
subtle differences in coding, though many models use the same or very similar basic 
code; some models use different parameterizations for specific phenomena, and 
sometimes differ in the choice of which physical variables to include.  
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A look at forcing variables included in the AR4 GCMs yields similar results. In 
Table 5.2 one can see that some features, such as forcing from the main greenhouse 
gases, are shared across almost all models. Greater differences occur across 
representations of aerosol forcings, with considerable variation in the components 
included, and the manner in which they are represented. For example, almost all models 
include sulfate, while very few have incorporated urban aerosols.  
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Table 5.1 
List of General Circulation Models included in the IPCC AR4, with key characteristics. Sources: IPCC Table 8.1 (Solomon et al 2007, p. 597-599) and the Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and 
Intercomparison (PCMDI http://www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/ipcc/model_documentation/ipcc_model_documentation.php) 
 Model Details 
Originating Group(s) Country CMIP3 I.D. 
Atmospheric 
Resolution 
(lat/long) 
Atmosphe
ric Layers 
Oceanic Resolution 
(lat/long) 
Oceanic 
Vertical 
Layers Grid Type 
Beijing Climate Center  China BCC-CM1 1.9° x 1.9 ° 16 1.9°  x 1.9° 30  
Bjerknes Centre for Climate Research Norway BCCR-BCM2.0 1.9° x 1.9 ° 31 0.5° - 1.5° x 1.5° 35  
National Center for Atmospheric Research USA CCSM3 1.4° x 1.4° 26 0.3°-1° x 1° 40 eulerian spectral transform 
Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling & Analysis Canada CGCM3.1(T47) 3.75° x 3.75° 31 1.9° x 1.9° 29 spectral transform 
Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling & Analysis Canada CGCM3.1(T63) 2.8° x 2.8° 31 1.4° x 0.94° 29 spectral transform 
Météo-France / Centre National de Recherches Météorologiques France CNRM-CM3 ~1.9° x 1.9° 45 0.5-2° x 2° 31 
semi-lagrangian semi-implicit time 
integration with 30 mn time-step, 3 hour 
timestep for radiative transfer; 
CSIRO Atmospheric Research Australia CSIRO-Mk3.0 ~1.9° x 1.9° 18 0.8° x 1.9° 31 spectral for some variables, lagrangian for others, leapfrog 
Max Planck Institute for Meteorology Germany ECHAM5/MPI-OM ~1.9° x 1.9° 31 1.5° x 1.5° 40 spectral transform method, leapfrong timestep scheme 
University of Bonn (Germany), KMA (Korea) and M&D Group* G/K ECHO-G ~3.9° x ~3.9° 19 0.5° - 2.8° x 2.8° 20  
LASG / Institute of Atmospheric Physics China FGOALS-g1.0 ~2.8° x 2.8° 26 1° x 1° 16 finite difference, semiimplicit time 
US Dept. of Commerce / NOAA / Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory USA GFDL-CM2.1 2.0° x 2.5° 24 0.3°-1° x 1° ? B-grid scheme 
US Dept. of Commerce / NOAA / Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory USA GFDL-CM2.0 2.0° x 2.5° 24 0.3°-1° x 1° ? B-grid scheme 
NASA / Goddard Institute for Space Studies USA GISS-AOM 3° x 4° 12 3° x 4° 16 C-grid scheme 
NASA / Goddard Institute for Space Studies USA GISS-EH 4° x 5° 20 2° x 2° 16 Arakawa B-grid, among others 
NASA / Goddard Institute for Space Studies USA GISS-ER 4° x 5° 20 4° x 5° 13 Arakawa B-grid, among others 
Institute for Numerical Mathematics Russia INM-CM3.0 4° x 5° 21 2° x 2.5° 33 finite difference (arakawa 1972), semiimplicit 
Institut Pierre Simon Laplace France IPSL-CM4 2.5° x 3.75° 19 2° x 2° 31 finite difference equations, leapfrog time approach 
University of Tokyo, NIES, and JAMSTEC** Japan MIROC3.2(hires) ~1.1° x 1.1° 56 0.2° x 0.3° 47 spectral transform 
University of Tokyo, NIES, and JAMSTEC** Japan MIROC3.2(medres) 2.8° x 2.8° 20 0.5°-1.4° x 1.4° 43 spectral transform 
Meteorological Research Institute Japan MRI-CGCM2.3.2 2.8° x 2.8° 30 0.5°-2.0° x 2.5° 23 spectral transform method, leapfrong timestep scheme, semiimplicit.  
National Center for Atmospheric Research USA PCM ~2.8° x 2.8° 26 0.5°-0.7° x 1.1° 40 eulerian spectral transform 
Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research / Met Office UK UKMO-HadCM3 2.5° x 3.75° 19 1.25° x 1.25° 20 Arakawa B-grid, hybrid vertical coordinates. Eurlerian advection scheme. 
Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research / Met Office UK UKMO-HadGEM1 ~1.3° x 1.9° 38 0.3°-1.0° x 1.0° 40 Arakawa C-grid horizontally, Chaney Phillips grid vertically 
*Meteorological Institute of the University of Bonn, Meteorological Research Institute of KMA, and Model and Data group.  
**Center for Climate System Research (The University of Tokyo), National Institute for Environmental Studies, and Frontier Research Center for Global Change (JAMSTEC) 
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Table 5.2 
Model Forcing Agents. Y indicates that forcing agent is included, 0 indicates that it is not. Modified from IPCC AR4 Table 10.1 in (Solomon et al 2007, p. 756). This version 
ignores nuances in the original which distinguished different data sets or modeling approaches that were used to account for different forcing agents. 
 Forcing Agents 
 Greenhouse Gases` 
 
Aerosols 
 
Other 
CMIP3 I.D.* CO2 CH4 N2O 
Stratos-
pheric 
Ozone 
Tropos
-pheric 
Ozone CFCs 
 
SO4 Urban 
Black 
carbon 
Organic 
carbon Nitrates 
1st 
Indirect 
2nd 
Indirect Dust Volcanic 
Sea 
Salt 
 
Land 
Use Solar 
BCC-CM1 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 0  Y Y 
BCCR-BCM2.0 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y 0 0 0 0 0 Y 0 Y  Y Y 
CCSM3 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y 0 0 0 Y Y Y  0 Y 
CGCM3.1(T47) Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y  Y Y 
CGCM3.1(T63) Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y  Y Y 
CNRM-CM3 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y 0 0 0 0 0 Y 0 Y  0 0 
CSIRO-Mk3.0 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
ECHAM5/MPI-OM Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 Y 0 0 0 0  0 0 
ECHO-G y y y y y y  y 0 0 0 0 Y 0 0 Y 0  0 Y 
FGOALS-g1.0 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 Y 
GFDL-CM2.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y 0 0 0 Y Y Y  Y Y 
GFDL-CM2.0 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y 0 0 0 Y Y Y  Y Y 
GISS-AOM Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y Y 0 Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
GISS-EH Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y Y 0 Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
GISS-ER Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y Y 0 Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
INM-CM3.0 Y Y Y Y Y 0  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 0  0 Y 
IPSL-CM4 Y Y Y 0 0 Y  Y 0 0 0 0 Y 0 0 0 0  0 0 
MIROC3.2(hires) Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y 0 Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
MIROC3.2(medres) Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y 0 Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
MRI-CGCM2.3.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 0  0 Y 
PCM Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 0  0 Y 
UKMO-HadCM3 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 0 0 0 Y 0 0 Y 0  0 Y 
UKMO-HadGEM1 Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 0 Y Y 0 Y Y 0 Y Y  Y Y 
*Modeling groups and country of origin for each ID are listed in Table 5.1.   
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In addition to these prima facie similarities and differences, deeper study of the 
components of the models raises further questions about independence. Two models 
considered from the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research, UKMO-
HadGEM1 and UKMO-HadCM3 are very closely related: the former is a newer version 
of the latter and some of the major personnel overlap. The same is true in the case of the 
two models (PCM and CCSM3) from the National Center for Atmospheric Research. 
Other models, like those considered from JAMSTEC and CGCM3.1, are high- and 
medium-resolution variants of each other, meaning that their parameterizations and basic 
approaches are identical, but they differ in their spatial resolutions. Still others, like 
GFDL-CM2.0 and GFDL-CM2.1, appear to vary with respect to discretization schemes 
for advection, damping schemes, and the value of time steps used for ocean components, 
but to share everything else.  
4.3 Regional Case Studies 
Though we have focused so far on the IPCC and on global climate change, 
regionally focused studies drawing on the IPCC models are becoming common. The 
recent paper on aridity and drought in the American Southwest (Seager et al., 2007) 
mentioned in Section 2, for instance, received a great deal of attention in the popular 
media, especially in the American Southwest. That paper uses agreement among models 
as strong evidence for an impending transition to a more arid regional climate. This 
“broad consensus,” the authors note, has implications for water and development policy. 
Indeed it does, but consensus and unanimity can be achieved in more than one way. What 
agreement means in this case is particularly important in the light of a similar study by 
(Christensen and Lettenmaier, 2006) that points to a slight decrease in overall 
precipitation (on the order of 1%), but also projects substantial precipitation increase 
during the winter months. The relationship of precipitation to climate change in the 
Southwest remains poorly understood, and which set of results is most convincing should 
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depend in part on the case that can be made for the independence of models from one 
another in the Seager et al. study. 
Regional studies also pose a model-selection problem. Often, studies of particular 
regions or processes cannot make use of the full set of AR4 model output due to resource 
constraints or, more commonly, because some models simply do not represent the system 
under examination in an appropriate manner. In these cases, researchers often proceed 
with a selection of models that best fit the study at hand. 
 Such is the case in a study reported by Kripalani et al. (2007), which investigates 
the effects of climate change on the South Asian summer monsoon. Beginning with 
twenty-two coupled GCMs, the authors argue that “confidence in climate model regional 
precipitation projections will depend on how well the models are able to simulate the 20th 
century monsoon rainfall.” Thus, through a selection process using statistical procedures 
to identify the models best suited to their study, they arrive at a group of six models (in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2: BCCR-BCM2.0; CGCM3.1(T47); CNRM-CM3; ECHAM5/MPI-
OM; MIROC3.2(hires); and UKMO-HadCM3), all of which project an increase in mean 
summer monsoon precipitation as a result of long-term climate change. 
 Our question here is the same as before: what significance does agreement 
among the six selected models have? Did the process of narrowing down to a subgroup of 
model results eliminate or preserve the independence necessary to add robustness to the 
study’s findings? We cannot answer this question comprehensively. A preliminary 
comparison based on the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 does not reveal any obvious 
interdependencies, but there are many other ways to investigate this set of models 
(Gleckler et al., 2008). For example, error profiles resulting from various probabilistic 
and deterministic skill measures, as described in Hagedorn et al. (2005), would be 
another approach. In any case, the authors would strengthen their case for increased 
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confidence with a clear account of what these six models share that would make them 
useful for this study, and an argument for independence despite this overlap. 
 In another example, Wang and Overland (2009) investigate Arctic sea ice extent 
using a subset the IPCC AR4 models. Their selection among the models relies on an 
“observational constraint,” which eliminates any model lying outside a certain range in 
its ability to simulate past sea ice extent. This strategy yields six models (as did the 
monsoon study mentioned above), which are then used to predict future sea ice extent. 
This approach is justified because: a.) confidence in IPCC projections is related to the 
ability of models to reproduce past observations, and b.) eliminating outlier models will 
reduce uncertainty in future projections.58 The authors do not offer a causal explanation 
of why these models can be expected to perform better than the others with respect to sea 
ice extent,59 but do point to similarity in their results as a source of confidence in the 
predictions. 
 Only one model is shared between the two studies described above (Kripliani et 
al., and Wang and Overland), each of which settled on six models that best reproduce the 
processes under investigation. This alone should raise concerns about such studies: given 
that these processes play out in the same open, highly complex, and interconnected 
system, what is the rationale for using one set of models to predict future sea ice extent, 
and an almost entirely different set to predict monsoon behavior? It may be reasonable to 
assume that there is something shared by each subset of models which makes them 
suitable to the task. How, then, can the authors treat them as independent?  
                                                      
58 Though it does reduce the spread among model results, it is far from clear how such an 
approach would reduce overall uncertainty. 
59 They note only that three of the six contain a “sophisticated sea ice physics and 
dynamics package.” 
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We readily acknowledge that different models have strengths and weaknesses 
when it comes to modeling particular processes in particular regions. The question here 
relates to the use of groups of models, and the comparison of their results. The results of 
each of these studies may not be wrong, but increased confidence requires an account of 
independence within each set of models, and an explanation of model selection that takes 
into account the underlying causal structure of the models. 
The central point of the preceding analysis and discussion is that there are 
compelling reasons to be concerned about the independence of models that share 
histories, computer code, causal assumptions, and other essential features if we are to use 
agreement across models as a reason to believe that our models are correct or 
approximately correct. Table 5.3 presents a list of the various dimensions we have 
identified, along which GCMs might be examined in an assessment of independence. 
This is a preliminary list, no doubt subject to further additions and modifications. If we 
are to understand the relationships between models, and between models and reality, a 
great deal more work will need to be done. Our task so far has been to raise a simple but 
crucially important question that should accompany studies such as those highlighted 
above: how independent are these models from one other?  
In tables and figures throughout the literature analyzing GCM output, one 
regularly sees distinct, apparently independent statistics or graphical elements for each 
model, when some may be, for all intents and purposes, either the same or at least highly 
interdependent. For agreement to lead to robustness, it must be at least possible for the 
models to disagree.  
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Table 5.3  
Sources of independence and interdependence among models.  
Basic Physics 
The underlying assumptions about how the climate works. Many models 
be similar with respect to fundamental issues such as principles of 
conservation of mass and energy but there can be different assumptions 
about how the climate works.   
Parameters 
Assumptions about how aspects of the system operate, such as the effect 
of cloud cover on global warming. Parameters are specific variables 
which can be represented with code, which is different from equations 
which can reflect more general laws. 
Scope and 
Idealizations 
The way that models resolve the system can be different. Models may 
use different resolutions, have different system boundaries, or make 
different idealizations. GCMs differ in their resolutions while making 
roughly similar boundary assumptions. GCMs use different idealizations 
(such as whether the model assumes that ground soil is 3.5m or 5.5) 
which may be literally false but predictively useful.  
Data 
Observations (e.g. from satellites or ground-based sensors) used for 
validating or tuning models, or model subcomponents. Using data from 
different time periods or physical sources could make model analyses 
independent from one another.  
Numerical 
Coding 
Software and computer processes that drive models. If equations are 
resolved through different coding schemes, this can be a source of 
independence.  
History and 
Sociology 
Origins and evolution of the institutions, personnel, cultural norms and 
technical approaches to modeling. If modeling programs were created 
based upon another program’s source code and approach, this may be a 
source of interdependence. Professional exchange among modelers can 
encourage shared strategies; at the same time, academic norms of 
openness and transparency can foster the criticism of ideas and 
proliferation of different approaches. 
 
5. Conclusions: Toward an Interdisciplinary Understanding of Models and their 
Meanings  
Understanding agreement among multiple models is one area in which 
conceptual clarity is crucial, and more work is needed. We have argued here that there 
are reasons to be concerned about multi-model analyses that claim robustness because 
there is presently no consensus on how to evaluate such claims. We have not offered a 
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metric of our own because we recognize that we are pointing to a hard problem. Indeed, 
following Gleckler’s (2008) survey of model performance measures, there probably is no 
single metric of independence that will prove appropriate in all cases. We hope these 
arguments encourage those who make robustness claims to pay attention to the 
relationships between the models in their analyses and to address the ways in which the 
models they study are independent of one another. Our argument is not that the IPCC’s 
models are incapable of supporting robustness claims or that regional studies that rely on 
multi-model ensembles do not withstand scrutiny. We are arguing that the situation is 
worse than this, because there is presently no way to judge the quality of analyses based 
on multiple models.   
A recent “Synthesis and Assessment Product” by the US Climate Change 
Science Program makes a distinction between the quality of climate models and our 
confidence in their ability to make accurate projections with basis in reality (CCSP, 
2008a). The quality-accuracy distinction goes to the heart of the robustness issue. If we 
merely strive to develop a suite of tools that can mimic observational data, then we can 
say that climate models have made great progress (though considerable room for 
improvement remains). The central problem addressed by Levins’ concept of robustness, 
however, is that of relating abstract models to the world – an issue that, for climate 
models, “remains a subject of active research” (CCSP, 2008a p.4). It seems, however, 
that climate science has not yet “actively” pursued this problem. 
Governments continue to invest billions of dollars in GCMs, seeking to capitalize 
on the promise of better predictions with lower uncertainty, and increased relevance to 
decision makers. But GCMs continue to have limited applicability at local and regional 
scales. Many within the climate science community see such limitations as reason for 
further investment in the development of GCMs. We argue that in the likely event that 
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such investments continue, considerable attention should be devoted to model 
independence.  
In pointing out the problem of model independence, we are also pointing out one 
of many broader science policy problems facing climate science. A recent report in 
Nature suggests that the IPCC Fifth Assessment will show a wider spread of model 
projections than in AR4 (Hefferman, 2010). Is this an appropriate direction for climate 
science, given the overriding goal of informing decisions? Will the Fifth Assessment 
express a better grasp of model independence, and thus the meaning of agreement among 
models? The answer depends on research choices made by scientists and science policy 
makers. 
Understanding model independence is likely to be an interdisciplinary venture. 
Scientists like Richard Levins have written on the topic, as have philosophers of science, 
though less directly (Giere, 1990; Cartwright, 1999; Norton and Suppe, 2001; Wimsatt, 
2007). Scientists and philosophers have also written on the topic together (Orzack and 
Sober, 1993; Oreskes et al., 1994). Historians and social scientists have considered the 
history of climate models and what models mean in the real world (Oreskes et al., 1994; 
Shackley and Wynne, 1996; van der Sluijs et al., 1998; Edwards, 2000; Oreskes, 2000; 
Edwards, 2001; Oreskes and Belitz, 2001; Lahsen, 2005; Parker, 2006). There are also 
broader questions about the role of models in shaping disciplines, and in influencing the 
outcomes of science (Shackley et al., 1998; Shackley, 2000; Robert, 2008). There is 
much more to do, and these scholars will have to work closely with modelers to 
understand the details of models and why they matter.  
 As with the general problem of uncertainty in climate science, there will be no 
silver bullet approach to the issue of independence and robustness in climate model 
results. In both cases, however, we think that science and society stand to benefit from a 
consistent and concerted effort to understand and communicate transparently, especially 
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as researchers become bolder in their attempts to make specific regional predictions, and 
more insistent in their demands for the substantial resources needed for this kind of work 
(e.g. Shukla et al., 2009). Discourse  is essential for maintaining transparency and 
avoiding the pitfalls of overconfidence and overreliance on models. 
 
 
166 
Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
“It is not enough to simply disassemble an existing myth—it needs to be replaced.” 
Tim Clark (2002) 
1. Key Contributions 
 Both STS and the climate science policy community have provided extensive 
answers to the question, “what kinds of climate science knowledge are we getting?” And 
they increasingly provide answers to a second question, “what kinds of climate science 
knowledge should we be getting?” But they continue to ignore a third crucial question: 
“how will the institutions of science policy need to change in order to support and 
manage science that fulfills public values?” Climate science policy discourse increasingly 
recognizes a need to change both the content and practice of research in order to fulfill 
public values. But such discourse tends to ignore its own organizational consequences. 
There is a need for more explicit understanding and engagement of the current system, 
and for empirical work in support science policy innovation.  
Despite volumes of writing on new and old themes in climate science, this 
dissertation represents the first detailed examination of how such ideas are playing out in 
the halls, meeting rooms, and cubicles where people actually implement climate science 
policy. I have shown that to the extent that climate science policy discourse has embraced 
new ideas about how climate science in the US should work, this has not led to 
significant organizational change in support of these new ideas. In Australia, despite the 
emergence of new organizations in the area of adaptation research, many challenges 
remain when it comes to fulfilling the public values that underpin research funding.  
 Throughout the preceding chapters, I have discussed tacit and problematic 
assumptions that continue to shape climate science in important ways. Ideas such as the 
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prediction imperative and the linear model have for decades been recognized as providing 
an inaccurate account of how science works, and as insufficient for linking science to 
desired social outcomes. I have also examined a variety of ideas and models that should, 
many believe, replace the old assumptions. Climate science, it is argued, should be 
stakeholder driven or use-inspired. It should integrate social sciences with natural 
sciences, and strive to generate information that is not only credible, but also salient and 
legitimate.  
A key contribution of this work has been to the development of new approaches 
for evaluating policies for science and technology. PVM grew out of a recognition that 
existing tools and concepts focused on economic indicators cannot capture the public 
values implications of research outcomes. Chapter 2 shows that PVM also provides a 
counterpoint to frameworks built on assumptions related to the linear model—the 
“knowledge as progress” assumption, as opposed to “profit as progress.” Parallel to 
PVM’s contrast with market values, I introduced the concept of “science values,” and 
used it to both map and unpack the dynamics of interagency climate science in the US, 
and to expand Bozeman’s (2007) initial set of public failure criteria (see Table 2.2, p.37). 
Chapter 4 both refines and elaborates the concept of science values. Chapter 2 
focused on a limited set of science values that remain quite influential, despite wide 
recognition that they involve a simplistic and inaccurate conception of scientific progress 
and its connections to policy and other potential uses. Chapter 4 recognizes that research 
policy (following this chapter’s epigraph above) must involve some set of assumptions 
about how science funding connects to public values. In other words we cannot eradicate 
inappropriate and inaccurate assumptions such as the linear model without replacing 
them with something new. In Chapter 4 I took a more systematic approach to science 
values by conducting an inventory of those assumptions, parallel to a public values 
inventory. The resulting contrast—between the short list of science values found in 
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official policy discourse, and the much more varied and dynamic ecosystem of science 
values found through interviews—allows for a value chain analysis that points out 
problematic connections (as in Chapter 2), and highlights potential new directions and 
new models for adaptation research policy. Put differently, the aim of Chapter 4 is not 
simply to identify and describe the causes of public value failures; it is also to make 
values discourse explicit in a way that encourages more reflective and effective science 
policy implementation. 
A second key contribution of this research is specific to climate science policy in 
the US. Chapters 2 and 3 examine this system in much greater detail than has been done 
before, particularly at the level of managers who make actual funding decisions. They 
reveal a variety of subtle dynamics that resist calls for change and perpetuate old ideas 
about science policy. Both chapters add a crucial element to the picture that emerges 
from previous research and writing on climate science policy. The prediction imperative 
has long been recognized (though not by this name) as a powerful social and political 
force within climate science (e.g. Glantz, 1988; Pielke, 1995a; Shackley et al., 1998; 
Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Dessai et al., 2009a). Similarly, many have documented the 
social and political processes through which climate knowledge is produced, legitimated, 
and accorded authority (e.g. Jasanoff et al., 1998; van der Sluijs et al., 1998; Shackley et 
al., 1999; Shackley, 2000; Demeritt, 2001; Miller, 2004a, b; Lovbrand et al., 2009). But 
while some do mention the importance of climate science policy (see Shackley and 
Wynne, 1995; Dessai et al., 2009a), these accounts have not engaged or unpacked the 
interagency process or the activities of program managers. These previously-overlooked 
processes are important for understanding the production of climate science knowledge 
and the potential for change in climate science policy. Thus, previous work on the politics 
of climate knowledge provides both an impetus and an intellectual platform for this 
research. 
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Another important element of this work was to take initial steps toward a model 
for conducting science policy research that is both consultative and collaborative, thus 
building on theory in a way also tests research practice. The case studies in both the US 
and Australia required building relationships with science policy decision makers, 
through which I could learn essential information about the cases themselves, and also 
communicate about my research and my findings in the hope of providing useful 
information to those decision makers. I discuss this idea further in the next section. 
2. Recommendations 
 In this section I discuss some general recommendations for improving science 
policy research and practice, and then offer a set of more specific recommendations 
focused on US interagency climate science. The PVM analysis presented in Chapter 2 ran 
up against space constraints (as it was being prepared for publication in Minerva), and so 
considerable cuts were made in both the conclusions and the description of the Program. 
Further description can be found in Appendix C, and specific recommendations are 
presented below in section 2.2.  
Following Pielke (2007), the goal of these recommendations is not to provide the 
“right” answer, but instead to expand the range of options one might consider as these 
policies and programs go forward. These recommendations emerge from research in a 
complex and constantly evolving policy environment. Some of these ideas may lose or 
gain salience depending on current and future events. Some may be realistic only in 
conjunction with other recommendations, or under changed circumstances. In other 
words, I present these recommendations as a window into the kinds of insights that 
science policy research can offer to specific policy programs in full recognition of the 
fact that a static and academic medium such as this dissertation is wholly inadequate to 
the task of informing policy practice.  
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2.1 General Recommendations 
 The first general recommendation stemming from my research is that science 
policy research needs to “walk the talk.” To be blunt, if we’re going to use government 
funds to do research on whether the use of government funds for research has been 
effective, we will need a certain degree of reflexivity about our own performance in that 
regard. From the standpoint of academic science policy research this means designing 
and conducting research in a way that is actually useful to science policy practitioners. 
With adequate resources and planning this might mean a very formal, elaborate process 
of iterative consultation, workshops, and reports aimed at key potential users. But 
working with users can also be an informal and less resource-intensive process. One can, 
for example, use research interviews as an opportunity to provide feedback by making 
time for back and forth discussion after the formal protocol has finished. Interview-based 
research requires building relationships with key actors, and gaining the trust of an 
organization in order to access sensitive information. Both processes can also provide 
opportunities for feedback. Frequent discussion with research subjects about one’s own 
thinking, about the successes and failures of the research process, and the interesting 
results emerging from research, can keep subjects involved and interested, and help to 
contextualize the end results so that they are better understood.60  
 Another way to ensure that science policy research is useful to science policy 
decision makers would be to build in-house capacity for research within agencies or 
programs. Groups like the CCSP/GCRP, CAF, and NCCARF might establish offices 
                                                      
60 My own process did not involve a formal system for feeding results back to science 
policy decision makers (although see the final section of this chapter), but frequent 
discussions with key supporters and interviewees gave me ample opportunities to float 
ideas and make recommendations. Those discussions also strengthened the contents of 
the recommendations presented here. One drawback of this is that there is no easy way to 
trace the impact of those discussions on the system. 
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with relevant expertise to conduct evaluations or commission studies that respond to 
specific science policy questions and help the organizations do a better job at 
implementing science policy. CAF has begun a few small efforts in this regard, which 
include network analysis of one of its themes, survey work with CAF participants and 
stakeholders, and the Masters thesis I referenced in Chapter 5 (Meharg, 2009), which 
examined CAF researcher attitudes toward engagement with government clients or 
stakeholders. These efforts could be more strategically organized, and tied in more 
strongly to evaluation procedures of the organization, and there is some evidence that 
CAF is moving in this direction (personal communication from an interviewee). I make 
more specific observations and recommendations about science policy research in the 
context of US climate science in the next section.  
Outside reports by consultants and advisory bodies can also play a role in 
conducting immediately relevant and helpful science policy research. Of course, agencies 
frequently commission reports along these lines, as exemplified by the many National 
Research Council reports that I have cited throughout the preceding chapters. Those 
reports, as I have already pointed out, highlight the need to be strategic about the 
questions asked and the organizations called on to provide answers. The NRC has very 
little reason to challenge the science policy status quo by making recommendations that 
might negatively impact funding for a particular area of research. The organization goes 
to great lengths to appear authoritative, independent, and neutral (e.g. Hilgartner, 2000), 
but when it comes to assessments of, and recommendations for, funding for science, it is 
necessarily conflicted. A common symptom of this problem are reports that advocate for 
changes while being absolutely unwilling to recommend tradeoffs. In other words, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, increased support of human dimensions or applications is 
recommended only if it does not take away from existing budgets for biophysical 
research. Such advice is simply unrealistic in the budget constrained world of climate 
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science policy. The NRC clearly has a role to play in US climate science but for 
evaluating the implementation of research policy against non-scientific goals and public 
values, the CCSP might look elsewhere, such as a non-government consultant, or the 
Government Accountability Office.61 
The recent operational review of NCCARF (Campbell and Morvell, unpublished) 
provides a stark contrast to NRC reports evaluating the CCSP/GCRP (e.g. NRC, 2007, 
2009b). The NCCARF report was assembled by an independent party with extensive 
experience working in government (though they were not working in government at the 
time), and with deep knowledge of issues surrounding research policy implementation in 
Australia (see Campbell and Schofield, 2007). Both the NCCARF review and NRC 
evaluations of CCSP/GCRP looked at knowledge outputs of the programs, and both made 
broad recommendations regarding imbalances in research portfolios. The NCCARF 
report, however, also combined knowledge of science policy scholarship, a detailed 
review of the organizational structure and operational realities of NCCARF, and 
interviews with many participants at many levels within the organization. It offered a set 
of recommendations aimed at specific processes, components, and actors within the 
organization, and a suite of options for policy makers to consider as they move forward. 
The results, when compared with recommendations offered by the NRC reports 
referenced above, are better tailored to the organizational realities of those who actually 
work at NCCARF.62 However, the challenging nature of the report’s criticisms, 
                                                      
61 The fact that the GAO is an arm of Congress is obviously a potential problem here. The 
CCSP is part of the Executive Branch, and may not be interested in proactively seeking 
advice from Congress, especially if the two branches are under control by different 
political parties. However, the GAO has in the past evaluated aspects of the CCSP based 
on the requirements of the GCRA (see GAO 2005), and such an evaluation could be 
usefully extended. 
62 Several of my research subjects in the US, when asked about NRC evaluations, 
expressed frustrations. They agreed with many of the recommendations, but felt that the 
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particularly those directed at the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 
which oversees NCCARF and commissioned the report, might carry political 
repercussions. It remains to be seen whether the Department will make the report 
public,63 and how it will react to the report’s contents. Any evaluation of a government 
program risks being politicized and causing controversy. However, in this context it is 
still possible to generate useful recommendations that actually bring in new information 
and new ideas, expanding the range of options that managers and others can consider in 
strategic planning, or in their day to day operations. 
2.2 US-Specific Recommendations 
 Recommendations aimed at US climate science must take into account the 
expected context of that policy space going forward, and the various actors that might 
implement such recommendations, depending on those circumstances. Table 6.1 
illustrates these considerations by grouping recommendations based on two different 
potential scenarios, and four different groups of potential policy actors. This matrix is 
necessarily incomplete and over-simplified, but it provides a useful starting point for 
thinking through the kinds of changes, both large and small, that might move the system 
in a direction more consistent with its motivating public values. 
 Some of the recommendations in Table 6.1 are repeated in multiple cells. For 
example, I have recommended that three different groups should consider changes and 
additions to the current array of interagency working groups. The existing structure of 
IWGs is already a mix of substantive research themes (e.g. atmospheric composition, 
                                                      
reports did not actually say anything new or helpful. They (the reports) simply point out 
challenges and imbalances that are already well-known. In this sense, such reports may 
provide a “shield or a sword”—political tools to trot out at hearings or other meetings—
but they do not provide helpful advice.  
63 The review was supposed to be released in June of 2010, but as of November of that 
year it is still not officially available to the public. 
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ecosystems) and operational concerns (e.g. observations and monitoring, international 
research and cooperation), but none of the groups is specifically focused on scientific 
practice or science policy practice related to public values. In other words, these groups 
convene to discuss research challenges, but not science policy challenges.  
It might make more sense for at least some of these program manager groups to 
be organized around goal-oriented concepts instead of disciplinary divisions. One might 
consider, for example, a group of program managers interested in science serving sectoral 
stakeholders (e.g. farmers, fishermen), or another group focused on generating useful 
data products.64 Or one could form an interagency working group around the topic of 
research evaluation methods and goal setting, in which program managers could share 
notes and develop strategies for innovative evaluation practices. This might even involve 
building a connection with NSF’s Science of Science and Innovation Policy (SciSIP) 
program.65 The simple argument behind this recommendation is that such issues are more 
likely to receive careful consideration if they form the common thread that ties a group 
together. In other words, if the main thing bringing people to the table is that they all fund 
water research, then the conversation will mostly revolve around water research. If the 
main thing uniting a group is research involving stakeholders, then one hopes that the 
conversation will revolve around best practices for supporting stakeholders. 
                                                      
64 The recommendation that the CCSP/GCRP focus more on research practice is in line 
with the recommendations of the NRC’s (2009a) recent report on decision support. 
However, that report does not get into the details of how the interagency program might 
institutionalize this. 
65 SciSIP, it should be noted, has funded a series of case studies using PVM, of which this 
research was a part. 
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Table 6.1 
Recommendations for different actors, based on two scenarios for interagency climate science in the US. 
 IWGs  
(interagency working groups of program 
managers) 
Interagency Office Principals/Agencies 
(top level career bureaucrats) 
Higher Level Policy 
(e.g. Congress, OMB, OSTP) 
Existing 
CCSP/GCRP 
structure. 
! Work to get IWG activities 
recognized in job descriptions of 
managers. 
! Argue for funds that can leverage 
existing activities (research, capacity 
building, events) from across 
agencies toward IWG priorities (as 
has been done w/in Carbon Cycle 
group). 
! Pursue collaborative funding of 
research through NSF’s SciSIP 
program. 
! Distinguish between climate 
science outputs/outcomes writ 
large, and science policy 
achievements of interagency 
office. 
! Create events, products, and 
processes that highlight 
exemplary scientific practice 
related to specific goals of 
interagency science. 
! Pursue collaborative funding of 
research through NSF’s SciSIP 
program. 
 
! Bureaucratic leadership that 
encourages science policy 
innovation. 
! Recognize and reward CCSP 
participation by lower level 
managers. 
! Demand better transparency 
and consistency in yearly OCP, 
particularly with regard to 
budget. 
! Demand improved reporting on 
outcomes with regard to useful 
information and other public 
values. 
! Distinguish between climate 
science outcomes writ large, 
and science policy 
achievements of interagency 
office. 
Changed 
structure; still 
within the 
GCRA. 
! Reconsider current IWG structure, 
and the possibility for creating groups 
around types of scientific practice 
(e.g. participatory processes, decision 
support), or key goals (i.e. 
developing policy options). 
! Encourage focus on scientific 
practice as an area of research, 
and a part of strategic planning 
and science policy discourse. 
! Reconsider current IWG 
structure, and the possibility 
for creating groups around 
types of scientific practice (e.g. 
participatory processes, 
decision support), or key goals 
(i.e. developing policy 
options). 
! Reach out to programs in 
participating agencies with 
existing stakeholder support 
capacity.  
! Partially redefine (i.e. reduce) 
scope of agency participation 
specific to science that is 
directly linked to desired 
outcomes, or needed capacity 
building. 
! Reconsider current IWG 
structure, and the possibility 
for creating groups around 
types of scientific practice (e.g. 
participatory processes, 
decision support), or key goals 
(i.e. developing policy 
options). 
! Partially redefine (i.e. reduce) 
scope of CCSP specific to 
science directly linked to 
desired outcomes, or needed 
capacity building. 
! Seek ways of funding research 
through the interagency 
process, targeted areas of 
needed capacity and science 
policy goals. 
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 I have placed this recommendation about IWGs in multiple cells in Table 6.1 to illustrate 
the fact that the impetus for such a change could plausibly come from different voices, and in 
different forms. The interagency working groups undertake priority setting at the program level. 
They are asked each year to communicate about their priorities to the Principals, and they often 
have a voice at Principals meetings. A proactive group of program managers could make a strong 
case for adding or re-forming an IWG around a new concept based on their day to day needs as 
managers, or on a strong desire to build capacity in a new area. The interagency office could also 
make a case for new or different IWGs based its own operational needs. For example, a new 
strategic planning process, or a new structure for yearly reports to Congress could serve as 
justifications for such changes. 
 Some IWGs, such as the group focused on carbon cycle science, have been successful at 
obtaining funding from agencies for research targeting interagency priorities.66 Some 
interviewees from other IWGs pointed this out to me as a model in which the science priorities of 
the CCSP/GCRP could be better supported. Unfortunately the carbon cycle example appears to be 
an anomaly. Whether due to agency penny-pinching or apathy among IWG members, in general 
these groups do not have much in the way of resources to organize events or fund research 
targeted at interagency priorities. Again, this is a recommendation that would only come to pass 
through some combination of personal and group efforts at one or more levels within the system. 
Directives from Congress or OMB could require designation of funds to interagency working 
                                                      
66 This is not to say that the Carbon Cycle group has done a better job at fulfilling public values. 
Rather, by securing resources from participating agencies, this IWG has managed to develop a 
more robust set of programs than have other IWGs. According to Dilling (2007), the group’s 
interagency priorities have focused mostly on basic science with little consideration for user 
needs.  
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groups,67 or individual IWGs could, following the carbon cycle model, work to win funds from 
their home agencies. 
 IWGs vary greatly in their degree of activity and the level of commitment by members to 
the activities of the group. One small way to address the problem of defunct or largely apathetic 
IWGs would be for agencies to recognize and reward IWG participation. To date very few agency 
programs do this, which means that program managers see little incentive to spend time on IWG-
related work unless it might benefit them in some other tangible way.  
 As I pointed out in Chapter 2, there are several small things that the interagency 
coordinating office could do to help change the discourse around climate science policy and 
encourage more focus on public values. One recommendation is for CCSP/GCRP to begin 
making a distinction between the achievements of climate science writ large and those of the 
integration office itself. This would highlight the fact that the office is not just a passive element 
serving the agencies, but an active body charged with implementing the Global Change Research 
Act (GCRA). It is meant to help steer the climate science enterprise toward a specific set of goals 
outlined in the GCRA and in strategic plans. The distinction would also highlight the fact that 
there is an important difference between good science and good science with a demonstrable link 
to supporting public values. The interagency office could do more to represent itself as playing an 
important role in moving toward the latter. 
Discourse around this distinction could emerge in feedback to Congress, such as yearly 
budget reports, testimony, and in other informal channels of day to day interaction with both 
Congress and higher level executive offices such as OSTP and OMB. However, it is important to 
point out that this might carry with it significant political risks. The interagency office is in many 
ways beholden to the agencies which are participating mostly on their own terms, and have a 
                                                      
67 One interviewee recently informed me that an Obama Administration employee at OSTP has 
recently floated this idea, but received a very cold reception among agency leadership.  
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great deal of flexibility in how they choose to support interagency coordination. The mere 
suggestion that not all of climate science is necessarily in keeping with interagency goals could 
cause backlash. However, a strong and savvy leader of the interagency office could, when 
communicating with Congress, OSTP, and OMB, use this recommendation to show him/herself 
to be an important ally in demonstrating accountability and delivering better returns on science 
investments.  
Another recommendation, which I mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, is for the interagency 
office to draw more widely from programs within participating agencies. In particular they might 
focus stakeholder engagement efforts on programs that already have considerable capacity in this 
regard. CCSP stakeholder engagement events have been unfocused and inconsistent both in the 
groups they choose to engage, and in the content of that engagement (see also Appendix C, 
section 4). They have defined an enormous stakeholder group (essentially everyone), but have 
extremely limited resources with which to interact with that group. An alternative would be to 
consider avenues through which ongoing federal programs with extensive relationships to various 
stakeholder groups might inform research agendas and interagency strategy.  
A third potential scenario not listed in Table 6.1 would be for Congress to reconsider the 
Global Change Research Act, and reconsider the program’s priorities and scope. Although the 
primary locus of this change would be Congress, it would necessarily involve extensive 
consultation with various agencies, as well as outside groups. As with the initial passage of the 
GCRA, any reconsideration would involve a good chance of what Pielke (2000a, p. 14) termed a 
“nonsinister conspiracy,” whereby government agencies and other interests lobby for priorities 
that primarily support biophysical science organized around the prediction imperative.  However 
there have been small movements in recent years to re-write the legislation with a stronger focus 
on human dimensions and useful information. One draft of senate legislation (which was never 
formally introduced) included the following statement: 
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In order to more effectively meet the needs of decision makers, both the research agenda 
of the United States Global Change Research Program and its implementation should be 
informed by continuous feedback from users of information generated by the Program.68 
In general, that legislation made a variety of edits and additions to the original GCRA which 
stressed the need to work with potential users and tailor scientific efforts to their needs. Of 
course, this particular bill was ultimately unsuccessful, but it demonstrates some awareness in 
Congress of some of the issues facing the CCSP/GCRP. 
 The NRC’s (2009b) evaluation of the CCSP highlighted the CCSP’s lack of authority 
over agencies, its lack of funds, and the large transaction costs of interagency programming as 
major impediments to climate science. These issues have prompted some to advocate for 
consolidation of research capacity from across the various departments currently funding climate 
research (see, e.g. Schaefer et al., 2008). Whether such a shift would alleviate coordination 
problems is unclear.69 But it is important to recognize that the problems facing climate change 
science are not simply the result of bureaucracy, red tape, and interagency politics. They stem in 
large part from the culture of scientific disciplines that have traditionally conducted climate 
science research, and from the politics of transitioning from old models of science policy to new 
models. Unless a new organization can effectively recognize and deal with these kinds of 
problems, one should not expect consolidation to be helpful in addressing the public values 
failures of climate science. 
3. Further Research 
In conducting this research, I have taken an important first step in describing several 
prominent assumptions about climate science, and documenting their role in climate science 
policy implementation. Tacitly accepted ideas such as the linear model, rational choice, and the 
                                                      
68 This legislation was forwarded to me by a staffer, and does not appear to be publicly available. 
69 There is also an important question of what it would mean to remove significant research 
capacity from multiple departments, which ostensibly have very practical, mission-related reasons 
for funding research. 
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prediction imperative have important implications for the ways in which organizations such as the 
CCSP/GCRP, CAF, and NCCARF go about planning, funding, managing, and assessing the 
outcomes of research. But this has only been a first step, and there are many remaining questions 
deserving of further research. In particular, as I suggested in the conclusions of Chapter 4, science 
policy researchers need to examine new ideas about research practice—emerging science 
values—with the same critical view that I have just applied to ideas such as the linear model. 
How do concepts such as “end-to-end climate research,” “climate services,” and “stakeholder 
support,” take shape, and influence discourse and action on climate science policy and climate 
change? 
 In particular, based on my interviews and observations, the concepts of participatory 
research and social sciences present potentially fruitful and important subjects for investigation in 
the context of science policy implementation. Both ideas have been around for many years in the 
context of climate science, and there is a large and growing literature dealing with each. But as 
science policy discourse increasingly embraces these ideas about how to do climate science, there 
is a risk of substituting oversimplified and even misunderstood notions about scientific practice 
for public values. 
3.1 The role of social sciences in studying climate change.  
 In Chapter 2 I noted that NRC assessments of, and advice to, US climate science have 
frequently advocated for increased support of social science related to climate change. Better 
integration of natural and social sciences is also a common recommendation. This theme has 
clearly grown in its visibility, and its acceptance by the wider climate science community, even as 
budgets for social science research on climate change have decreased as a share of the overall 
interagency program in the last twenty years (NRC, 2009a). 
That the need for more and better integrated social science is gaining such prominence 
even while the underlying fiscal reality of science policy changes very little is itself an interesting 
avenue for further research. But there are a variety of other trends in discourse about social 
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science which are also worthy of focused investigation. I noticed in my interviews a tendency for 
natural scientists and science policy decision makers to conflate social sciences with other 
concepts. For example, some in the natural sciences view social science as synonymous with 
applied research, or even as a process of applying natural science research. In this view, a social 
scientist working on climate change is merely looking for ways of making natural science 
research useful. Of course, as with natural sciences, social science may be basic or applied. And it 
may have little to do with natural science research of any kind. There may be very particular 
circumstances in which involvement by very particular kinds of social scientists helps to apply 
research, but this has apparently led to an inaccurate extrapolation in the minds of many scientists 
and decision makers. 
Similar to that preconception is the idea that social science is primarily about 
communicating research results or working with stakeholders. I have sat in a variety of 
workshops and meetings in which individuals frustrated with the task of communicating about 
climate change turn to social scientists for advice, as though an economist or political scientist 
might have particular expertise related to, for example, communicating about sea level rise, or 
working in communities affected by drought. In reality, these are activities that a researcher in 
any discipline might find very challenging and daunting, or on the other hand quite useful and 
rewarding. The presence of a social scientist on a research team does not necessarily augment that 
team’s ability to fulfill the values that have become prominent in climate science policy 
discourse, but remain unsupported by the norms and organizational structures underlying that 
system. 
Rhetorical support for social science, combined with widespread misperceptions about its 
true nature, puts social scientists in an awkward position when it comes to participating in climate 
science and engaging with natural scientists. One frustrated researcher complained to me that 
“social scientists are being used as glue at the moment.” She felt that she was expected to fill a 
variety of roles—integrator, communicator, stakeholder supporter—that researchers in other 
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disciplines are not, simply because her research focuses on social systems, instead of natural 
systems.  
Further research on these problems might consist of a detailed scrutiny of how rhetoric 
around social sciences and climate change has evolved over time, and how it is shaping climate 
science policy. Also instructive would be a set of case studies examining the social, 
organizational, and policy contexts in which social sciences have been successfully integrated 
with natural sciences (which would of course require a careful definition of the word “success”). 
What was the contribution of social sciences in these cases? In what ways does the role of a social 
scientist conform with and depart from widespread assumptions and expectations? A further 
unpacking of the role of social scientists could be achieved through interviews with researchers 
from across the disciplinary spectrum and with science policy decision makers. 
3.2 Participatory Research and Science Policy 
 The NRC (2009a) has recognized a need for more and better coordinated “decision 
support experiments” in order to improve practice related to engaging with user communities and 
providing useful climate information. There are many examples of climate science using various 
models of engagement and participation (see e.g. Jacobs et al., 2005; SPARC, 2005; Nelson et al., 
2009a; Nelson et al., 2009b; NRC, 2009a; Buizer et al., 2010), but as I pointed out in Chapter 4, 
research on how these efforts can be most effective could be useful to both scientists and science 
policy decision makers.  
 There are three general problems that deserve some attention. The first, clearly identified 
by the NRC (2009a), is to identify how scientists can effectively use participatory methods to 
support decision making. The second is to look for ways that managers and science policy 
organizations can incentivize this kind of research, and move toward models of funding and 
evaluation in which this kind of activity is rewarded. The third problem is focused on how 
decision making communities can and should participate in priority setting and strategic planning 
in science policy itself. There is an important distinction to be made between funding 
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participatory research, and using participatory methods as part of deciding what to fund. The 
organizations I have examined here explicitly embrace both of these ideas, but are not always 
clear about this distinction between the two, and the particular challenges presented by each one. 
 The CCSP and NCCARF both demonstrate the potential drawbacks of somewhat blindly 
embracing the idea of engaging with stakeholders without adequate resources or a coherent 
strategy. Each organization has mandate to serve an enormous array of communities and sectors, 
but neither has clearly defined and realistic goals for doing so on such limited budgets. In the case 
of the CCSP, many of its efforts to include stakeholders in science policy deliberation have been 
organized around single public events, some of which lasted no longer than a couple of hours. 
These events were planned in haste, without a longer-term strategy for maintaining interaction 
with those who become involved. This was due, at least in part, to political pressure on the 
CCSP/GCRP to demonstrate progress in this area despite time and resource constraints. This 
highlights the fact that organizations must undertake activities that, from a cynical point of view, 
“check the box” of public participation. One question worth investigating the extent to which it is 
possible for organizations working in these kinds of circumstances to get meaningful results from 
such limited activities. 
 As I mentioned briefly in Chapter 4, there is considerable experience with public 
participation outside of climate science (e.g. Rowe and Frewer, 2000, 2004, 2005). In particular, 
there are many cases from the areas of technology assessment (e.g. Guston, 1999; Guston and 
Sarewitz, 2006), risk assessment (e.g. Slovic, 1993; NRC, 1996; De Marchi, 2003), and 
environmental regulation (e.g. Jasanoff, 1990; Fine and Owen, 2005) that could inform both 
research on, and practice in participatory climate science. 
4. Engagement and Outreach  
 It would seem hypocritical to conclude this dissertation, focused as it is on successes and 
failures to generate useful information, without an account of my own efforts in this regard. As 
stated in Chapter 1, this research is aimed at providing practical ideas and observations that can 
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help with the general challenge of managing science for desired outcomes. There are already 
numerous ongoing and potential interactions that seem promising (see Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2 
Ongoing and expected impacts and outreach from research in this dissertation. 
Policy Domain Impacts and Outreach 
US Science Policy CSPO program manager “support group” 
SPARC Handbook, and planned PVM handbook. 
Australian Adaptation Research Engaging with CAF researchers and managers on science policy 
frameworks. 
Potential for implementing RSD and PVM as part of CAF program 
evaluation. 
Climate Modeling Community New papers by climate modelers and philosophers responding to and 
building on Chapter 5. 
 
In the context of US science policy, the Science Policy Assessment and Research on 
Climate (SPARC)70 project has produced a “Handbook for Decision Makers” (of which I am a 
co-author) synthesizing findings from case study research on science policy using the Reconciling 
Supply and Demand framework. The handbook, launched in 2010, is one part of a broader 
“attempt to build a critical mass of practitioners taking a creative approach to reconciling supply 
and demand” (Dilling et al., 2010, p. 18). A few exploratory meetings of science managers from a 
broad array of federal entities (e.g. National Institutes of Health; NASA; Homeland Security; the 
National Science Foundation) have already shown the potential value of sharing experiences and 
best practices across these domains of science policy. A similar synthesis of findings from PVM 
case studies is also planned. 
I am currently in discussions with colleagues in CAF about ways of incorporating PVM 
and RSD into their program evaluation. This is part of a broader set of interactions resulting from 
work of the Public Value Mapping project at the Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes 
                                                      
70 http://cstpr.colorado.edu/sparc/, accessed October, 2010. 
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and the University of Georgia.71 International bodies such as the Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD), national level science policy groups from around the 
world (e.g. Spain, South Africa, France, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal), and a variety 
of US federal agencies and departments have all shown interest in applying PVM to assess 
science policies (Sarewitz et al., in prep). 
Publication of chapter 5 in Environmental Science and Policy has already had an impact. 
My weblog article (Meyer, 2010) on the robustness framework and subsequent discussion has led 
one modeler who works with GCM ensembles to publish a paper offering one approach to 
evaluating model independence (Annan, in prep.). Several philosophers have also recently taken 
up the issue of climate model independence (personal communication, Andrew Hamilton). 
 
 
 The findings of this research, combined with ongoing and potential activities described 
above, suggest an evolving research agenda focused on improving science policy implementation 
through clarification of the links between knowledge advance and public values. This requires an 
empirical understanding of how science policy works, a framework for thinking through desired 
outcomes, and close interaction with science policy communities. 
 In presenting these findings, I seek a constructive and inclusive way forward for climate 
science and climate science policy. I have avoided laying blame for particular problems at the feet 
of any institution or group, as doing so would be an unfair oversimplification of the policy 
problem. Although I focus, for example in Chapter 3, on the responsibilities and opportunities for 
public officials to manage the politics of prediction, I do not suggest that they are solely to blame 
for those politics. It is important to remember that science policy decision makers in general are 
motivated, intelligent, passionate individuals who believe in the importance of what they do. The 
                                                      
71 http://www.cspo.org/projects/pvm.htm, accessed October, 2010. 
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goal of science policy research should be to engage with these individuals and the organizations 
implementing research in order to find realistic ways of better connecting science to public 
values. 
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APPENDIX B  
PREVIOUS PUBLICATION OF MATERIALS IN THIS VOLUME  
210 
This dissertation has, from the beginning, been planned as a series of self-
contained articles with a common theme. This appendix describes previous and ongoing 
publication and peer review activities associated with Chapters 2 and 4. 
Chapter 2, “Public Values Failures of Climate Science in the US,” is one of 
several case studies undertaken as part of the Public Value Mapping (PVM) project at the 
Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes at Arizona State University, and the 
University of Georgia.72 Those cases studies (including chapter 2 of this volume) are 
currently under review for inclusion in a special issue of Minerva. 
Chapter 4, “What Does it Mean When Climate Models Agree? A Case for 
Assessing Robustness Among General Circulation Models,” was published in 
Environmental Science and Policy in 2010.  
The two co-authors, Pirtle and Hamilton, and I have contributed equally to 
conceptual development, research, and writing of this paper. Zachary Pirtle is listed as the 
first author for professional considerations, as he will be continuing to work directly on 
further cases that make use of the robustness framework. Both Pirtle and Hamilton have 
given me their explicit permission to reproduce the paper here as Chapter 4. 
                                                      
72 http://www.cspo.org/projects/pvm.htm 
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APPENDIX C  
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INTERAGENCY CLIMATE SCIENCE  
212 
This appendix, taken from an earlier, longer version of Chapter 2, provides an in 
depth account of interagency climate science, with particular focus on the structure and 
function of the CCSP under the Bush Administration. The following sections include a 
brief history of interagency climate science, followed by descriptions and discussions of 
the its major components, drawing from program documents, external documents such as 
National Research Council (NRC) reports, and interviews I conducted with more than 50 
individuals associated with the Program. 
1. Interagency Climate Science: Brief History 
The now-dominant framing of climate science as the investigation of global 
processes with global consequences has emerged through a complex interaction of 
scientific, technological, and infrastructural advances (c.f. Zehr, 1994; Edwards, 2001; 
Miller, 2004a; Edwards, 2006; Lovbrand et al., 2009). Since 1978 the US has supported 
programs charged with coordinating and combining global-change-focused climate 
science activities among multiple federal agencies in order to maintain and advance 
science research, and generate policy-relevant information. For almost as long, outside 
evaluators have highlighted the failure of these programs to make significant progress on 
the latter task (Byerly Jr, 1989; Pielke, 2000a; NRC, 2005, 2007).73  
The charge to produce useful climate information became law in 1990 with the 
passage of the Global Change Research Act (GCRA), which initiated the interagency 
Global Change Research Program (GCRP). That program, still subject to the GCRA, is 
now known as the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP). An important part of the 
GCRA mandate is to “produce information readily usable by policymakers attempting to 
formulate effective strategies for preventing, mitigating, and adapting to the effects of 
                                                      
73 Pielke (2000a) documents various examples such criticism aimed at both the National 
Climate Program of 1978 and the GCRP. 
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global change.” The Program resulted from efforts by a broad community of individuals 
interested in maintaining a large integrated effort in global change research – one that 
spans multiple federal agencies and many national and international organizations.  
The structure of interagency global change research has changed in various ways 
since it was established by law in 1990, but the production of useful information remains 
a central goal of the Program (as expressed in formal documentation). In its strategic plan 
(CCSP, 2003, p.111), the CCSP aims to “match, coordinate, and extend resources 
developed through the research activities to the support of policy and adaptive 
management decisionmaking.”  
Since 1990, more than $25 billion has been spent on global change research as 
evidenced in the combined budgets submitted to Congress and OMB each year in a 
document called “Our Changing Planet.” Program administrators have established a 
lasting bureaucratic presence that helps to ensure significant financial support for a core 
set of climate science activities concerned primarily with characterizing, simulating, and 
generating predictions about complex systems. By that measure, global change research 
efforts have been very successful. The activities within the Program constitute sustained 
output of scientific results that have significantly advanced understanding of the global 
climate and related systems (NRC 2007). This observation, in light of the critiques 
mentioned above, highlights a fundamental reality of mobilizing science to solve social 
problems: advanced scientific understanding is not the only ingredient necessary for 
producing useful information outside the context of science. 
The CCSP came into existence on June 11, 2002, when President Bush delivered 
“The Rose Garden Speech”74 outlining his administration’s plan to address climate 
                                                      
74 This address, well-known and commonly referred to in this way by most members of 
the global change research community, is a significant and brief moment of guidance 
from the highest levels of the administration. Six years later, even as the CCSP began to 
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change (Bush, 2001). This plan promised new institutional approaches to the problem of 
climate change along with a redoubling of scientific efforts, with resources targeted at 
key areas of uncertainty and high scientific priority. Of course, the announcement 
occurred in the context of a large climate science research community already supported 
by almost $2 billion per year, and already very much embedded in a number of federal 
science agencies and other institutions throughout the government.  
The CCSP is in many ways simply a continuation of the GCRP, but there are a 
few notable changes. To begin with, the management structure has changed such that 
oversight of the Program is one level higher in the Executive branch hierarchy. So-called 
“Blue Box meetings” (see Figure A1) which take place at the level of Deputy Secretary, 
are meant to integrate the CCSP, the Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP), and 
other areas of the President’s agenda related to climate change. Such a shift has a 
symbolic effect, showing that the program is a higher priority than it has been in previous 
administrations, though further removing authority from those primarily responsible for 
its day-to-day implementation may be an unfortunate side effect.75
                                                      
look toward the future and a change of administration, this speech was still mentioned 
frequently at meetings and workshops. 
75 Though major decision making and priority setting takes place at the “Blue Box” level, 
strategic planning resides in the Subcommittee for Global Change Research, a group of 
managers from each participating agency and key groups within the Office of the 
President often simply referred to as the “Principals.” 
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Fig. A1. Hierarchy and Main Components of the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP 2003).
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The role of “lead agency,” filled by NSF in the 1990s, is now taken up by 
NOAA, with Jim Mahoney serving as Director from 2002 to 2005, and William Brennan 
succeeding him as Acting Director until the end of 2008.76 The true motivations for the 
shift in agency leadership are unclear,77 but given the mission of the new program, which 
emphasizes more heavily the application of climate information through decision support, 
it makes sense: of the four largest financial contributors to the program (NASA, NOAA, 
NSF, and DOE, respectively), NOAA clearly has the greatest experience in this area, 
through funding of programs such as the Tropical Ocean and Global Atmosphere 
(TOGA) program, the International Research Institute for Climate Prediction (IRI), and 
the Regional Integrated Sciences Assessment (RISA) program. 
Increased emphasis on real-world applications of climate science has brought 
with it questions about identity for the CCSP. Many within its ranks see the Program as 
primarily concerned with science, but its vision and mission suggest a process that 
extends far beyond the conduct of basic research. The CCSP would embrace decision 
support and communications as essential to the success of interagency climate science, 
but understandings of these concepts among people I interviewed varied widely. Even 
individuals who have undertaken or supported research integrated with decision support 
do not have a clear picture of how the CCSP can make this a more prominent part of US 
climate science. To achieve its purpose, the CCSP needs to influence agency budgets and 
decision making at a variety of levels, from the individuals who write calls for proposals 
to Executive and Congressional leadership. but often it can do little more than convene 
                                                      
76 Brennan was not confirmed in this role by the senate until Spring of 2008, and in 
November of 2008, he assumed the role of Acting Director of NOAA. 
77 In one interview (June, 2007), I was told that the decision came out of Vice President 
Dick Cheney’s energy task force meetings. There also appear to be varying 
interpretations of GCRP leadership during the 1990s – some seeing OSTP as the lead 
organization, and others NSF. 
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and coordinate among participating agencies. Below I describe the key components of the 
CCSP to illustrate these and other challenges. 
2. The Climate Change Science Program Office (CCSPO) 
A small, but important component of the landscape of interagency climate 
science is the office that, since the passage of the Global Change Research Act (GCRA) 
in 1990, has existed in order to coordinate, formulate, and carry out the strategic plan for 
US climate science. This office (currently known as the Climate Change Science 
Program Office [CCSPO])78 reports to Congress and other relevant bodies on progress 
made toward goals and objectives related to climate science, and may serve as an 
advocate, both for the climate science community, and for the President’s climate science 
agenda. In addition, the Office coordinates the production of reports and other products.  
The CCSPO operates at a variety of levels in its attempts to generate consensus 
on scientific priorities and communicate those priorities to the relevant political entities. 
It works directly with scientists and stakeholders to generate products, and to gather input 
for functions such as strategic planning; it convenes and staffs “Interagency Working 
Groups” (IWGs) made up of agency program managers who fund climate science 
research; and it interfaces with upper level management of participating agencies and key 
executive branch offices such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Though a climate change science 
network connecting agencies and other entities existed prior to the GCRA (Pielke 2000a), 
the CCSPO plays a strong role in maintaining and formalizing this network. 
                                                      
78 The structure and identity of interagency climate science coordination has changed in 
certain ways as different American presidents have assumed power and asserted their 
own agendas. However, there has been considerable continuity in the general purpose of 
the coordinating office, even if the language used to express that purpose and the means 
of achieving it have evolved. 
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The two most active elements of the CCSP are the Principals group and the 
Interagency Working Groups (IWGs). The Principals consists of a high level career 
representative (i.e. not a presidential appointee) from each agency, as well as someone 
from OSTP and OMB. The CCSP Director runs these meetings, which may involve 
securing agency approval of, or participation in, CCSP activities such as strategic 
planning, synthesis and assessment reports (SAPs), personnel issues, interactions with the 
National Academy of Sciences, or planning of workshops and other events. The CCSP 
convenes 12 different IWGs dealing with issues such as carbon cycle science, 
ecosystems, data and information, communications, and operations (see Figure A1 for a  
full list).  These groups consist of agency personnel, usually program managers, who 
meet periodically to develop science and programmatic priorities, contribute to CCSP 
planning activities, and share information about programs in their home agencies.  
Though its function is to manage science across agencies, the CCSPO has no real 
power over those agencies; its budget and its activities rely heavily on their cooperation 
and participation. As one interviewee put it, the CCSP is not exactly “the pointy end of 
the spear of US climate programs…. It’s a polite discussion.” Priorities exist only as 
recommendations, not authoritative mandates. Those making specific decisions about the 
science that gets funded with government money are employed directly by agencies, and 
are rarely if ever rewarded directly for participation in IWGs, or for compliance with the 
priorities of the CCSPO. Figure A1 gives an overview of the hierarchical structure of the 
interagency program, and Figure A2 shows a rough sketch of the funding and 
prioritization processes as they relate to the CCSP and climate science. 
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Fig. A2. Two Representations of Interagency Climate Science Dynamics. (a): transfers 
of, and negotiations (dashed) over, funding for climate science; (b): formal and informal 
(dashed) communication about research priorities for climate science policy. 
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3. The CCSP Strategic Plan 
The CCSP began a strategic planning process in early 2008 with the goal of 
having the elements of a new plan ready for the next presidential administration. The 
most recent plan was completed in 2003. Preparing this plan involved program managers 
from all participating agencies, as well as extensive public comment periods and 
workshops eliciting feedback from the science community and other stakeholders. The 
National Research Council (NRC) also reviewed it (NRC, 2004). The Plan represents a 
mix of agency and interest group values, not to mention the policy position of the 
President, whose Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) carefully scrutinized the 
activities of the CCSP during its first several years. The Plan, that is, results from a 
political process. But the Plan is also a resource for understanding the public values 
aspirations of interagency climate science, and the manner in which the CCSP has 
intended to support them. 
As alluded to above, another important change from the GCRP is the increased 
programmatic focus of the CCSP on issues related to the application of climate science 
knowledge, variously referred to as “decision support,” “human dimensions,” “impacts 
and adaptation,” or “applications.”79 The goal of generating climate information useful to 
policy makers and others is not new – it has been a part of the GCRP from the very 
beginning. However, the CCSP (2003) strategic plan emphasizes this element far more 
than had been the case in previous years.  
                                                      
79 These terms all have different meanings, of course, but, as pointed out by the NRC 
(2007), so far the CCSP has made little attempt to distinguish among them both in its 
structure and in its official documentation. By some accounts, this is due to the relative 
infancy of such programs compared with other areas of climate science, and to the 
absence of a recognizable, coherent, and focused research program in these areas. 
221 
Table A1 lists the main elements included in the Strategic Plan, and Figure A3 
gives a basic account of its internal logic. The vision and mission both indicate that to 
conduct scientific research following the traditional science values discussed earlier will 
not be enough to achieve broader societal goals.  The basic structure of the Plan 
prescribes four different “approaches” to be used in pursuit of goals, which ostensibly 
support the mission and vision of the program: 
 
However, as indicated in Figure A3, the Plan does not describe how achievement of the 
goals would actually support the mission and vision. Indeed each of the links in the 
structure is implicit, and taken for granted. Many involved with CCSP view goals one, 
two, and three as pertaining to “basic science” activities, with goals four and five 
constituting the more applied, or “decision support” work.80 As it happens, the 2003 Plan 
only ascribes the latter to goal five. In any case, all five of the goals are flexible and 
overlapping, and all are concerned with expanding knowledge, not with developing 
capacities to apply it in various decision making contexts.81 
                                                      
80 Indeed, the “Revised Research Plan,” released in May of 2008, seems to codify this 
understanding (CCSP 2008, p.16): “Substantive progress in CCSP Strategic Goals 1 
through 3 is a required component of progress in many areas associated with Goals 4 and 
5…” 
81 There is an important distinction to be made here: research on how to apply climate 
science effectively, though quite necessary, does not in and of itself generate sustained 
capacity in that regard. 
approaches ! goals ! mission ! vision 
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Fig. A3. Internal Logic of Interagency Climate Science Based on a Reading of the CCSP Strategic Plan (2003).
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Table A1. 
Major components of the CCSP Strategic Plan (2003) 
Vision 
A nation and the global community, empowered with the science based knowledge to manage 
the risks and opportunities of change in the climate and related environmental systems. 
Mission 
Facilitate the creation and application of knowledge of the Earth’s global environment through 
research, observations, decision support, and communication. 
Goals 
1. Improve knowledge of the Earth’s 
past and present climate and 
environment, including its natural 
variability and improve understanding of 
the causes of observed variability and 
change. 
2. Improve quantification of the forces 
bringing about changes in the Earth’s 
climate and related systems. 
3. Reduce uncertainty in projections of 
how the Earth’s climate and related 
systems may change in the future. 
4. Understand the sensitivity and 
adaptability of different natural and 
managed ecosystems and human systems 
to climate and related global changes.  
5. Explore the uses and identify the 
limits of evolving knowledge to manage 
risks and opportunities related to climate 
variability and change. 
Approaches 
1. Scientific Research: Plan, 
sponsor, and conduct 
research on changes in 
climate and related systems. 
2. Observations: Enhance 
observations and data 
management systems to 
generate a comprehensive set 
of variables needed for 
climate-related research. 
3. Decision Support: Develop 
improved science-based 
resources to aid in decision 
making. 
4. Communications: 
Communicate results to 
domestic and international 
scientific stakeholders, 
stressing openness and 
transparency. 
Research Areas 
Atmospheric 
Composition 
Climate Variability 
and Change 
Water Cycle 
Land-Use/Land-
Cover Change 
Carbon Cycle 
Ecosystems 
Human 
Contributions and 
Responses to 
Environmental 
Change 
 
The two elements of the Plan that indicate something beyond supporting research and 
expanding knowledge are the third and fourth approaches: Decision Support, and 
Communications. However, in the years since this plan was developed, as in the 1990s, 
the vast majority of resources devoted to climate science have gone to Research and 
Observations.  Based on a survey of CCSP agencies, the NRC (2007) estimates that 
resources devoted to human dimensions and decision support research in a typical year 
total between $20 million and $31 million (out of a total of $1.6-2 billion). The authors of 
that report also noted the conceptual ambiguity of those two activities, as expressed by 
CCSP documentation, and as understood in different agency programs. They point out 
that human dimensions research does not necessarily support decisions, and that decision 
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support activities of the CCSP are focused largely on finding uses for existing and 
emerging knowledge, rather than shaping research to meet identified needs. 
Decision support and communications may be crucial to the mission and vision of CCSP, 
but they are not necessary for achieving the five over-arching goals of the Strategic Plan. 
This yields a framework in which efforts to achieve identified goals may ignore 
completely the broader values that motivate global change research. 
 Another important element of the Plan is its list of “Criteria for Prioritization” 
(see Table A2). Aside from favoring the status quo (criterion 3), and reiterating the link 
between uncertainty reduction and decision support (criterion 2), this list does little to 
clarify the CCSP strategy. It is highly unlikely that any single research effort within the 
CCSP would satisfy all of these criteria, but the list is broad enough that anything 
currently underway at participating agencies will probably satisfy at least one or two. 
Thus, instead of providing concrete direction for those wishing to make funding decisions 
with CCSP priorities in mind, the Plan offers complete flexibility within the normal limits 
of science funding. Politically, this may be a convenient arrangement. And, if one accepts 
the linear model dictum, “knowledge equals progress,” it is entirely justifiable. As 
discussed later, however, the public values underlying interagency climate science are not 
well served by this type of flexibility and circularity. 
Table A2.  
CCSP Criteria for Prioritization (CCSP 2003, p.8) 
1. Scientific or technical quality 
2. Relevance to reducing uncertainties and improving decision support tools in 
priority areas. 
3. Track record of consistently good past performance and identified metrics for 
evaluating future progress. 
4. Cost and value 
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 In practice, as I discuss below, the List has had an imperceptible impact on the 
conduct of climate science policy, both within the participating agencies, and the various 
moving parts of the CCSP. 
4. Participation in the CCSP 
Agency participation is crucial to achieving the priorities and goals of the CCSP. Two 
ways of viewing agency participation in the CCSP – budget share and IWG participation 
– are depicted in Figure A4. A third way to view agency participation is to examine the 
CCSP’s yearly report to Congress, “Our Changing Planet,” 82  which summarizes 
highlights and achievements from each agency, as well as an appendix with budget 
information. Each of these perspectives on participation can be both revealing and 
misleading. For example, “Our Changing Planet” reports tend to give roughly equal 
attention to each agency, though their respective budget shares may vary by an order of 
magnitude. The CCSP website lists 179 unique individuals filling about 230 membership 
slots on the IWGs (i.e. many program managers are members in more than one IWG). 
However, that list is not even a rough approximation of actual IWG participation.83 Some 
groups are quite active, meeting often, and engaging most of their members. Others meet 
in person as few as two or three times a year, and may have only three or four members 
in attendance at those meetings.  
                                                      
82 For an online archive, visit http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/default.htm#ocp. 
83 Developing such a list is probably impossible. 
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Fig. A4. Snapshot of agency participation in the CCSP in FY 2008. Bars represent personnel officially assigned to interagency working groups, 
and the line shows agency budget share in $millions.
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Both the GCRA and the Strategic Plan specify a list of agencies that must 
participate, and at the upper levels of the decision making chain (“Blue Box,” and 
Principals, see Figure A1), agencies ensure that they have someone at the table. But 
substantive participation – getting those around the table to step in line with, and take 
ownership of interagency priorities – often requires concessions or compromises on the 
part of some agencies. Any new priority, or even a small shift in the balance of priorities, 
may entail a shift in resources as well. Without any formal authority over the agencies, 
the Director must resort to cajoling, coalition-building, inspiration, and other means of 
persuasion to make progress on particular issues, or attain funding for particular 
activities. 
Members of both the Principals group and the IWGs participate for different 
reasons. Some are interested in building new programs with their colleagues in other 
agencies, while others simply want to stay informed about the CCSP and programs in 
other agencies that interest them. Still others view themselves as CCSP stakeholders, and 
hope to get their interests recognized by the CCSP and people in other agencies. This is 
particularly common in agencies with smaller budget shares of the CCSP that conduct 
only small amounts of research, but to which climate change information may be very 
important. As one program manager said: 
The incentive for [us] as a small underfunded minority group, is that if we’re not 
at the table, they won’t take into account [our issues]…. Just participating and 
partnering has brought more money from NASA and DOE for issues that link to 
[our priorities]. (paraphrased to preserve anonymity) 
The quotation reveals one kind of motive for participation, but also an important 
underlying reality: simply specifying what constitutes climate science in something like 
the GCRA or a strategic plan will not make it happen; the activities of the CCSP – the 
issues receiving attention and priority – are determined in large part by personalities of 
those at the table.  
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Regardless of motive, IWG members do not receive additional compensation for 
time spent on IWG activities, nor any other form of recognition from their own agencies 
in return for their participation (though successful collaboration and budget influence 
may elevate the status of an agency program or program manager). With some initiative, 
IWGs can sometimes secure resources for workshops, or other small events, but most do 
not have designated funding for such things, and the CCSP does not provide money for 
targeted, collaborative research. 
The Strategic Plan presents the IWGs as key elements in both the identification 
and implementation of the priorities for climate science. As program managers with 
budget authority within their own agencies,84 IWG members are in an ideal position to 
translate the goals of interagency climate science into requests for proposals, funding 
decisions, and the general management of climate science. However, the circularity of 
this arrangement (specifying priorities that they themselves will carry out and 
subsequently report on) combined with a lack of authority and resources on the part of 
the CCSP, leaves little incentive for program managers to initiate anything beyond, or at 
odds with, the expectations of their home agencies. Thus, if asked to specify a priority for 
the coming year, the easiest answer for an IWG member would be whatever he or she had 
planned to fund anyway. Priorities identified by IWGs are usually broad enough to 
accommodate ongoing research already planned or under way at the various agencies 
around the table. One can always mold what one is already doing to match a new priority. 
As one program manager put it: 
We get asked every year how much money are we spending on ________, so, I’ll 
come back and say, well, do you want a large number or small? Because I can go 
                                                      
84 The Strategic Plan specifies that IWG participants should have budget authority within 
their own agencies. In practice this is not always the case. One IWG co-chair complained 
to me that he was the only person in the group with budget authority, making it quite 
difficult from them to implement new priorities, even if they wanted to. 
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through my proposals and there’s some of them that have some relevance … so 
do you want me to say “half of that’s _______ money?” If you want me to, sure, 
fine, I don’t’ care. If you want to say “none of it,” that’s ok too. (blanks inserted 
to preserve anonymity) 
This account of agency participation in the CCSP highlights structural issues and 
incentives that tend to discourage interagency climate science from moving in new 
directions. I should note, however, that this does not completely prevent such 
occurrences. As with other areas of public service, most individuals involved with 
climate science policy share a firm belief in the importance of their work. For some, this 
translates into a strong desire to continue what they have been doing, defending and 
expanding their budgets as best they can. For others, a dissatisfaction with the status quo 
may lead to a more entrepreneurial spirit, as they collaborate across boundaries and look 
for ways to try new approaches in spite of institutional norms and budget limitations. For 
some, staying ahead of the game is very rewarding. As one program manager in this mold 
told me: 
At some point, you have all these interacting things going on… and suddenly 
people take it, make a policy change, rearrange deck chairs, and co-opt.  So the point is, if 
you want to do something new and innovative, … you have to learn to work with existing 
structure to keep them moving in the direction that’s similar to the one you established 
when you were an outlier.  When it becomes mainstream … you have to keep pushing 
and pushing to find innovative ways of doing things. 
5. CCSP Products 
5.1 Budget Reports 
Almost every year since the establishment of the GCRP, the interagency 
coordinating office (known as the CCSPO since 2002) has submitted an “Our Changing 
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Planet” report to Congress.85 The contents and structure of this document have changed 
from one year to the next as the program, its political environment, leadership, and 
underlying structure have evolved. In general, however, the document has provided 
research highlights from the previous year, a sampling of plans for the coming year, and 
budget tables documenting resources allocated to climate science from each participating 
agency.  
In theory, such a series of reports would provide a valuable resource for 
determining the extent to which the CCSP has made progress toward its mission and 
vision, and the degree to which new priorities for climate science have been implemented 
through the budget process. In practice, however, one can find very little to demonstrate 
the influence of the CCSP in US climate science, or the impact of climate science on 
potential users. Instead, OCP amounts to an aggregation of agency activities, with 
selected research programs highlighted depending on the external political climate, or 
internal agency politics. For example, the first report to include an extensive chapter on 
decision support activities highlighting multiple examples, was submitted in the lead up 
to fiscal year 2006 (CCSP, 2006). This report was assembled as the Program came under 
increased pressure from Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the 
public to prove that it could meet the requirements of the GCRA, particularly with 
respect to support for decision making. However, this OCP report does not explain what 
role the CCSP had in actually stimulating any new activities in this area, or what it has 
done to encourage agencies to increase funding for existing decision support activities. In 
other words, a change in external dynamics led to a change in content for OCP, but there 
is no evidence that this came with substantive shifts in science funding. 
                                                      
85 To access these reports, visit http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/default.htm#ocp. 
231 
The budget tables in OCP further demonstrate the ambiguity of the CCSP’s role 
in advancing federal climate science. Each agency reports the funds it has allocated to 
CCSP based on its own internal programs. With no consistency across agency budget 
reporting, and no direct link between agency activities and CCSP priorities, it is virtually 
impossible to track overall change in climate science over time within the framework of 
values and priorities established by the CCSP. Beginning with its FY2006 report, the 
CCSP began to group agency budget allocations under particular CCSP goals.86 This 
affords one snapshot of how the Program has prioritized its funds over the last five years 
(Figure A5), but the ambiguity of the goals, as discussed in the previous section, subverts 
any attempt to monitor changes and priority setting in US climate science. The only 
major change visible in Figure A5 occurred in 2006, when Goal 1 surpassed the others in 
funding. But it is unclear what this means, and OCP reports do not provide any analysis 
to this end. 
                                                      
86 However, the allocation of research to particular goals was done by the agencies, so the 
process is “black-boxed” and most likely based on inconsistent decision criteria. 
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Fig. A5. Research funding allocated to CCSP goals as a proportion of the overall CCSP 
budget. The goals are listed in Table A1. Note that the overall budget includes both 
research and observations, which is why the five goals  to not add up to 100%. 
5.2 Synthesis and Assessment 
The GCRA, in addition to mandating an interagency research program, and 
yearly reports to Congress, requires that a national assessment of climate impacts in the 
US be produced every 4 years. However, this was only achieved once, and the report – 
released in late 2000 – received little attention.87 Under the direction of  Jim Mahoney, 
the CCSP has taken a different, and at times controversial approach. In keeping with the 
goal of prioritizing research to deliver results quickly, CCSP aimed to produce in the first 
two to four years of the Program 21 “synthesis and assessment products” (SAPs), 
focusing on “key uncertainty and decision making issues” (CCSP, 2003, p.8).  This 
                                                      
87 Several individuals involved noted that release of this document during the controversy 
surrounding the 2000 presidential election results was poorly timed. Once George W. 
Bush was sworn in, his administration had little incentive to embrace a product that bore 
the stamp of the Clinton administration, and so the document was marginalized.  
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resembles the approach taken by the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program 
(NAPAP), of which Mahoney was the Director from 1988 to 1991. 
At first the SAPs were not intended to replace the National Assessment 
requirement, which remains in force. However, the process experienced severe delays 
due to a politicized and lengthy review process required for each report. The CCSPO was 
consumed with the effort of getting the SAPs completed before the end of the Bush 
Administration. By the end of 2007 only four had been published, and the last five were 
released on January 16, 2009, a few days before President Obama was sworn in.88  
In the face of major delays, CCSP argued (in the end unsuccessfully) that the 
SAPs do indeed fulfill the National Assessment requirement of the GCRA. Criticism of 
this premise began early on. Both the NRC and the GAO raised concerns over the 
structure and content of the SAPs (NRC, 2004; GAO, 2005; NRC, 2005), and whether 
they would address adequately the main elements required by the GCRA.89 The GAO 
report, requested by Senators John Kerry and John McCain, concluded that the plan for 
the SAPs was in violation of the GCRA, both because of the timeline for their 
completion, and the fact that information contained in the reports dealing with separate 
scientific issues would not constitute useful policy advice. The CCSP re-scoped three of 
the SAPs in order to address this (CCSP, 2005), but in the end a court ruling required the 
CCSP to assemble a “Unified Synthesis Product,” which as of April 24, 2009, was still 
undergoing public comment. 
                                                      
88 For details on each SAP, see http://climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap-summary.php 
89 The assessment should: “(1) integrate, evaluate, and interpret research findings on 
climate change of the Global Change Research Program (implemented under the Global 
Change Research Plan) and scientific uncertainties associated with such findings; (2) 
analyze the effects of global change on the natural environment, human health and 
welfare, and other specified areas; and (3) analyze current trends in global change and 
project major trends for the next 25 to 100 years.” 
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There are two elements of the SAP controversy related to the delivery of useful 
information, and the fulfillment of public values by the CCSP. First, in an interview with 
the GAO, the CCSP Director noted that:  
considering the number of advancements in science and technology today 
compared with 1990, 4 years may not be enough time to complete a 
comprehensive assessment, such as that called for under the act. Further, over the 
past decade and a half, federally sponsored climate research has greatly 
expanded. … This has increased the burden of analyzing and synthesizing all of 
the research. 
The statement appears logical, but suggests an expectation that decision making 
processes should conform to already established norms of the scientific community, 
rather than the reverse. Secondly, the SAP process in general has treated scientific 
problems individually, without integrating across disciplines or issue areas to respond to 
specific decision making needs. This may be due to a lack of clear audience for the 
reports. It is also worth noting that the NAPAP program of the 1980s came under similar 
criticism for its failure to shape its assessments in response to decision making needs 
(Herrick, 2000). 
Delays have compromised the goal of delivering results quickly, and the goal of 
developing a responsive process. The CCSP strategic plan had originally intended that: 
research activities and the development of new synthesis and assessment  
products will evolve in partnership, as scientific research progresses  and as new 
questions related to policymaking, planning, and adaptive management arise. 
However, even on schedule, the SAPs are not well positioned to address specific policy 
and resource management decision contexts. Many of the reports are focused on 
uncertainties and other knowledge gaps identified by the science community. A count of 
public comments on all SAPs by Fall of 2008 shows that the review process has been 
dominated by government and academia. Some author teams took a more proactive 
approach to specifying an audience and engaging stakeholders in the writing process, but 
these efforts were not required by the CCSP, and so were not consistent across all reports. 
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As this appendix has shown, the interagency coordination and prioritization 
process is complex and convoluted. Despite the appearance of a carefully planned 
structure, federal climate science is neither centrally directed, nor is any particular entity 
in control of its definition. The makeup of climate science is a function of the interests, 
organizations, and disciplines that happen to be involved with the ongoing process of 
managing relationships among agencies, among branches of government, and with 
various members of the broader public. This dynamic plays out at different time scales, 
and at different levels of decision making.  
Judging from the changes in emphasis in OCP reports over the last five years, 
and the re-scoping of several SAPs to meet the demands of Congress, the CCSP has not 
been entirely immovable and unresponsive as an organization. However, such 
responsiveness is ad hoc, reactive rather than proactive, and in some cases, merely 
superficial. The Program lacks a concrete strategy for steering climate science and 
implementing priorities, and built-in flexibility and ambiguity of its strategic plan allows 
the CCSP to present itself as changing merely through its choice of what to highlight in 
the OCP reports. 
Many observers and participants in the CCSP, including the NRC on multiple 
occasions (2005, 2007, 2009b), and many of the people I interviewed, have pointed out 
that the CCSP promises more than it can deliver given its lack of carrot or stick with 
respect to the agencies. Even with greater authority, however, it is not at all clear what 
the CCSP is trying to deliver. However, through public value mapping, one can identify 
public values underlying the program – what the CCSP should be trying to deliver – and 
examine the extent to which those values have been pursued and fulfilled.  
 
